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Abstract 
In this study I investigate the significance of climate variability and extremes (and by 
analogy, climate change) for human security in an African context of multiple risks, 
shocks and stresses.  I consider the sociocultural dynamics of people’s responses to 
these diverse threats and their implications for climate adaptation.  The location is a 
poor hillside village in Uganda.  Its Gisu inhabitants rely on subsistence farming and 
are exposed to climate variability and extremes as well as acute land scarcity and 
environmental degradation.  I interviewed over 80 men and women in different 
structural positions and with different social identities.  
Destructive rainfall destroys food crops, erodes soil and triggers landslides.  
Analysing these impacts helps to build understanding of the possible context-specific 
consequences of climate change in East African highland communities.  Villagers’ 
ability to cope with and adapt to destructive rainfall is socially differentiated, with 
gender relations an important influence.  The impacts of destructive rainfall 
contribute to a complex cycle of human insecurity, which needs to be viewed as an 
integrated whole.  Hunger and poverty are at the core; but tensions, contestations and 
conflicts among differently-placed social actors are also prominent.  Some of these 
socially-constructed threats are associated with unequal power relations and 
maladaptive responses to deteriorating environmental and economic conditions.  The 
metaphor of ‘threat landscapes’ is useful for explaining differences and changes in 
individuals’ awareness of threats and the epistemic limitations of subjective 
accounts.   
Responses to climate and non-climate threats alike are shaped by cultural norms, 
values and traditions.  They can be undermined, as well as supported, by conjugal, 
kin and community relations and by governance institutions and actors.  
Sociocultural issues such as these should be at the centre of climate adaptation 
narratives because they are critical to adaptive capacity. 
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Introduction 
 
This is a study of the threats that the inhabitants of a small Ugandan community 
perceive around them and how they respond to those threats.  Through this enquiry I 
hope to be able to provide answers to this two-part research question; ‘How 
important are climate threats (and by analogy, climate change) to human security in a 
rural African context of multiple risks, shocks and stresses, and what do the socio-
cultural aspects of current threats and responses imply for climate adaptive 
capacity?’  
I started my research with a sharp focus on the social impacts of climate change and 
adaptation, but I soon became uncomfortable with this.  Two doubts nagged me.  
First, based on my experience working as a social development specialist in the 
international development ‘industry’, it seemed to me that there was a danger of the 
climate change discourse overshadowing fundamental development issues.  These 
misgivings grew during my first visit to Uganda to identify a suitable location for my 
study.  Talking to local government officials and villagers in Manafwa District it 
became clear that this was an area where weather shocks and stresses had serious 
negative impacts, but that it also suffered from widespread poverty and challenging 
environmental problems other than climatic ones.  How legitimate would it be for me 
to impose my narrow climate change focus on the people living there?   
As well as this ethical dilemma, an analytical problem bothered me; it would be 
pointless to consider the social effects of climate change without taking into account 
these other aspects of people’s situations (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010).  Many 
researchers have drawn attention to the fact that most poor Africans live in a context 
of multiple risks, stresses and underlying problems, all of which intersect and interact 
(Reid and Vogel, 2006; Yohe et al, 2007).  A burgeoning sub-genre of research is 
based on the premise that climatic factors need to be considered not in isolation but 
in interaction with the many other threats that confront people, including wider 
environmental change (Homer-Dixon, 1999; O’Brien, 2006; Reid and Vogel, 2006; 
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Thomas et al, 2007).  Rather than pursue a singular narrative of climate change, I 
decided not to assume a priori that climate impacts are the main problems facing 
individuals in my study location.   
That location is a Gisu village in the foothills of Mount Elgon, in Manafwa District 
in south-eastern Uganda.  Its inhabitants are poor, rely on subsistence farming for a 
large part of their livelihood and are exposed to climate variability and extremes. All 
over the developing world communities like this will bear the brunt of anthropogenic 
climate change (Boko et al, 2007; World Bank, 2010).  The village is also a rather 
dramatic, although not untypical, case of  an African community confronted by land 
scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1999), conflicts over land (Berry, 2002; Peters, 2004), 
environmental degradation and a range of governance pressures (Bryceson, 2002; 
Ellis, 2006).  Although the impacts of climate variability and extremes and people’s 
responses to them are context-specific, answering my research question will involve 
developing insights that may be extended beyond this location to other vulnerable 
communities in the region. It will also enable me to contribute to the important 
ongoing debate about the relationship between climate change adaptation and 
development (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010).   
But what is the relationship between current climate variability and extremes and 
anthropogenic climate change (which for the sake of brevity I just call ‘climate 
change’ from now on)?  This is both a theoretical and an empirical question relating 
to my study location.  African farmers have always had to deal with climate 
variability and extremes (Morton, 2007), usually with very little support from their 
governments.  How they deal with it now is a ‘solid basis’ for assessing how they 
will respond in future (Parry et al, 2007:31).  There are two different arguments 
available to support this view.  First, people’s responses to damaging climate impacts 
can be seen as proxies for their future responses to climate change (Thomas and 
Twyman, 2005:121).  Secondly, some researchers argue that current climate 
variability and extremes are part of a continuum of long-term climate change, so 
there is no real distinction between the current and future responses of private 
individuals (Washington et al, 2006; Cooper et al, 2008).   
Are current climate variability and extremes in Uganda a manifestation of climate 
change?  Like people in other highland areas in Uganda, the inhabitants of the Mount 
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Elgon foothills perceive an increase in the intensity and frequency of heavy rains, 
leading to more floods and landslides than used to be the case (Economic Policy 
Research Centre, 2001a:14; Republic of Uganda, 2007).  It is possible that 
perceptions of a deteriorating climate may be due to the denuding of slopes, which 
intensifies the impact of heavy rain.  On the other hand, Ugandans in general, not just 
in the highlands, believe that the climate has changed over the last 20 years or more 
(Republic of Uganda, 2007).  This is consistent with studies in other parts of sub-
Saharan Africa which also report perceptions of increasingly unpredictable rainfall 
patterns (Thomas et al, 2007; Conway, 2011).  
The authors of Uganda’s National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA) 
frequently imply that the reported increases in destructive rainfall are due to 
anthropogenic climate change (e.g. Republic of Uganda, 2007:4) and predict that the 
trend will intensify (Republic of Uganda, 2007:21).  Since the publication of the 
NAPA, government communications, the Ugandan press and some international 
NGOs have tended to blame all weather shocks on climate change (Magrath, 2008; 
Tenywa, 2009; Kirunda, 2009; and see Appendix 1).  Yet there appear to be no 
meteorological data to associate these shocks with climate change.  The East African 
climate is considerably under-researched.  One problem is the shortage of weather-
monitoring stations in working order.
1
  Another difficulty is that the region’s climate 
is naturally variable and as yet not well understood, being linked in complex ways to 
surface temperatures in the Indian Ocean and the El Niño Southern Oscillation 
(Conway, 2011).  Conway also points out that the few existing regional climate 
studies and scenarios have coarse resolutions and so do not take into account the 
effect of large surface features.  This is a notable shortcoming in relation to my study 
location because of its proximity to the vast mass of Mount Elgon.   
While there appears to be no meteorological evidence to link current weather shocks 
with climate change, some researchers do predict increasing rainfall in East Africa.  
Reviewing five different studies, Goulden (2006) found that they all projected 
significant rainfall increases during the main rainy seasons in 2070-2100, with some 
projecting increases as early as 2010.  In addition, some of the scenarios point to 
                                                 
1
 When I tried to obtain rainfall figures from Department of Meteorology officials in Kampala in June 
2009, I was told there were no working weather stations in the Mount Elgon area.  
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increased mean rainfall during the second rainy season in the middle and late 21
st
 
century.  McHugh (2005) predicts that higher annual and seasonal rainfall will be 
accompanied by an increase in the frequency of extremely wet periods.  The 
implications of these studies for Uganda are very serious, as it is reported to be one 
of the most vulnerable and-least prepared countries in the world in relation to climate 
change (Hepworth, 2010).   
Given the lack of meteorological evidence, in this thesis I use past and current 
weather shocks as an analogy for climate change rather than claiming that climate 
change is already happening.  I explain my analogical approach more fully in 
Chapter 1, where I also discuss my investigative framework, human security.  In 
Chapter 2 I take the reader on a ‘guided walk’ through my study location, pointing 
out features of interest, and in Chapter 3 I give an account of my methodology.   
Chapters 4 to 9 all address both parts of my main research question.  In Chapter 4, I 
investigate and contextualise the impacts of destructive rainfall on farming and 
consider some of the socio-cultural dynamics that influence coping and adaptation.  
Chapter 5 is about landslides, another threat arising from heavy rainfall.  Here I am 
particularly interested in gendered cultural norms, ideology and traditions in relation 
to villagers’ experiences of landslide crises, and I briefly discuss the behaviour of 
governance actors after a recent landslide disaster.   
The topic of Chapter 6, the cost of healthcare, marks a move away from concerns 
about weather shocks.  I frame healthcare charges as an abuse of unequal power 
relations that undermines people’s ability to cope with and adapt to a changing 
environmental and economic context.  In Chapter 7 I analyse the socio-cultural 
dynamics of conjugality in relation to household-level food insecurity and poverty 
and argue that the social status of married women may be in decline.  Chapter 8 
looks at theft and violence in the community; I frame crime and responses to it as 
types of maladaptation to worsening conditions.  The contestations over brideprice 
and defilement charges that I analyse in Chapter 9 are priorities for young unmarried 
men in the village and are another manifestation of conflicting interests within the 
community.   
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I then discuss the polarities of social relations, for instance between spouses, kin and 
neighbours (Chapter 10), and in particular how they affect people’s attempts to 
diversify their livelihood activities.  Finally, in Chapter 11 I synthesise insights from 
all these chapters and draw out the main contributions to knowledge.  Throughout, 
my interest is in individual, subjective experiences of human security, and how they 
react to it, as I look for insights that may be applicable to a climate change scenario. 
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Chapter 1: Developing an investigative framework 
 
1.1 Introduction 
How important are climate threats (and by analogy, climate change) to human 
security in a rural African context of multiple risks, shocks and stresses, and what do 
the sociocultural aspects of current threats and responses imply for climate adaptive 
capacity?  In this chapter I discuss the ideas, distinctions and debates that have 
influenced the development of this research question, which is essentially about the 
dialectic of threats and responses. I begin by discussing the concept of human 
security, which provides the investigative framework for the thesis (section 1.2).  
This leads to a consideration of the empirical literature about the threats that face 
rural Africans (section 1.3).  Both these sections address the first part of my research 
question.  In section 1.4, I switch to considering the ideas behind the second part of 
the question, which is about the ‘response’ side of the dialectic.  I discuss the concept 
of adaptive capacity together with other closely-related ideas from the climate 
change adaptation literature.  In section 1.5 I retain the focus on adaptive capacity, 
reviewing recent literature that illuminates important influences on people’s ability to 
adapt to climate change, notably resources and sociocultural factors.  I sum up the 
chapter in section 1.6, depicting the interrelationships among these ideas in a 
diagram. 
1.2 Human security: A holistic investigative framework 
For reasons I explained in the thesis’ Introduction, I am interested in the totality of 
the threats that the people in my study location perceive, including the relative 
salience of climate shocks and stresses.  That means I need an inclusive investigative 
framework.  In this section I explain why I have chosen the idea of human security as 
my framework and discuss its key features in relation to my study.   
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Human security is a normative concept which originated in the 1994 Human 
Development Report, where it was defined as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom 
from want’ (Alkire, 2003.)  However its roots go back to Sen’s capabilities approach 
to well-being (1993) and the concept of ‘human development’ through which the 
capabilities approach has been operationalised, notably in annual reports produced by 
the United Nations Development Programme (e.g. United Nations Development 
Programme, 2010).  Essentially, the distinction between human security and human 
development is one of emphasis.  Whilst human development is ‘concerned with 
progress‘, and is ‘upbeat’, human security is about the protection of ‘life, livelihoods 
and dignity’  from severe and widespread threats emanating from any source and 
over varied time-scales (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003:4).
2
  Such a 
defensive stance is appropriate for my study location, where a formidable 
combination of problems is damaging lives.  
The UN Commission on Human Security defines ‘dignity’ rather widely as matters 
pertaining to ‘love, culture and faith’ and self-determination (2003:4).  Alkire 
stresses that this is a minimalist ‘working definition’ (2003:2) in that it concerns only 
a subset of basic functionings.  It is clear, though, that even this subset is much 
broader than a livelihoods approach, although livelihoods are an important 
component of human security; this is the main reason why I have decided to use 
human security, rather than livelihoods, as a framework.   
Since the publication of the UN Commission on Human Security’s report in 2003, 
various scholars have considerably enriched human security thinking. For instance, 
Truong et al (2006) highlight how individuals’ social identities affect their 
experience of human insecurity.  This implies that the individual has to be the unit of 
analysis, because perceptions of human security may differ among individuals in the 
same community and even the same household due to their different structural 
positions and the cultural norms and values pertaining to them.  This is an important 
point, because alternative investigative frameworks, notably the livelihoods 
framework, often take households as the units of analysis, and unitary models of the 
                                                 
2
 According to this definition, a threat need not affect every member of a population in order to 
qualify as ‘widespread’.  For instance, idiosyncratic threats such as ill-health come into this category, 
provided they are common among a population (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003).   
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household can hide conflicts of interest among household members (Folbre, 1986; 
Quisumbung and Maluccio, 2003).   
It follows from this emphasis on diverse social identities that the epistemic basis of 
human security is individuals’ subjective perceptions (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 
2007; Gasper 2010).  However the social relations that link individuals together are 
critical to identity and well-being, so they also need to be included as referents 
(Truong et al, 2006; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:109; Gasper, 2010).  Analysing 
social relations as objects of enquiry requires a consideration of the ideologies that 
underpin them and the discourses through which these ideologies are articulated 
(Truong et al, 2006).  All these features of the framework are critical to my analysis 
in Chapters 4-10.   
While some scholars have criticised the concept of human security as vague (e.g. 
Paris, 2001), Gasper (2010:20) maintains that its holism enables it to function as a 
‘boundary object’ that pulls together disparate threats that would normally be 
considered separately.  With specific reference to sub-Saharan Africa, several 
authors demonstrate how a human security approach enables disparate issues to be 
addressed in a single framework.  For instance, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) argue 
that ‘in Africa, food security, conflict and gender inequalities may be the most 
pertinent insecurities’ (2007:242), and Ajakaiye and Dercon (2008:ii3) include issues 
such as the unsustainable exploitation and depletion of natural resources, 
environmental degradation, poverty, social inequality, HIV/AIDS and conflict as key 
aspects of human insecurity across the region.  Researchers involved in the Global 
Environmental Change and Human Security Project have developed a 
conceptualisation of human security which privileges environmental factors (e.g. 
O’Brien, 2006) and recently scholars have started to use human security thinking to 
analyse the impacts of climate change (e.g. Adger, 2010).  In particular, Gasper 
(2010) champions it as an alternative to the economistic discourse on climate change 
that has tended to predominate in policy circles (e.g. Stern, 2007).   
A human security framework can facilitate sophisticated social analysis of the 
impacts on individuals of diverse risks, stresses and problems.  The understanding of 
human security that I operationalise in this thesis incorporates both the mainstream 
conceptualisation (Human Security Commission, 2003) and the scholarly 
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elaborations that I have briefly discussed above.  I now consider some of the recent 
empirical literature analysing the problems that constitute human insecurity for rural 
Africans in a variety of locations.  
1.3 Sources of human insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa: Recent empirical 
literature  
Rural Africa is well-known as a high-risk environment (Ellis, 2006; Fafchamps, 
2003: Dercon, 2008).  Shocks and stresses arise both from disasters and from the 
vicissitudes of everyday life, and different research traditions have grown up that 
accentuate one or the other.  The disaster literature primarily deals with risk in 
connection with natural hazards affecting vulnerable populations (Blaikie et al, 1994; 
Wisner et al, 2004), although these authors do argue that poor people themselves 
tend not to distinguish between such out-of the-ordinary risks and the risks that 
permeate their daily lives.  Another strand of relevant research does not have a 
disaster focus but uses participatory methods to explore people in rural African 
communities’ perceptions of everyday threats (Smith et al, 2000; Quinn et al, 2003; 
Thomas et al, 2007; Tschakert, 2007; Getachew et al, 2008; Westerhoff and Smit, 
2009; Bunce et al, 2010).  Although some of these studies are framed in terms of 
climate change, what comes across very strongly is the multiplicity, intersectionality 
and everyday nature of the risks and stresses that characterise life for poor people 
across rural Africa.  I should point out that these studies are not framed in terms of 
human security; nevertheless, their findings help to build a picture of what drives 
human insecurity in the region.   
The overall picture is that climate variability and extremes are perceived as serious 
threats in quite different contexts throughout sub-Saharan Africa in interaction with 
many other shocks, stresses and underlying problems.  In some contexts climate 
variability and extremes seem to be a ‘modest’ contributor to food insecurity 
compared to political, economic and social forces (Westerhoff and Smit, 2009:327), 
while in others they are important sources of risk (Thomas et al, 2007). Study 
participants often prioritise the risk of ill-health above everything else (Smith et al, 
200; Thomas et al, 2007; Tschakert, 2007; Bunce et al, 2010).  Other non-climate 
priorities that recur from study to study include lack of access to basic services (e.g. 
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Smith et al, 2000: Quinn et al, 2003), income poverty and food insecurity (e.g. 
Tschakert, 2007).  In general, the findings resonate with disaster vulnerability 
assessments which often find that poor people themselves prioritise similar day-to-
day problems rather than the disasters that external agencies are concerned about 
(Cannon, 2008; Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010).  Understanding how these 
ordinary risks and stresses compare and interact with climate change risks over time 
has been identified as a critical research imperative (Yamin et al, 2005), and my 
study is in part a response to this challenge.  
An interesting characteristic of the above studies is that the concepts of ‘risk’ and 
‘stress’ tend to be conflated, along with underlying structural problems. Smith et al 
(2000) comment on the difficulty of distinguishing between ‘risks’ and more general 
ideas such as ‘worries’ or ‘concerns’ when conducting research in the field, 
remarking that their study participants, pastoralists in Ethiopia and Kenya, made no 
such distinctions. Similarly Tschakert (2007) uses the terms ‘concern’, ‘worry’, 
‘stress’, ‘stressor’, ‘hazard’, and ‘threat’ interchangeably, although she does not 
comment on this in her article. Quinn et al (2003) write that they deliberately 
avoided introducing the idea of ‘risk’ in interviews and asked about ‘problems’ 
instead, although again they do not explain why they made that choice; in their 
analysis they conflate risks, stresses and problems.   
This blurring of distinctions is significant for my own study.  As I explain in Chapter 
3, I began my own research by enquiring about risk; in other words events that, if 
they happened, would result in damage or loss of some kind (Thomas et al, 2007).  
Renn (1992) writes of a ‘spectrum of thinking’, with ideas of risk as objectively 
measurable at one end and as pure social or cultural constructions at the other.  My 
own epistemological stance falls between these two extremes.  I take the view that 
risks have an undeniable objective reality in contexts such as my study location, but 
that how they are experienced and perceived may depend on social, economic and 
cultural factors; in other words, they are socially constructed.
3
  Soon after I began my 
fieldwork I decided to broaden my enquiry to include current stresses and problems 
as well as risks.  I agree with Smith et al (2000:1956) that academic preoccupations 
                                                 
3
 I discuss my epistemological position more generally in Chapter Three. 
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with conceptual distinctions should take second place to reporting people’s own 
perceptions: the relaxed attitudes of the researchers I cite above to matters of 
temporality and causality also encouraged me in my decision.  My use of the term 
‘threat’ covers perceived risks, current stresses (that is, long-term pressures such as 
chronic income poverty) and underlying problems. 
Several African studies show that perceptions of threats to well-being are a matter of 
individual perspective associated with social position and identity, and gender in 
particular emerges as an axis of difference in several studies.  For instance, Quinn et 
al (2003) found that women tended to rate problems associated with social and 
human capital more highly than men, while men were more concerned about natural 
capital issues.  Tschakert (2007), who carried out gender-disaggregated participatory 
risk-ranking with men and women farmers in Senegal, found gender differences in 
priorities and perceptions, but it is hard to discern any pattern and little interpretation 
is offered.  Thomas et al (2007), who were researching climate perceptions of 
climate, found a clear gender difference in the type of risk perceived.  More women 
than men saw heavy rain as a distinct risk, and conversely, fewer women than men 
recognised drought as a distinct risk, which they attribute to the requirements of 
gender-specific livelihood activities.  Similarly, a study of risk perception among 
pastoralists in Ethiopia (Getachew et al, 2008) found differences based on gendered 
roles and responsibilities, in that men were more concerned with livestock prices and 
women with food availability.   
Life-stage also shapes rural Africans’ perceptions of threat.  For instance Tschakert 
(2007) found that young men in her Senegalese study location prioritise the lack of 
electricity in the village because of their consequent vulnerability to attack when they 
conduct night-time security patrols.  In the same village, young men and women 
alike see the lack of training and employment opportunities as a threat to their future 
livelihoods.  Young male pastoralists in Ethiopia, on the other hand, prioritise land 
scarcity (Getachew et al, 2008).  Turning now to the influence of wealth status on 
perceptions of threat, Smith et al (2000) report differences among study participants 
across three wealth terciles, connected to poor people’s vulnerability to cattle raids 
and the ability of wealthier pastoralists to live in healthier environments.  Taken 
together, these studies indicate some of the most significant axes of social identity 
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and structural position in relation to threat perceptions in my study location, and their 
findings inform my sampling strategy (Chapter 3).   
I have discussed the concept of human security and empirical evidence indicating 
that climate-related threats are not necessarily the main concerns of rural Africans 
and that people’s perceptions of what threatens them are to some extent a matter of 
individual perspective.  This and the previous section have helped me to ground the 
first part of my research question ‘How important are climate threats (and by 
analogy, climate change) to human security in a rural African context of multiple 
risks, shocks and stresses?’  I now move on to deconstruct the second part of my 
research question: ‘What do the sociocultural aspects of current threats and responses 
imply for climate adaptive capacity?’ by discussing a family of concepts from the 
climate change adaptation literature.  
1.4 Climate adaptive capacity and related concepts 
The idea of climate adaptive capacity is one of the conceptual nodes of my thesis.  
However, before I discuss it I first need to explain the concept of climate adaptation.  
I also briefly discuss a relatively new addition to this nexus of ideas, climate 
maladaptation, a concept to which I also refer in later chapters.   
Climate adaptation   
I begin, then, with the concept of adaptation to climate change.  Until recently the 
literature has tended to concentrate on large-scale technical adaptation strategies to 
the detriment of other types of response (Pelling and High, 2005; Tschakert, 2007).  
My own interest is with micro-level private adaptations, because African 
smallholders already have to respond to climate risk with little or no support from 
governments or aid agencies and this situation seems unlikely to change 
significantly.  There are various competing definitions of climate adaptation, and this 
is one of the most straightforward: ‘the ability …to respond successfully to climate 
variability and change’ (Adger et al, 2007:727).  The core idea is that adaptation 
reduces long-term vulnerability (Thomas et al, 2005; Ziervogel et al, 2006; Morton, 
2007; Vincent, 2007), and this is the main distinction between adaptation and coping 
behaviour.  Researchers working on food security, livelihoods and climate change 
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have found that attempts to cope with shocks after the event may exacerbate long-
term vulnerability; for example the distress sale of productive assets to tide a 
household over a famine (Corbett, 1988).  However, the distinction between coping 
and adaptation on the ground is not always obvious, and some authors see coping as 
a component of, or a stage towards, adaptation (Yohe and Tol 2002; Ebi et al, 2006; 
Eriksen et al, 2005; Morton, 2007; Agrawal and Perrin, 2008).  Several authors make 
the point that behaviour can only be defined as adaptation if it is motivated by an 
explicit awareness that the climate is changing (Smit and Pilifosova, 2001; Füssell 
and Klein, 2006; Thomas et al, 2007; Tschakert, 2007).  However Thomas et al 
(2007:303) argue that such awareness may be experiential rather than scientific.  
Recent years have seen several studies investigating how African smallholders 
respond to interlocking threats, including current climate threats, framed as 
contributions to literature on climate change adaptation (Eriksen et al, 2005; Roncoli, 
2006; Thomas et al, 2007; Bryan et al, 2009; Goulden et al, 2009).  The following 
have been identified as types of adaptation activity in rural Africa:  adjustments to 
farming; seeking off-farm and non-farm sources of income in the immediate 
location; the establishment of income generation projects; and selling labour, 
including urban migration (Boko et al, 2007:452).  All these activities fall under the 
heading of ‘livelihood diversification’, the process by which households or 
individuals increase the range of productive activities they engage in (Ellis, 2000), 
and some authors (Bryceson, 2002; Sabates-Wheeler et al, 2008) have challenged the 
tendency to frame all diversification in sub-Saharan Africa as responses to climate 
change.  So is the climate change adaptation literature simply putting new labels on 
old bottles?   
Bryceson (2002) argues that the search for non-farm livelihood activities was 
initiated decades ago by economic liberalisation policies and structural adjustment.  
Ellis (2000) and Fafchamps (2003) have pointed out that livelihood diversification 
can serve many functions, depending on the context.  It can be a coping strategy, a 
form of risk management, a way of exploiting new opportunities or an adaptation to 
changed conditions.  For de facto female household heads in the area where my study 
is set, diversification is often the product of desperation (Dolan, 2004).  Livelihood 
diversification is an example of how African smallholders tend to employ generic 
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strategies in response to combinations of livelihood threats rather than addressing 
them separately (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Reid and Vogel 2006; Smit and Wandel, 
2006; Ziervogel et al, 2006; O’Brien et al, 2009).  Empirically, it is often impossible 
to disentangle people’s adaptive responses to climate variability and extremes from 
their adaptations to other threats to their livelihoods.  Does this matter?  Drawing on 
examples from southern Africa and Canada, Thomas and Twyman (2005:121) argue 
that there is nothing ‘special’ about adaptation to climate change compared to 
adaptation to other types of change, so it may be futile to try to separate them out.  
Maladaptation 
The concept of climate maladaptation has only recently been added to the analytical 
tool-box.  Barnett and O’Neill (2010: 211) define maladaptation as ‘action taken …to 
avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change that impacts adversely on, or 
increases the vulnerability of other systems, sectors or social groups’.  Although they 
do not use this particular term, other researchers have pointed out that community or 
household level responses to shocks, stresses and risks may in fact heighten some 
individuals’ vulnerability (Leichenko and O’Brien, 2005; Thomas and Twyman, 
2005; McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008).  The above definition, then, could usefully be 
extended to include adverse impacts on other individuals, and this is how I use it in 
the thesis.   
Adaptive capacity  
The idea of adaptive capacity has antecedents in other knowledge domains.  For 
instance there is Homer-Dixon’s notion of ‘social ingenuity’: the ability to respond to 
interlocking environmental and social changes (1999).  The capacity or lack of 
capacity to adapt to climate change is generally understood as an important 
component of climate vulnerability. For instance, a definition commonly used in the 
literature sees adaptive capacity as one of three components of climate vulnerability, 
the others being exposure and sensitivity to climatic hazards (McCarthy et al, 2001).  
Proponents of the social vulnerability approach to climate change (e.g. Kelly and 
Adger, 2000) privilege adaptive capacity in the mix.  Climate change researchers 
have sought to measure adaptive capacity at the national level (Alberini et al, 2006; 
Yohe and Tol, 2002), but the idea is also applied to small communities, households 
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or individuals (e.g. Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Tschakert, 2007), and this is the level 
at which I study it here.   
1.5 What shapes adaptive capacity? 
In this section I look at the climate change adaptation literature for insights into the 
factors that influence adaptive capacity.  Adaptive capacity is often defined in terms 
of resources, including information and social capital as well as physical and 
financial assets.  The concept of social vulnerability, initially developed by Blaikie et 
al (1994) foregrounds poverty, social marginalisation and discrimination as 
constraints on people’s climate adaptive capacity (Kelly and Adger, 2000), which is 
socially differentiated at the individual level as well as being dependent on broad 
socioeconomic and political patterns (Few, 2007).   
In general, adaptive capacity in sub-Saharan Africa is said to be low because of the 
widespread extreme poverty, frequent natural disasters and structural problems at 
various levels (Boko et al, 2007:453).  There is certainly plenty of evidence showing 
that a lack of financial resources constrains the adaptive capacity of poor individuals 
and households.  For instance, for the poorest farmers in two study sites in South 
Africa and Ethiopia, even slight increases in wealth would improve their ability to 
adapt (Bryan et al, 2009).  Thomas et al (2005) found that in South Africa and 
Mozambique only farmers with surplus cash could experiment and innovate, for 
instance by trying out short maize varieties to protect against crop loss from erratic 
rainfall.  Ziervogel et al (2006), on the other hand, found simple adjustments to 
farming methods such as a change in planting dates to be a cost-free way of 
protecting against crop loss due to rainfall variability.  In fact poor households in 
their South African study location were more likely than better-off farmers to use 
such safeguards because they had more to lose if they did not.  This shows that even 
resource-poor farmers have some adaptive capacity.   
In recent years researchers have reacted against what they see as the deterministic 
equation of adaptive capacity with resources (e.g. Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Smit 
and Wandel, 2006; Burch and Robinson, 2007).  They argue for the importance of 
individual agency, ‘the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them’ (Kabeer, 
1999:3).  Thomas and Twyman (2005) emphasise poor people’s resourcefulness in 
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the face of climate change in order to counter what they see as a demeaning tendency 
to cast poor people as hapless victims.  Others temper an acknowledgement of poor 
people’s ingenuity with recognition of the harsh realities and negative historic 
legacies they have to contend with.  For instance, for small-scale farmers in Senegal 
the Sahelian drought period between the 1960s and the late 1990s has given rise to an 
inventiveness that may support adaptation to future climate stress, while at the same 
time farmers’ adaptive capacity has been badly undermined by problems such as 
poor health and inadequate infrastructure (Tschakert, 2007).   
A focus on agency represents a welcome move away from material determinism, but 
much more work needs to be done to build an understanding of the factors apart from 
resources that underlie adaptive capacity and the adaptation choices that people 
make.  In recent papers (e.g. Burch and Robinson, 2007; McLaughlin and Dietz, 
2008; Adger et al, 2009; Moser, 2009) authors have privileged different influences, 
as well as sometimes framing the same influences in different ways, so that it is hard 
to provide a concise summary of the debate.  In general terms, though, climate 
adaptation behaviour is said to be heavily influenced by sociocultural characteristics 
manifesting through governance and social institutions; they set the scene in which 
adaptation agency is enacted.  Next, I briefly discuss three broad categories of 
sociocultural factors that have recently emerged as critical to adaptation; micro-level 
social relations, cultural identity, norms and values, and lastly governance 
institutions.  
Micro-level social relations 
In considering this category of influences I look first at evidence that intra-household 
gender relations influence adaptation.  Then I look at evidence on the importance of 
social bonds and networks.  
Intra-household gender relations  
Some studies of climate adaptation are gender-blind, some treat gender as a social 
category (e.g. Deressa et al, 2009), and a few explore the ways in which gendered 
relations between men and women, both as groups and as individuals, shape 
adaptation choices, implementation and outcomes.  Gender relations are central to 
African smallholder livelihoods (Francis, 2000; Morton, 2007:19680), and 
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Whitehead and Kabeer (2001) draw attention to the paradox that, despite African 
women’s crucial role in production, intra-household gender relations are shot through 
with inequalities which are often taken for granted by study participants and 
researchers alike.  In this thesis I use Sen’s cooperative conflict model of households 
(1990) to conceptualise conjugal relations in my study community.  As its title 
suggests, the model is premised on the idea that intra-household relationships are 
characterised by both cooperation and conflict. The outcomes of explicit and implicit 
bargaining are influenced by three factors; each spouse’s breakdown position, that is 
his or her degree of vulnerability should the marriage fail; his or her perceived 
interests; and his or her perceived contributions to the household, which may differ 
from what they actually contribute.   
Two studies of climate adaptation in Africa are unusual in that they pay special 
attention to how conjugal relations shape adaptation.  First, a study of smallholders’ 
responses to climate stress in Kenya and Tanzania (Eriksen et al, 2005) explores how 
gender norms restrict non-farm livelihood options for married women.  
Diversification at the household level is accompanied by the specialisation of 
individual household members.  Married women are excluded from profitable 
activities because of local taboos and their heavy domestic responsibilities.  Instead, 
they tend to pursue activities such as rearing chickens, which although not very 
profitable can be done at home and which women can control independently of their 
husbands.  These findings reflect many studies in the gender and development 
tradition (e.g. Vaughan, 1987; Whitehead and Kabeer, 2001:13; Dolan, 2004).  The 
second study I want to comment on is Carr (2008).  Based on research in central 
Ghana, Carr (2008) argues that male household heads adopt certain household 
livelihood strategies because they reinforce existing gender inequalities concerning 
the control of land, even though they are suboptimal in terms of household income.  
He labels such strategies ‘socially sustainable’ because they are based on the gender 
status quo. 
Both Carr (2008) and Eriksen et al (2005) show that livelihood diversification may 
enhance security at the household level while at the same time damaging the interests 
of individual married women (Ellis, 2000).  They paint a rather gloomy picture of the 
effects of adaptation on gender relations and married women’s status.  An earlier 
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study of smallholders in a drought-affected area of Burkina Faso, on the other hand, 
indicates that married women’s participation in coping strategies can lead to an 
improvement in their status in the household (Roncoli et al, 2001:128).  In general, 
culturally-specific conjugal relations affect both adaptation choices and their 
outcomes.   
These articles are mainly concerned with male-headed households, but the situation 
of de facto female household heads in relation to adaptation also deserves attention.  
In East Africa, such women are often characterised as mere caretakers of their 
husbands’ farms because they have no decision-making power over land use (e.g. 
Francis, 2000), although Chant (2007) has pointed out that there is considerable 
variation in this particular social group.  In keeping with Chant’s point, a study of 
climate vulnerability in South Africa did not find that the gender of the household 
head was significant because of the many cross-cutting factors involved (Vincent, 
2007); instead of deploying the gender of the household head as a variable, the 
author recommends an enquiry into gendered vulnerabilities among household 
members.   
Social bonds and networks 
Heald (1998) vividly describes the dense web of social interactions that make up a 
Gisu community such as the one featured in this thesis and in general kin relations 
and other social bonds and networks have long been recognised as crucial elements 
of African livelihood strategies.  In many African societies both men and women 
deliberately develop and maintain these links as a form of insurance (Ellis, 2000; 
Dercon, 2005).  The importance of social networks in supporting coping and 
adaptation is also well recognised (e.g. Boko et al, 2007:456), and several empirical 
studies conducted in contexts of climate stress in Africa illustrate the very practical 
benefits they can bring in this context (e.g. Roncoli et al, 2001; Thomas et al, 2005; 
Roncoli, 2006; Getachew et al, 2008; Goulden et al, 2009).  On the other hand, 
geographically compact social networks have obvious limitations in situations of 
covariate climate risk such as drought (Dercon, 2005; Getachew et al, 2008).  
Moreover the poorest households and households headed by women tend to have less 
access than others to social bonds that could facilitate coping and adaptation 
(Cleaver, 2005; Goulden et al, 2009).  
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Cultural identity, norms and values  
Recently, a few climate adaptation researchers have turned their attention to the role 
that cultural identity, norms and values play in adaptation choices.  For instance, 
Pelling argues that successful adaptation necessitates changes to cultural norms and 
routine behaviour (2011:35), while Ensor and Berger highlight the ambiguity of 
cultural norms and values in that they can play both positive and negative roles in 
relation to adaptation (2009a:228).  Adger et al (2009) focus on how places and 
environments become imbued with symbolic meaning for the people who live in 
them, and how this might set psychological limits on adaptation.  Empirical studies 
exploring cultural influences on adaptation are, as yet, rare, as Nielsen and Reenberg 
(2010:142) point out at the start of their fascinating paper.  They analyse how 
culturally-specific views of ‘the good life’ as well as historical processes have led 
two ethnic groups living in the same Sahelian village to take different livelihood 
paths in a context of drought and economic pressures.  Because of their cultural self-
image, the Fulbe have turned their backs on the main adaptive strategies practiced by 
the Rimaiibe, whom they regard as inferior.  While Rimaiibe married women are 
active in independent income generation, the Fulbe’s isolated way of life in the bush 
prevents Fulbe women from being so.  Nielsen and Reenberg suggest this is one 
reason why Fulbe men prefer to follow a traditional life in the bush rather than 
moving to towns where they would have wider range of adaptation options, as they 
deplore the greater independence of Rimaiibe women compared to their own wives.  
In consequence of these differences, the Rimaiibe, who used to be slaves to the 
Fulbe, are now better-adapted to local conditions and exceed their former masters in 
income and assets.  Nielsen and Reenberg make a bold and possibly controversial 
argument when they state that livelihood diversification in this particular village ‘is 
determined by culture’ (2010: 150).  While this may be going too far, it is clear that 
culture is a strong influence on the forms that adaptation takes in particular contexts.  
Reponses to threat have to be culturally imagined, whether as incremental changes to 
the old way of life or abrupt disjunctures.  
Local governance institutions 
Moser (2009) likens governance to a ‘fulcrum’ for the ‘levers’ of adaptation 
strategies; if the fulcrum is weak, the action of the levers is impaired.  My interest is 
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in the part that local governance institutions and actors play in adaptation practices, 
another area as yet under-researched (Boko et al, 2007:452).  What evidence there is 
presents a mixed picture.  Goulden et al (2009) found that micro-level governance 
institutions exercised both positive and negative influence on the ability of villagers 
in their three study sites in Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa to implement 
adaptive strategies. Negative influences arose, for instance, from weak government 
agricultural extension programmes, the limited availability of emergency aid and 
lack of access to formal credit.  Village-based institutions such as council committees 
and credit groups, on the other hand, tended to exert a positive influence. Working in 
KwaZulu Natal in South Africa, Reid and Vogel (2006) found that farmers’ groups, 
community networks and Department of Agriculture programmes all had a pivotal, if 
not always beneficial, role in farmers’ livelihood strategies, and that their 
strengthening would support effective adaptation to climate stress and other 
pressures.   
Based on the theory and empirical evidence cited here, I conceptualise climate 
adaptive capacity as rooted in access to various types of resource but mediated by 
individual agency and sociocultural dynamics. Comparatively few researchers have 
analysed these sociocultural dynamics in relation to climate change: because of this 
research gap I privilege them in my analysis.  
In this and the previous section I have discussed the ideas that are the building blocks 
for the analysis that will enable me to answer the second part of my research 
question.  However, there is also a much broader debate going on, concerning the 
relationship between climate change adaptation and development.  Much of the 
discussion centres on the implications of climate change for international and 
national development policy-making (Newell, 2004; Lemos et al, 2007; Hassan, 
2010) and for development paradigms (Brooks et al, 2009).  Tanner and Mitchell 
(2008a) have a strong poverty reduction focus; they advocate pro-poor adaptation 
that builds on nuanced understandings of poverty and vulnerability.  Yet another 
subdivision of the literature champions community-level adaptation as a way of 
bringing together climate change adaptation and development agendas on the ground 
(Yamin et al, 2005; Ensor and Berger, 2009b).  There is a pressing need to generate 
micro-level empirical evidence that can form the basis of theory on climate change 
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adaptation in development contexts (Tanner and Mitchell, 2008b), and this is where I 
position my study.  
1.6 Summary 
My overall investigative framework is a holistic understanding of human security.  In 
order to address the first part of my research question, and to understand the sources 
of human insecurity in my study location, I explore individual subjective accounts of 
threats, bringing into the analysis risks, shocks, stresses and underlying problems 
from any source.  Rather than assuming that climate threats are a priority for poor 
people, I keep an open mind.   
In order to answer the second part of my question I investigate how people respond 
to the threats they see.  Like Tschakert (2007), I take the view that people’s 
responses to both climate-related and non-climate threats today or in the past can 
provide useful insights into how they might respond to climate change in future 
because the underlying factors are the same. In other words, my analogy approach 
embraces responses to current non-climate threats.  I am especially interested in 
exploring various micro-level sociocultural influences, because this area is under 
researched.   
I have structured my argument in this chapter around human security on the one hand 
and a family of concepts from the climate change adaptation literature on the other.  
It may be useful at this stage to explain how I see their interconnections, which I 
show in Figure 1.1.   
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Figure 1.1: Climate vulnerability and human insecurity: Dynamic relationships 
Figure 1.1 presents climate vulnerability as having three components: livelihood 
sensitivity, exposure and climate adaptive capacity (McCarthy et al, 2001), which act 
in combination to mediate climate impacts.  The double-headed arrows between the 
elements of the diagram signify mutual construction.  For instance, climate 
vulnerability has a bearing on resources and sociocultural dynamics, while 
conversely resources and sociocultural dynamics affect climate adaptive capacity and 
hence climate vulnerability.  The net outcome for human security is ambiguous, and 
depends on many diverse factors and their permutations. In the next chapter I 
describe the context in which I apply these ideas: my study location. 
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Chapter 2: A walk in the Mount Elgon foothills 
 
Bubufu
4
 is situated in Manafwa District in Uganda.  In this chapter I use the format 
of a guided walk to present notable features of the study location and to introduce 
some of the themes that appear in succeeding chapters.  The Google Earth hybrid 
satellite image and map (Figure 2.1 shows the volcanic mass of Mount Elgon and the 
Uganda-Kenya border running north to south across it.  The red pointer indicates 
Bududa town, a few miles from my study site.  Manafwa District has a population of 
around 317,500 (United States Agency for International Development, 2008), and is 
one of four Districts that comprise Bugisu, which is located in the south-eastern 
corner of Uganda and occupied by the Gisu people.  The Gisu are one of the smaller 
ethnic groups in the country and have inhabited the area for several hundred years.   
 
Figure 2.1: Google Earth satellite map of the Mount Elgon area of Uganda 
                                                 
4
 Bubufu is not the settlement’s real name.  In this thesis I use fictional names for villages, parishes 
and people in order to preserve the anonymity of the people involved in the study. 
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In 1902 the Sub-Commissioner of the Uganda Protectorate made what seems to be 
the first published reference to the area, describing it as ‘a densely populated region 
to the west of Mount Elgon in a very hilly area...little is known of these people’ 
(Hobley, 1902).  The region came under colonial control in 1905, and the first 
European to settle in the area described the people as ‘perhaps the wildest people to 
be found anywhere in the protectorate’ (Purvis, 1909:268).  These hill people still 
have something of a reputation for unruliness and violence.  On hearing where I was 
doing my fieldwork, people in Mbale and even in Bubulo, just half an hour’s taxi 
ride away, expressed amazement. ‘Mmmh, they are tough, those people up there’ 
said the proprietor of a Bubulo guest-house, using ‘tough’ as a euphemism for a 
propensity for physical violence. 
At the time of my fieldwork, in early 2009, Bubufu comprised two adjacent 
administrative units or ‘Local Council 1s’.  The official boundaries during that period 
are marked on the sketch map (Figure 2.2).  At times I refer to the Local Council 1 
(LC1) unit nearest the Manafwa River as the ‘lower village’, and the LC1 above it as 
the ‘upper village’.  These two LC1s have since been further subdivided.   
Describing a short walk through Bubufu is a good way of introducing some of the 
notable features and characteristics of the location, as well as the topics and themes 
that I develop in later chapters.  What follows is based on my own observations of 
the landscape and the people in it; it is a description from an outsider’s perspective, 
and of course the villagers themselves would doubtless describe it very differently.  I 
have divided the walk into stages linking defined points, which are numbered 1-10 as 
marked in Figure 2.2, below. 
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Figure 2.2: Sketch map of Bubufu (from a drawing by Mr John K., 2009)
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2.1 Point 1: Arriving at the parish trading centre 
 
Figure 2.3: The parish trading centre 
There is only one means of road access to the village, via the road running along the 
Manafwa valley.  At this point a feeder road branches off the main road and leads up 
through Bubufu to the crest of a ridge.  A parish trading centre has grown up at the 
junction (Figure 2.3), comprising a few shops, eating places and a private maize mill.  
There are often one or two women on the shop verandahs selling small heaps of 
vegetables.   
Apart from the vegetable-sellers most of the people at the trading centre are men and 
boys, socialising, ‘doing business’, looking for work or eating in one of the cafes.  
There are usually one or two men leaning on rented bicycles hoping for a boda boda 
fare (Figure 2.4).  Someone might want a ride to Bukawai, the much larger and 
busier trading centre about two kilometres along the road, or to Bududa General 
Hospital, a few kilometres away.   
In the 1950s, La Fontaine wrote: 
The district as a whole makes an impression of prosperity; there are an 
increasing number of Gisu-owned cars and lorries and almost every man has 
a bicycle. (La Fontaine, 1959:261) 
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Figure 2.4: Boda boda riders waiting for a fare 
Since then, Bugisu has seen dictatorship, civil war, structural adjustment, economic 
liberalisation, changing terms of trade, and rapid population growth.  Bicycles are 
few and far between, an indication that the area is now far from prosperous.  Bird 
and Shinyekwa (2005) comment that the region is much poorer than in the 1950s, 
while researchers working in other parts of the country have also remarked on the 
economic decline (Reynolds Whyte, 1997; Jones, 2009).   
The vegetable-sellers and boda boda riders in the trading centre embody the search 
for non-farm livelihood activities that preoccupies many people here.  Land scarcity 
is acute, and in a survey of three villages close by, researchers found that subsistence 
consumption by value represented only one third of total income for households in 
the poorest income quartile (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003).  Cash is essential to pay for 
food, to pay school fees and buy uniforms and learning materials and for medical 
costs, clothes and household necessities.  Selling coffee, the area’s traditional cash 
crop, is a source of income for those with land, as is the sale of food crops.  In 
Eastern Uganda as a whole, 81 per cent of farm households sell part of their produce 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2002, cited in Bahiigwa et al, 2005).  But this still 
leaves a shortfall.  While the better-off practise a skill, run a business or find salaried 
employment, people without any capital ride boda bodas, buy and sell tiny quantities 
of food, look for casual farm labour in the locality or seek jobs as ‘shamba boys’ and 
‘house-girls’ (domestic workers) in Kenya. In addition, large-scale out-migration, 
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predominantly of men but also involving women, has been practised for a long time; 
Heald (1998:94) cites the 1949 and 1959 censuses as showing that ‘as many as 
twelve per cent of Gisu were living outside their home districts’.  La Fontaine writes 
that in every village there is a contingent of men who only reside there intermittently 
but who aspire to settle permanently in the village (1962:115).  On average, around 
50 per cent of SSA rural household incomes comes from non-farm sources and 
transfers such as remittances (Ellis, 2006:390).   
A few yards beyond the trading centre the sub-county headquarters are housed in a 
lock-up (Figure 2.5).  The building is often empty but for a watchman.  The sub-
county officials do not live locally but commute from Mbale town, and they are 
frequently engaged elsewhere.  I called several times to try to introduce myself to the 
sub-county chief, but on each occasion I was informed that she was in Mbale or 
elsewhere, attending meetings.  According to the District government, this sub-
county has the highest population density of any in the District; 699-871 persons per 
square kilometre (Community Based Services Department and District Planning Unit 
Manafwa District, 2007).  It is also one of the most densely-populated areas in 
Uganda (Kagoda 2008; Verschoor, 2008).  In addition, it is very vulnerable to 
flooding because the Manafwa River passes through it (Community Based Services 
Department and District Planning Unit Manafwa District, 2007).   
 
Figure 2.5: Sub-county headquarters 
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2.2 Point 2: Crossing the Manafwa River  
 
Figure 2.6: Manafwa River after rain, viewed from the bridge 
The next landmark is the bridge over the Manafwa River (Figure 2.6), which was 
built a few years ago to replace the one destroyed by flooding in 1997.  This is where 
the feeder road crosses the river.  Hundreds of people use this bridge every day, 
walking to and from the villages along the ridge to the shops, markets, schools and 
health facilities in the valley.  The road is steep for most of the way and very rough.  
In the rainy season it is impassable on bicycles or even motorcycles, so the vast 
majority of journeys are made on foot.   
The river has burst its banks several times in recent years.  The most serious floods 
occurred in 1997, following heavy rain associated with an El Niño event.  There 
were more floods in 2007, and in 2010 the river burst its banks again following 
weeks of unseasonal heavy rain.  
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2.3 Point 3:  Crossing the Singye 
 
Figure 2.7: The Singye with piles of stones ready for sale in the background 
A few yards beyond the bridge over the Manafwa River a much smaller bridge takes 
the feeder road over the Singye, a small tributary (Figure 2.7).  From this point the 
road runs up the Singye valley more or less parallel to the stream.  The Singye is 
insignificant during the dry season, but it tends to flood after heavy rain, when it is a 
hazard to children, some of whom have to cross it on stepping stones on their way to 
school.  During the fieldwork period contractors were widening the feeder road, and 
in May 2009 their mechanical digger was bogged down here beside the Singye for 
several days.  Dotted along the road are piles of stones and sand gathered from the 
stream bed, waiting to be sold for use as building materials.  This is a popular 
livelihood activity among young men in the village 
A few small makeshift bars cluster at the other end of the bridge (Figure 2.8) and 
there are always a few customers, even quite early in the morning.  Beer-drinking is a 
traditional pastime in the area, but husbands’ expenditure on alcohol is a major 
source of conjugal tension in some households and much of the violence in the 
village is linked to drinking.  
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Figure 2.8: Ernest M.’s bar near the Singye bridge 
2.4 Point 4: Passing the schools  
 
Figure 2.9: A classroom in the primary school 
Climbing gently, the road passes a track that branches off on the right towards the 
village’s two schools; a dilapidated primary school (Figure 2.9) and the spanking 
new sub-county secondary school (Figure 2.10) built in 2009 with finance from the 
African Development Bank.   
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Figure 2.10: The new secondary school 
Although the national government adopted a policy of universal primary education in 
1997, fees still have to be paid at secondary school level.  Even so, this secondary 
school has opened up new opportunities for the young people of Bubufu.  Previously, 
secondary schooling was only available to the children of better-off parents, who 
paid for them to attend boarding schools in other parts of the district.  Although I 
have no figures for adult literacy at the village or sub-county levels, according to the 
sub-county chief only 52.5% of men and 47.4% of women in Manafwa are literate 
(pers. comm.).  She said the national rates are 76 per cent and 61 per cent 
respectively: according to the United Nations Education, Science and Cultural 
Organization (2010) the overall literacy rate for adults (defined as over 15 years old) 
in the period 2000-2007 is 72 per cent.  Although having this school in the village 
means that children no longer have to be boarded out, many parents struggle to pay 
their sons and daughters’ school fees and other educational costs.   
The school has also provided jobs for several villagers, while others make money 
selling snacks or lunches to the pupils.  As the only public building of any 
significance in the sub-county, in 2010 it was used to host official International 
Women’s Day celebrations which were attended by local M.P.s, the District 
Chairman and several District Councillors.  This was seen by villagers as an 
important event (e.g. interview with Albert N.).  
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There is a brick-built church on the same piece of level ground, belonging to the 
Church of Uganda, which many of the church-going villagers attend.  
It is official government policy for every parish to have its own health centre, and if 
there were a clinic in the parish, one might expect to find it on the comparatively 
large area of flat land where the schools and church stand. However, the inhabitants 
of Bubufu either have to climb up the hill to a clinic about forty minutes’ walk away, 
use a drug shop in Bukawai or make the journey to Bududa General Hospital beyond 
Bukawai.  
2.5 Point 5: The Coffee Growers’ Cooperative building 
The defunct Coffee Growers’ Cooperative building (Figure 2.11) is a few yards 
beyond the turning for the schools.  It is kept locked, although meetings of the 
National Agricultural Advisory and Development Service are occasionally held on 
the verandah.  Mr B., who used to be the cooperative’s secretary, lives in a small 
house just behind this building.  He brought his family down here in 1998 after 
landslides forced them to abandon their house on the slopes.   
 
Figure 2.11: Villagers outside the Coffee Growers’ Cooperative Society building 
Mr B. used to be one of the most important people in the area because all of 
Bubufu’s farmers sold their coffee harvest to the cooperative until this national 
marketing system was dismantled in the 1990s as part of a raft of neo-liberal 
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economic policies.  Nowadays individual farmers take their raw coffee beans to 
traders in Bukawai and Mbale, or sell them to buyers who go from house to house 
during the harvest season.  Villagers elsewhere in the district told government 
researchers in 2002 that since the demise of the cooperative system that they had 
received low prices for their coffee and were exposed to international market 
fluctuations (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002).  In 
2009 the itinerant traders were paying Bubufu’s coffee growers USh2,000 per 
kilogram, while traders in Mbale paid between USh2,500 and 2,800.
5
  Coffee is the 
only crop grown exclusively for cash here, and male household heads usually control 
the proceeds.   
2.6 Point 6: A spring 
 
Figure 2.12: Children collecting water at a protected spring 
The unmade road, which is dusty in the dry season and dangerously muddy in the 
rainy season, winds uphill towards the crest of the ridge.  For a short distance after 
the Coffee Growers’ Cooperative building, houses and compounds line the feeder 
road in a pattern of ribbon development.  The Gisu live in nuclear families, and it is 
unusual to find more than two generations living under the same roof (La Fontaine, 
1979).  The vast majority of houses in the village are built of a greenwood 
                                                 
5
 During my 2009 visit the exchange rate was approximately USh2,800 to the US$. 
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framework and plastered mud; only a handful of houses belonging to the better-off 
have walls made of permanent materials.  Most, however, have a tin roof rather than 
one of banana leaves, although often in a dilapidated condition.  Inside, the furniture 
comprises at most a few rough chairs and a low table, with a foam mattress or two in 
a room behind.  In some houses a few pages from a Kenyan newspaper are stuck to 
the walls, a sign that a household member has worked in Kenya.  Floors are of beaten 
earth, and it is common for children to sleep on the floor.  Kitchens are low shelters 
made of traditional materials and situated in a corner of the compound.  Many 
houses, especially on the upper slopes, do not have a latrine, so people use the land 
around the compound.  
These days most villagers use water from protected springs such as the one next to 
the Singye here, where the ground slopes sharply down to the stream (Figure 2.12).  
There are usually a few women and children collecting water in jerry cans to carry up 
the hillside to houses on the far slope.  There are two of these water points, which 
were built with donations from a faith organisation in the American mid-west.  
Before that, villagers took water straight from the Singye.   
2.7 Point 7: A young man’s hut 
 
Figure 2.13: A young man’s hut 
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A little further uphill near the road there is a small, newly-built young man’s house, 
situated on the very edge of a compound (Figure 2.13).  Traditionally Gisu boys 
would move out of their parents’ house, either building themselves a hut like this one 
in their father’s compound or going to live with a friend until they married and set up 
their own households.  According to Heald (1998:31) this would happen when boys 
were eight or nine years old, but La Fontaine (1959:24) names puberty as the time 
for this transition.  Daughters, too, would move out once they reached puberty, 
usually to stay in a married male relative’s house.   
This particular house has a New Year’s greeting painted on the wall, together with 
the declaration; ‘Nobody can charge me wrong except Alaa’.  Muslims are a small 
minority in the village.  However this inscription is interesting not because of the 
reference to Allah but because its defiant tone testifies to what Heald calls ‘the 
aggressive or violent individualism’ (1998:3) of Gisu culture.  According to Purvis 
(1909), in Bugisu ‘every man, woman and child claims to be independent’ 
(1909:336), and this theme of Gisu individualism runs through succeeding chapters. 
The population density decreases markedly as one moves uphill, and as the houses 
thin out this is a good place to take a closer look at agriculture in the village, 
especially as narrow footpaths strike out across the food gardens in all directions.  
The climate is bimodal, with the first rainy season lasting from March to June and 
the second shorter one from September to November. The high average rainfall of 
1,500 mm per annum (Community-based Services Department and District Planning 
Unit, Manafwa, 2007) is very conducive to farming.  The village falls into what Ellis 
and Bahiigwa (2003:1000) describe as a ‘higher altitude land-scarce intensive coffee-
banana system’ of agriculture. The main food crops are plantains and beans (Figure 
2.14), although banana wilt has killed many plantain trees here as well as elsewhere 
in Uganda. Irish and sweet potatoes, rice, soybeans, millet, wheat and vegetables 
such as cabbages, tomatoes and spinach are also grown. There are mango and 
avocado trees near the houses, and eucalyptus wood-lots on steep slopes and along 
water-courses.  Although maize flour or posho is the main staple alongside plantain, 
the landholdings are too small to grow maize except in very small quantities for 
roasting, so it has to be bought.   
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There are no livestock to be seen grazing, again because of the shortage of land.  
Cows, pigs and even goats are kept stalled: where the path skirts a compound one 
may see or smell a stalled cow or pig.  Even hens are kept tethered during the 
growing season, to prevent them from eating seedlings and triggering disputes with 
neighbours.  A cow is seen as a benchmark of a thriving household, but less than half 
of Bubufu households own one.  This is not unusual in the area; according to a 
survey in 2001, 63 per cent of households in three nearby villages owned no cattle 
(Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003).  People who cannot afford to buy a cow may rear one for 
someone else and keep a calf as payment.   
 
Figure 2.14: Garden with plantains and bean seedlings, house behind 
Back on the road and continuing uphill, a few more minutes’ walk bring one to a 
rudimentary structure built of traditional materials, the Roman Catholic church.  This 
and the Church of Uganda building by the schools are the only two churches in 
Bubufu.  
2.8 Point 8: A lineage elder’s house 
Beyond the Roman Catholic church stands an isolated house built of permanent 
materials on a levelled plot cut into the side of the road, with the land falling away 
steeply behind it towards the Singye (Figure 2.15).  Excavating the slopes sometimes 
triggers landslides, so this is an example of how human activity creates 
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environmental risk in the area.  The house belongs to Mr S., leader of the largest 
lineage in the village.
6
  
 
Figure 2.15: Lineage elder’s house with Orange mobile phone mast behind 
Traditionally, clans occupied separate ridges and were divided by streams (La 
Fontaine, 1979:102).  Local government organisation started out as a systematisation 
of the Gisu clan and lineage structure (1979:106), with each village corresponding to 
what La Fontaine calls a minimal lineage, consisting of between thirty and fifty adult 
men and their households.  While the identification between lineages and territory is 
weaker than it used to be, sub-counties, parishes and LC1s still have clan and lineage 
names.  Land here is held under customary tenure and has traditionally been held by 
individuals rather than communally.  While land is mainly in men’s hands, about 15-
20 per cent of women in this region also own some land (Tripp, 2004:14). The 
lineage elders are the ultimate guardians of the land; they are called upon to resolve 
land disputes among kin and are supposed to be consulted before land is sold to 
someone outside the lineage.  Lineage elders are also responsible for maintaining the 
tradition of male circumcision which makes the Gisu unusual in Uganda.  In the front 
room of his house Mr. S. keeps a carved stick and a goatskin studded with shells, the 
emblems of his role as overseer of the biennial circumcision ceremonies.   
                                                 
6
 According to La Fontaine, while sub-counties corresponded to the territory of a clan, the villages 
within them corresponded to maximal lineages, and a single village might have several minimal 
lineages within its boundaries (1979).   
Mast 
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As well as being a lineage head Mr S. is one of the richest men in the village. 
According to other villagers he owns about fourteen acres of land as well as several 
lock-up shops in the parish trading centre on the main road.  Behind Mr S.’s house 
there is a good view of the ridge, which is topped by the Orange mobile phone mast 
that was still under construction in 2009.  The only motor vehicle I ever saw using 
the feeder road was a smart Mitsubishi Pajero with the Orange logo emblazoned on 
its side, grinding up the hill.  It contained the only other white person I ever saw in 
the vicinity too, presumably an engineer. In Bubufu only the sub-county Vice 
Chairman had a mobile phone.  However, some of the men working outside the 
village use them to pass messages to their families via intermediaries at the trading 
centre.   
From here it is easy to see how the land is cultivated on the steep slopes, in some 
places up to the very crest of the ridge. Trees have been planted too.  Local 
government officials promote tree-planting on the slopes and villagers appreciate the 
opportunity to earn cash from avocado or mango trees.  The demand-induced aspect 
of land scarcity is not confined to this part of Uganda, nor is it a recent phenomenon.  
In many parts of Uganda, lack of land and declining soil fertility are seen as major 
livelihood constraints (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
2000).  As long ago as 1909, the first missionary in Bugisu wrote that ‘almost every 
foot of land seems to be under cultivation’ (Purvis, 1909), while La Fontaine 
comments that land pressure was first identified as a problem in the region in the 
1930s and ‘has become increasingly severe since then’ (1959:103).  The shortage of 
land is recognised as a serious crisis in Bugisu and as a threat to the traditional way 
of life (Jenkins et al, 2010).  One problem is that the traditional rotation system, 
whereby gardens were left fallow after a growing season, has not been practised for 
many years, and this is contributing to the declining soil fertility.   
Land scarcity mainly arises from the combination of rapid population growth and the 
traditional partible inheritance system.  There appear to be no figures for district-
level annual population growth; a recent report simply uses the estimated national 
rate (Community Based Services Department and District Planning Unit Manafwa 
District, 2007).  The current annual population growth rate for Uganda as a whole is 
3.2 per cent, one of the highest in the world (United Nations Department of 
  
52 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2011a).  The gazetting of Mount 
Elgon National Park in 1992, which was accompanied by the clearing of settlements 
within the park boundaries, is also said to have exacerbated the problem by pushing 
many people down from the mountain itself into the surrounding foothills.  While the 
government has made efforts to relocate people from the overcrowded hills onto the 
plains of Sironko to the north, many are unwilling to quit the fertile soil and high 
rainfall that are so conductive to agriculture (Nalugo and Naturinda, 2010). A survey 
of three nearby villages found that 61 per cent of households had less than a hectare 
of land and 34 per cent had less than half a hectare (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003). 
2.9 Point 9: Viewpoint for the landslide zone 
A closer look at the hillside behind Mr S’s house reveals a long scarp (Figure 2.16) 
which marks a landslide that killed an entire family during the night of 17th 
November 1997 during that year’s disastrous rains.  Close by, on the other side of the 
road, deep gullies scar the slopes marking rainwater channels.  Soil erosion is a 
massive problem for farmers here, as in many parts of Uganda.   
 
Figure 2.16: Site of the 1997 landslide from behind Mr S.’s house 
From this point another fifteen minutes’ strenuous uphill walking takes one to the top 
boundary of the upper village, where Bubufu ends and the next village begins 
(Figure 2.17).  Looking back from here there is a good view of Bubufu and the 
Scarp of November 
1997 landslide 
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Manafwa valley; the landslide zone is to the right, out of view.  Tin roofs glint in the 
sun, making the dispersed settlement pattern very clear.  While there are no houses 
along the road between here and the LC1’s upper boundary there are still a few 
dotted about the hillside, despite the landslide problem.   
 
Figure 2.17: Looking back over the village from above Mr S’s house  
The walk from the trading centre has taken about fifty minutes, but it will take 
considerably less time to return, due to the gradient.  Some of the threats and 
underlying problems that confront the inhabitants of Bubufu, such as environmental 
degradation, have been clear to see.  Other threats are less obvious and are best 
understood by talking to the villagers themselves.  This, then, is my study location.  
In the next chapter, I explain the methodology of my study. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I introduce my research approach and methods.  I begin with an 
overview of the study design then I outline my epistemological position, set out my 
subsidiary research questions, go into detail about the methods I used and explain 
why I used them.  I also explain the practicalities of the fieldwork and some 
modifications that I made to my methods.   
3.2 Overview 
Broadly speaking, my study falls into the category of interpretive social science 
(Malone and Rayner, 2001).  I am interested in individuals’ perceptions of the threats 
in their lives, what they do about them and the underlying reasons for their 
perceptions and responses.  The design is a hybrid of cross-sectional research and a 
case study.  The location is a paradigmatic, perhaps rather extreme, ‘case’ 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001) of a poor rural African community whose members rely on 
subsistence farming for a large part of their livelihoods and are exposed to the 
impacts of climate variability and extremes as well as other shocks, stresses and 
risks, including the effects of environmental degradation.  Insights from the study 
may be applicable to other locations with these characteristics.  On the other hand, 
my interest is primarily in individuals and their relations with one another, so that the 
village is the context for my study rather than its object (Bryman, 2008).  The real 
core of my study is the cross-sectional research whereby I collected data from 
interviewees over a single time period, ensuring that people in different structural 
positions were included and looking for differences in perspectives and experiences.  
I decided to use qualitative methods that would allow individuals to discuss what 
threats they themselves see as important, rather than presenting participants with 
preconceived lists in the form of questionnaires (Gustafson, 1998).  Collecting 
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qualitative data also meant that I could explore underlying explanations for the 
phenomena I was studying (O’Laughlin, 2007), including social relations.  As I 
indicated in Chapter 1, I also wanted to see how useful ‘human security’ is as a 
framework for research on the sociocultural dimensions of climate change.   
3.3 Epistemological issues 
The epistemic basis for my study is individual subjectivities and the only way I could 
hope to access individual perspectives, experiences and meanings is through what 
people said.  According to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007:106, human security is 
about ‘the feelings of insecurity that individuals express’.  However, as part of the 
interpretation stage I also used secondary data concerning the historical, 
ethnographic, economic, political and social context; data that interviewees could not 
or did not articulate themselves.  I adopted a critical realist standpoint.  My premise 
is that objective realities exist and can be accessed, but they are doubly mediated by 
subjects’ articulations and by researchers, who interpret accounts from their own 
perspectives (Blumenfeld-Jones, 2009).  In other words, my evidence is a co-
production (Polkinghorne, 2009).   
The researcher’s social identity starts to influence a study right from the moment the 
research questions are developed (Harding, 1987).  In my case, a longstanding 
personal interest in climate change initially directed me to the topic.  I have worked 
as a ‘social development’ adviser for several years and this propelled me towards the 
social aspects of climate change, while my training as a gender and development 
specialist meant that I was committed to exploring its gender dimensions.  Conscious 
of being a conspicuous white outsider, I tried to be alert to the way my presence was 
affecting the study and in the empirical chapters I allude to some of the ways it might 
have shaped the data I collected.  Generally speaking, during some interviews and 
discussions I got the sense that individuals were consciously presenting a certain 
image directed towards me as a type of ‘performance’ (Goffmann, 1969).  I 
attempted to treat such performances as integral elements of my data.  
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3.4 Research questions  
In order to answer my main research question I devised a set of subsidiary questions.  
The core subsidiary questions are listed in Table 3.1, matched to their data collection 
methods.  I also needed to investigate the social, economic and cultural context in 
order to facilitate the analysis.  Further research questions concerning the study 
context are listed in Appendix 2. 
Overall research question:  How important are climate threats (and by analogy, 
climate change) to human security in a rural African context of multiple risks, 
shocks and stresses and what do the socio-cultural aspects of current threats and 
responses imply for climate adaptive capacity?  
Subsidiary research 
questions 
What information do I need? How can I obtain the 
information? 
What threats to 
themselves, their 
households and the 
community are individuals 
in different structural 
positions aware of and 
what priority do people 
give to climate variability 
and extremes? 
Risks, stresses and problems that 
individuals are aware of and 
prioritise  
Relative prominence given to 
impacts of climate variability and 
extremes 
Variations in perspective shaped by 
social relations and cultural norms 
and values  
Semi-structured interviews 
(SSIs) and group discussions 
with individuals  
How do sociocultural 
factors influence 
individuals’ response to 
threats?  
Responses to climate and non-
climate threats at individual, 
household and community level 
Social variation in choice of 
responses 
Influence of cultural norms and 
governance institutions/actors on 
responses to climate-related and 
other types of threats  
SSIs and group discussions  
Observation 
Key informant interviews 
Secondary literature  
What are the social and 
cultural outcomes of 
villagers’ responses to 
threats and how do they 
differ?   
Short-term distribution of costs and 
benefits of coping and adaptation. 
Longer-term changes to micro-
level social relations and cultural 
norms  
SSIs and group discussions with 
men and women from range of 
sampling categories 
Observation 
Key informant interviews 
Ethnographic literature 
Other secondary literature  
Table 3.1: Core research questions matched to methods 
 
My research methods traced a definite trajectory during the course of the fieldwork, 
in that although I began by relying on specifically selected and designed research 
instruments during the individual interviews, after the pilot interview stage I adopted 
a more open, less structured and more flexible approach to collecting and analysing 
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data.  Also, as our fieldwork proceeded, the semi-structured interviews began to be 
complemented by more natural encounters with villagers, usually with people who 
had already been interviewed.  Talking to them informally during these chance 
meetings turned out to be an excellent source of data and a considerable proportion 
of my evidence is derived from such fortuitous conversations.  Throughout the 
fieldwork I used observation.   
Table 3.2 sets out the distinct phases of my fieldwork and the methods I used during 
each phase.  I then go into some detail about the different phases of the work and the 
individual methods.   
FIELDWORK METHODS 
Study stage Observation Key 
informant 
interviews  
Household 
enumeration 
survey 
Participatory 
rural analysis   
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Focus 
groups  
Reconnaissance 
visit 
√ √     
Preliminary 
fieldwork  
√ √ √ √ (Participatory 
wealth ranking) 
√ (Piloting)  
Main fieldwork √ √  √ √ √ 
Follow-up visit  √    √  
Table 3.2: Fieldwork methods in each phase  
Reconnaissance visit  
I first visited the Mount Elgon region in October-November 2008, when I spent three 
weeks identifying a suitable location.  Before leaving the UK I read relevant 
literature on Uganda and in particular Bugisu, the south-eastern region of the country 
that is inhabited by the Gisu people.  During the visit I had several meetings with 
local government officials and elected officers in Bududa and Manafwa Districts and 
had a chance to see the topography of the area, seasonal agricultural activities and 
other livelihood activities.   
By prior arrangement I also met Joshua Balungira, who had been recommended to 
me as a potential research assistant by a faculty member of the School of 
International Development at the University of East Anglia.  A Gisu man and a 
resident of Mbale, Mr. Balungira had a social sciences degree from Makerere 
University in Kampala and had worked as a research assistant for various British and 
European academics.  People with this level of qualification and experience are few 
and far between in Bugisu, so I quickly arranged to hire him as my senior assistant 
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for the duration of the fieldwork.  He made a very significant contribution to the 
study, for instance undertaking a follow-up visit in 2010 as I explain below, and 
showed professionalism as well as a genuine interest. 
After travelling around both districts and talking to a large number of people, I 
decided to choose Bubufu as my location.  I have already explained that it represents 
a paradigmatic case of communities in Africa that are poor, dependent on natural 
resources and exposed to multiple risks, shocks and stresses.  It is also fairly typical 
in other ways.  It is neither particularly remote nor close to a major town, and it is not 
as badly exposed to landslides as some villages in the area, where I thought people 
might be completely preoccupied with that particular source of risk.  My choice was 
confirmed by the welcoming attitude of local government officials and the village 
chairmen.  
Preliminary fieldwork  
I returned to Uganda in January 2009.  This phase included recruiting and training 
junior research assistants to carry out the household enumeration survey and translate 
for me during my own interviews with women in the village.  Local government 
officials spread the word that temporary work was available for local people with a 
specific educational standard.  Several people applied by letter, and the final 
selection of three extra assistants was made by interview.  Two ‘fixers’ from the 
village were also recruited by word of mouth; it was their job to contact villagers 
chosen for interview and arrange a convenient time and place with them.   
After a two half-days of training in a local venue we began the household 
enumeration survey, initially with Mr. Balungira and me accompanying the other 
assistants.  For more information on training the fieldwork team see Appendix 3. 
Semi-structured interview instruments and topics were then piloted with ten 
individuals.  Several key informant interviews were also carried out at this time with 
local government officials and village elders, and a participatory wealth-ranking 
exercise was conducted. Appendix 3 contains details of the methods used in the 
preliminary and main fieldwork phases.   
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Main fieldwork  
The remaining semi-structured interviews and key informant interviews, focus group 
discussions and participatory rural analysis (PRA) discussions were all carried out 
between the start of March and the end of June 2009.  Appendix 4 contains the semi-
structured interview guide.  Interviews were nondirectional in that they did not steer 
people towards talking about climatic threats despite my particular interest in this 
topic.  
The semi-structured interviews varied greatly in the amount and quality of evidence 
they produced.  The relatively large number of interviewees (58 individuals, some of 
whom were interviewed twice) was vital to achieve data saturation, the point beyond 
which no new topics or themes emerge (Bryman, 2008:462).  They also provided a 
matrix of data against which the validity of insights from the most productive, 
detailed and interesting interviews could be appraised during the analysis (see 
below). 
Follow-up visit 
In 2010, after I had returned to the UK, I commissioned Mr. Balungira to return to 
Bubufu to conduct some follow-up interviews, instructing him by email on the topics 
to pursue.  Although a follow-up visit had been planned for some time, a landslide 
that killed over 300 people a few miles away at the beginning of March injected 
urgency; Mr. Balungira made his visit to Bubufu a few days later.  The aims were, 
first, to find out how the village had been affected by the heavy unseasonal rains that, 
according to the media, were causing havoc in the Mount Elgon area at the time.  
More specifically, I also wanted to find out what had happened to some of the 
individuals we had interviewed in 2009.  Had the worries they articulated in 2009 
been realised in the intervening months?  If so, how had they dealt with them?  This 
visit produced very useful data.  As well as revisiting individuals who had been 
interviewed already, Mr. Balungira also spoke to people whose houses were at risk 
from landslides but who had not been in our original sample.  
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Analysing transcripts and notes 
Once all the recordings were transcribed and the notes typed up, back in the UK I 
used NVIVO8 to organise the data and code it according to emerging themes.  As 
social differentiation is an important theme running through my study, I looked for 
patterns and variations of perspective associated with my sampling categories; 
gender, wealth rank, household headship and life-stage.  A common criticism of 
qualitative research is that it allows ‘verificationism’, the tendency of researchers to 
look for evidence that supports their preconceived ideas and to ignore any evidence 
that undermines them.  As I developed interpretations I tried to avoid this trap by 
deliberately looking for counterexamples in the data.  
Sampling   
I treated two Local Council 1 areas (LC1s) as a single sampling frame because 
neither was large enough to serve as a sampling frame in itself.  Until a few years 
ago they had comprised a single administrative unit.  Administrative boundaries in 
this area are frequently changed in response to rapid population growth and the need 
to legitimise claims to government resources; two LC1s are eligible for more 
government funding than a single LC1.  Most villagers I asked did not know where 
the boundary between the two LC1s ran, and shortly after my fieldwork they were 
further sub-divided anyway, so I am confident that conflating the two LC1s made no 
difference to the evidence I gathered.  I defined a household as a group of people 
who ate together.  Before they marry, young men commonly live in separate huts in 
their father’s compound but eat with their parents; I counted such young men as 
members of their father’s household.  
My sampling strategy was purposive and ‘theoretical’, in the sense that it was driven 
by my hypotheses about what criteria would be likely to differentiate perspectives 
and experiences within this small community (Gomm, 2008).  First, I wanted to 
interview roughly equal numbers of men and women in order to avoid gender 
blindness.  I also needed to talk to men and women in a range of structural positions, 
defined as ‘the perceived set of possible interactions with other actors and the 
perceived likely outcomes of these interactions’ (Homer-Dixon, 1999:137).  The 
ethnographic, African risk perception and gender and development literatures 
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suggest that gender, wealth rank, household headship and life-stage/marital status 
would all be significant.  
Each household in the village was assigned to one of three wealth ranks through a 
participatory wealth-ranking exercise (Appendix 3).  Working in three villages near 
my own study location, Dolan (2004:647) found that 20 per cent of all sample 
households were female-headed, so clearly this was an important category to include 
in my sample.  Female household heads have to be distinguished between de facto 
and de jure female household heads.  I decided to interview female household heads 
from households assigned to all three wealth ranks: however, in practice all the 
village widows fell into the lowest wealth rank, which reflects the custom of 
stripping a wife of land and household assets after her husband dies, and only one of 
the de facto female household heads belonged to a household in the highest wealth 
rank.   
I also included in the sample young unmarried men and women aged 18 or over: 
these young people are poised to pass into adulthood and start their own households 
so they might be expected to have specific perspectives.  Previously-married men 
now living alone were also included in a separate sample segment.  According to the 
ethnographic literature (La Fontaine, 1959; Heald, 1998), Gisu inheritance traditions 
have the effect of creating impoverished men at both ends of adult life, and Gisu men 
living alone, whether widowers, divorced or never married, often experience specific 
vulnerabilities.  It was important, then, to interview a sample of the men who fell into 
this group and take into account the reasons that they were living alone.   
Based on these criteria, I created 15 sample segments, trying to get roughly equal 
numbers of interviewees in each segment (Appendix 5).  The sampling was done by 
populating the segments with named individuals based on information from the 
household survey and selecting interviewees from those names.  It was not entirely 
random, because I tried to interview spouses and children over 18 from the same 
households with a view to highlighting intrahousehold differences.  In the event, that 
was seldom possible and the 58 people interviewed individually were drawn from 40 
separate households.  As well as being interviewed in 2009, a good number of these 
people were also interviewed in 2010 depending on their availability at the time of 
Mr. Balungira’s follow-up visit.   
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Appendix 6 lists the people who were interviewed individually about threats and 
responses, using the pseudonyms I assigned to them to protect their anonymity.  It 
also shows where interviewees belonged to the same household.  In the event, in 
some categories we interviewed more people than we had originally intended, for 
reasons I explain below. 
Participants of the group discussions were segregated by gender because I anticipated 
that it would be a key differentiating factor in threat perceptions and responses.  One 
group consisted mainly of married women and the other of married men.  In both 
cases there was a mix of all three wealth ranks to try to access differences in 
perspective along wealth lines; see Appendix 3 for more information about the 
participants.   
3.6 Fieldwork challenges and adjustments  
In this section I discuss some of the challenges that arose during the fieldwork and 
the changes I made to my methods in the course of it.  Some of these issues were 
very informative in relation to my investigation.   
Identifying and defining households  
It was sometimes not easy to decide which category of household an interviewee 
belonged to.  For one thing, during the household enumeration survey married 
women always gave their husband’s name as the household head, even in cases 
where the man had not visited the village for many years.  This caused some initial 
sampling errors because often such households were registered as male-headed.  On 
the other hand, these mistakes were instructive regarding the position of de facto 
female household heads: even if their husbands have to all intents and purposes 
vanished from the scene, the wives are still regarded as temporary residents on their 
land.   
A second sampling problem arose from rapid changes in household composition.  
Several researchers have remarked on the dynamism that characterises African 
households (e.g. Moore, 1994; Reid and Vogel, 2006; Thornton et al, 2007).  In 
Bubufu, nuclear households were the norm, but their composition often changed due 
to circular and longer-term migration, the practice of sending older children to 
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boarding school, marriage breakups, the fostering of relatives’ children and so on.  
This constant churning of the village population illuminated the precariousness of 
livelihoods and marriages and drew attention to possible sources of human 
insecurity.  In relation to research methods, it meant that some households that were 
sampled as female-headed at the start of the fieldwork became male-headed before 
we could get to them because the husbands had returned from wherever they had 
been working, whereas others that started as male-headed households became de 
facto female-headed as men left the village to find work.  These changes caused 
over-sampling in two categories: wives with husbands in wealth rank 3 and married 
men in wealth rank 3.  This was because several men in this wealth rank returned to 
the village after we had identified their wives as de facto female household heads; 
once we had arranged to interview someone it would have been rude to cancel or 
abandon the interview on realising that the household headship was different to what 
we had expected.   
Interviewing young unmarried women   
It was difficult to find young unmarried women who were self-confident and mature 
enough to talk to me.  Young women aged 18 or over from the better-off households 
were usually at boarding school elsewhere, while their counterparts in poorer 
households had already married and moved to their husband’s village.  It was no 
accident that two of the young women we interviewed were in difficult 
circumstances because this was the very reason they were still in the village rather 
than being married or educated elsewhere.  One of these young women was blind. 
Another lived as an unwelcome guest in her grandmother’s house and was ostracised 
as an outsider because she had been brought up in Kenya; she had nowhere else to 
go.  Two other young women refused point blank to be interviewed, despite their 
mothers’ exhortations, one because she was on her way to meet a man.  Eventually, 
by visiting the village during public holidays when the schools were closed, I 
managed to conduct interviews with six young women.  However, two of these were 
not at all useful, as the young women concerned were very nervous.  The high 
proportion of girls from better-off households who were attending secondary school 
was an interesting finding, while the determination of the young woman to meet her 
boyfriend corroborated what several adults told us about young women’s agency in 
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relations with the opposite sex (Chapter 9).  In general some of my difficulties in 
interviewing young women can be interpreted in the light of Ardener’s theory of 
women as a ‘muted group’ whose interests and status in the community are marginal 
to the mainstream (Ardener, 1975). 
Modifying the semi-structured interview focus  
I started my fieldwork with research questions that focussed on risks – damaging 
occurrences that might happen in the future – rather than current stresses and 
problems.  Interviewees were asked about ‘the bad things that could happen’ to them 
as individuals, to members of their household or to the community in general, and 
what they could do about them.  This way of formulating the question was decided 
by my research assistants, who told me there was no single Lugisu word equivalent 
to the English word ‘risk’ and agreed among themselves that ‘bad things that could 
happen’ was the closest equivalent.  Although I expected some deliberation about the 
precise translation, in fact this decision was quickly arrived at without much debate.  
See Appendix 4 for the Lugisu translation.   
I planned to use a two-dimensional metric in interviews, asking people to rate both 
the probability of something occurring and the severity of the impact if it did, on a 
three-point scale.  Before I began, though, I had three concerns.  First, I thought that 
questions about risk might seem remote, hypothetical and difficult to answer.  
Second, I thought that people might find it difficult to rate risk, particularly using the 
scale I provided.  While many Europeans are familiar with such scales I guessed they 
would be alien to people in Bubufu.  Third, during my preliminary visit I had seen 
that poverty and livelihood vulnerability were both widespread and acute in the 
Mount Elgon area.  With this in mind, it seemed to me that it would be crass to ask 
people to engage in such a rating exercise.   
Once in the field, my concerns were quickly resolved one way or another.  During 
the pilot semi-structured interview stage it soon became clear that far from being 
remote and hypothetical, it was all too probable that the risks people talked about 
would indeed occur because this was a high-risk environment and people’s 
perceptions were rooted in their past experiences.  This meant that people tended to 
talk about stresses and problems that were already affecting them or had affected 
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them in the past as well as risks.  I realised that trying to retain a narrow focus on a 
hypothetical future was artificial and, given the problems that people were already 
facing, insensitive too.  So I decided to broaden my analytical focus to include 
current stresses and problems as well as risks.  That brought my research into line 
with other studies of risk in Africa (e.g. Smith et al, 2000; Quinn et al, 2003) which I 
have already mentioned in Chapter 1.  These early interviews brought home to me 
the pervasive nature of human insecurity in the village. 
Another, associated, change was that I dropped the idea of asking people to rate risks 
and threats after the pilot interviews. Interviewees tended to rate every risk or 
stressor they mentioned as both highly probable and very severe in impact, without 
discriminating.  This seemed not unreasonable in view of the high-risk environment, 
which meant that the rating system was inappropriate analytically as well as from the 
perspective of sensitivity.  In a few cases, too, interviewees seemed to manipulate the 
rating exercise in order to represent themselves as in need of assistance.  Because of 
these experiences during the pilot stage, in subsequent interviews people were simply 
asked which of the threats they had mentioned caused them most anxiety.  
Time constraints 
Although there was a suitable empty house in the village the absentee owners refused 
to rent it to me. This meant that we had to stay in a guest house in Bubulo and travel 
to Bubufu and back by ‘taxi’ each day of the fieldwork, a journey that often took an 
hour each way inclusive of waiting time.  The fieldwork began in the dry season, but 
the rains came on a few weeks later, making the taxi service unreliable because they 
tended to stop running in the afternoon once the heavy rain set in.  In any case it was 
difficult to get a seat on a taxi after mid-afternoon on the twice-weekly market days 
in Bududa district, as vehicles were crowded with traders returning to Mbale with 
their goods.  Because of these transport restrictions the time we could spend in the 
village each day was often curtailed, and this problem was compounded by the 
amount of time spent walking between interviews due to the dispersed nature of the 
settlement and the steep terrain.  On many days, Mr Balungira and I could only finish 
two or three interviews each before we had to start back to Bubulo.   
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Accuracy of data   
During the course of the fieldwork it became clear that many interviewees had given 
us inaccurate information in the household survey, usually by understating their 
assets and overstating the number of people living in their household.  The survey 
was conducted when we were new to the village and people did not know what we 
were doing; many assumed we were forerunners of a ‘project’ (see below).  Clearly, 
they hoped to gain some material advantage by their inaccuracies.  Later, word 
spread about what we were doing and some degree of trust was developed, so I think 
the villagers became less likely to deceive us on matters such as these.  In about five 
cases Mr. Balungira or I abandoned interviews because we realised we were being 
deliberately misled.  During the training I encouraged my assistants to use their own 
judgement to appraise the likely veracity of what people were telling them about 
their material circumstances and to comment on this in their interview notes. I myself 
did likewise.  I also spent 20 minutes or so at the end of each day’s fieldwork 
discussing the interviews with other team members.  It was often easy to cross-check 
information about assets and household members. 
Another tactic for enhancing the accuracy of the interview evidence was to use a 
‘vignette’ of a typical household to depersonalise discussions in the hope that it 
would encourage frankness, especially regarding sensitive issues. After talking to 
individuals about the threats they themselves perceived, I showed a picture of a rural 
couple, their children and their livestock, which I commissioned from a sign-painter 
in Mbale town (Appendix 7).  I asked people to imagine that members of the pictured 
household were menaced by the same threats as they were; what would they advise 
them to do?  While the vignette did not seem to encourage interviewees to talk about 
sensitive issues as I had hoped, it served to highlight common preoccupations, 
attitudes and strategies.  On the other hand, data saturation point was soon reached, 
with interviewee after interviewee making the same observations about the picture.  
Lastly, using the vignette added to the length of the interviews and some of the 
interviewees politely complained that we were taking up too much of their time.  
Taking all this into consideration, I decided to discontinue use of the vignette during 
the remaining interviews.   
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Recording, translating and transcribing  
Mr. Balungira and I each used a digital voice recorder during interviews, as well as 
taking hand-written notes as a backup and to record information about settings, body 
language, impressions and so on.  Focus group discussions were also recorded.  I did 
not record the PRA discussions for several reasons.  First, the room where these 
meetings were held was very small and crowded, so there was nowhere a recorder 
could be safely placed.  Secondly, participants were moving around writing and 
drawing on sheets of paper, which did not lend itself to recording.   
Getting the interviews and discussions accurately translated and transcribed turned 
out to be one of the biggest challenges of the fieldwork.  For one thing it was hard to 
find individuals with the required English language and typing skills, even in Mbale.  
After two false starts I eventually succeeded in hiring two transcribers, both of them 
Mbale residents.  They complained that they had difficulty understanding the Bubufu 
accent and that extraneous noises (in particular, rain drumming on tin roofs during 
individual interviews) made it hard for them to hear what was being said.  
Translating and transcribing is very time consuming and there was quite a long delay 
between finishing the last interviews and obtaining the first transcriptions.  
Unfortunately, when the transcriptions began to arrive I found that in some cases 
they fell far short of my memories and notes.  I asked Mr. Balungira to do a random 
check of ten per cent of the transcriptions.  He reported many cases of inaccurate 
translation, as well as perfunctory summarising rather than the comprehensive 
verbatim translations I had commissioned.  Many of the transcriptions had to be 
redone, and I decided to retain only one of the transcribers, with Mr. Balungira 
checking all her transcriptions.   
Low interpersonal trust as a barrier to effectiveness 
During the fieldwork I sometimes experienced at firsthand how endemic mistrust 
increases transaction costs and is a drag on effectiveness, alerting me to some of the 
problems I discuss in Chapter 10.  For example, not being paid for work done is a 
perennial problem in the area.  One woman, who mistakenly thought she would be 
paid for her transcription work day by day, destroyed the transcriptions she had 
worked on when I failed to return from the village in time to pay her at the end of the 
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afternoon.  A simple transaction like hiring a vehicle to take my team up to the 
village one day turned out to be fraught with dishonesty and deceit, with the result 
that our arrival in the village was delayed by several hours.  Although minor, such 
incidents were frustrating and wasted time.   
3.7 Ethical considerations  
The main ethical exigencies were the need for confidentiality, including among 
household members; the avoidance of pressure or coercion when asking respondents 
to cooperate; ensuring that respondents were not inconvenienced; avoiding 
researcher bias; and lastly making sure that respondents benefitted in some way from 
the study. I also had to damp down expectations of ‘project’-style support, which 
unfortunately I could not meet.  I will explain how I addressed each of these issues in 
turn. 
First, I ensured confidentiality during the fieldwork by instructing my assistants 
never to discuss what named individuals told us with anyone else in the village and 
by sticking to this rule myself.  In this document I have ensured confidentiality by 
anonymising my findings and the names of the settlements concerned.   
With regard to consent and convenience, we asked individuals a day or so in advance 
whether they would agree to talk to us, and if so, when would be convenient. 
Occasionally we happened to bump into individuals in our sample segments who 
were willing to talk to us then and there, so advance notice was not required.  At the 
start of each interview a short statement in Lugisu was read out explaining that we 
were gathering information as part of a university study and that we were not 
associated with a non-governmental organisation. We then asked the individual if 
s/he was happy for us to proceed.  Many of the villagers cannot read or write, so their 
verbal agreement was considered sufficient.
7
  No-one refused to be interviewed at 
this point, although some villagers refused the initial invitation and two or three 
turned out to be uncooperative despite having given their assent.  
                                                 
7
 I took advice on this from the UEA’s School of International Development’s research ethics adviser.   
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As a researcher I embody a certain positionality and perspective (Harding, 1987; 
Blumenfeld-Jones, 2009), as the few lines I gave about myself earlier indicate.  
However, I tried to avoid researcher bias by constantly reflecting on my own 
reactions to interviews and transcripts and recording them in a journal.   
Regarding the participants’ expectations, I was warned by a faculty member who had 
carried out his own PhD study in Uganda that villagers would assume I was 
‘bringing a project’, and other researchers have commented on the same issue (e.g. 
Quinn et al, 2003:114).  I tried to deal with this possibility by explaining to local 
government officials and the village chairmen that I was a researcher and not 
connected with an NGO, in the hope that they would pass this information on to 
villagers.  We also explained this at the beginning of each interview or discussion, 
stressing that my objective was simply to gather information and that I was not 
associated with any organisation. While I cannot be sure how successful these 
disclaimers were, very few people attempted to extract any immediate material 
benefit from me, which I am inclined to think was because the message was, in fact, 
received.  This is not to say that villagers did not expect something in return for their 
assistance, which seemed entirely reasonable.  Interviewees and discussion 
participants were compensated for their time with small gifts of sugar or soap, 
although these were not used in advance as an inducement.  At the end of the 
fieldwork a small gift was also made to every household in the village, to thank the 
community for its cooperation. I did not offer incentives to the village chairmen or 
local government officials, but at the request of one of the village chairmen I am 
writing up my study in the form of an accessible report that the LC1 Chairmen can 
use as they see fit.  
In the next chapter I begin my analysis of perceived human security threats. 
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Chapter 4: Destructive rainfall: impacts, coping and 
adaptation 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I investigate the impacts of current climate variability and extremes on 
farming in a context where there are many other agricultural constraints, thus 
addressing the first part of my main research question.  I also discuss coping and 
adaptation strategies, drawing attention to some of the socio-cultural dynamics that 
influence them, in this way addressing the second part.  The chapter is structured as 
follows: after a brief overview of the full range of climate threats that cause villagers 
concern (section 4.2), I concentrate on crop loss and soil erosion, both of which are 
linked to destructive rainfall (section 4.3).  In sections 4.4 to 4.6 I discuss coping and 
adaptive strategies, arguing that access to these is socially differentiated and 
influenced by Gisu ideology.  I also discuss the extent to which agricultural 
adaptation to destructive rainfall impacts is supported by government services.  I 
conclude the chapter in section 4.7.  The evidence cited here was collected at 
individual interviews held in 2009 and 2010 and to a lesser extent at group 
discussions using PRA techniques in 2009.   
4.2 Weather shocks and stresses as threats to human security 
From now on in the chapter I use the term ‘weather shocks and stresses’ rather than 
‘climate variability and extremes’, because in general people spoke about day-to-day 
weather impacts rather than variability over a longer time-scale.  My evidence 
strongly indicates that weather shocks and stresses have highly damaging impacts on 
people’s lives in the study location, in large part because they jeopardise food 
security.  During non-directional interviews, roughly 75 per cent of adult men and 50 
per cent of adult women brought up the impacts of weather shocks and stresses, 
including landslides, as a threat to themselves, their household or the community as a 
whole. 
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Table 4.1: Impacts of weather shocks and stresses that cause concern  
 
Table 4.1 contains a list of weather shocks and stresses and the outcomes that 
interviewees said caused them concern.  A few complained that the start of the long-
season rains was less predictable than it used to be, and about dry spells during the 
Weather shocks and 
stresses 
Impacts that cause concern 
Destructive rainfall 
(includes both intense 
rainfall and periods of 
prolonged rainfall)  
Crops 
Damage to foliage, flowers and fruits affecting food crops and coffee 
Food crops washed away 
Sweet potato mounds damaged  
Land/soil 
Mini-landslides make land uncultivable 
Land next to river and streams flooded, cut off or washed away  
Land next to feeder road suffers from runoff 
Gully erosion on steep slopes  
Property  
Houses on steep slopes threatened by landslides  
Flooding of houses 
Pit latrines overflow, causing health hazards 
Livestock injured or killed by landslides 
People 
Risk to life and limb from landslides 
Food insecurity due to poor harvests 
Short-term hunger due to physical inability to harvest food during 
periods of intense rainfall  
Risk of drowning in swollen and flooded rivers (especially children and 
drunks) 
Risk of water-borne diseases  
Risk of injury from slipping in mud 
Risk of traffic accidents due to slippery roads  
 
Hailstorms 
Crops 
Damage to crop foliage, coffee flowers and berries 
Property 
Hens killed by hail 
 
Storms  with high winds 
Crops 
Plantains and fruit trees damaged or uprooted  
Property 
Damage to house, e.g. roofs blown away and damage from falling trees 
Livestock injured or killed 
Delayed rains and dry 
spells during growing 
seasons 
Loss of seeds and the cost of resowing 
Crop loss and reduced harvests  
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long growing season.  However these were a small minority.  With respect to the 
problem of late rains, some people pointed out that it was an easy matter to wait until 
the rains set in before sowing, in order to protect against crop losses.  Destructive 
hail (which I witnessed myself on one occasion) and windstorms were also 
mentioned as causes of damage, and people talked about a range of weather shocks 
that affect people and property as well as impacts on crops (Table 4).  
Overwhelmingly, it was destructive rainfall that people said they worried about, 
which is consistent with reports from other highland areas in Uganda (Republic of 
Uganda, 2007).  In this chapter I concentrate on crop loss and soil erosion.  I discuss 
landslides, which are also associated with rainfall, in Chapter 5.   
4.3 Destructive rainfall impacts: crop loss and soil erosion 
The loss of standing crops, especially food crops, due to severe runoff or flooding is 
generally seen as a very significant problem.  Villagers talked in their interviews 
about the sheer destructiveness of heavy rainfall and the consequent food insecurity 
in a context of multiple constraints to agricultural productivity:   
Dorcas K: extract from interview transcript 
For beans [heavy rain] removes all its leaves, cassava it uproots, then the 
potatoes it covers with more soil that is washed down, and then it breaks 
matoke, mangoes, and pawpaw. This is all calamity of hunger. 
John M: summary from interview notes 
Rain and hunger is what he worries about most because he spends money 
buying the seeds, and sometimes he just borrows the seeds, and just when 
they are starting to grow the rain comes and destroys them. Sometimes even 
when someone wants to help you with some seeds he hesitates because he 
knows that even if you plant them they might be destroyed by the rain. 
Getting seeds is very difficult.   
I return to the lack of agricultural inputs that John alludes to later in the chapter.  In 
the PRA sessions only men in the lowest wealth rank prioritised crop loss due to 
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destructive rainfall as a threat, although all groups identified food insecurity and 
poverty, to which destructive rainfall contributes, as priority issues.  I am not sure 
how to interpret this, given the consensus from the individual interviews that 
destructive rainfall is a highly significant threat.  One explanation may be that the 
participants tended to see the PRA sessions as vehicles for communicating ‘project’-
type needs rather than for considering underlying problems.  Also, men in the higher 
wealth ranks, who in contrast to men in the lower wealth ranks did not prioritise crop 
loss due to rainfall, are less reliant on farming for their livelihoods than men in the 
lowest wealth rank and have enough land to be able to spread the risks of weather 
damage; this could explain their different priorities relative to poorer men.   
In order to get a clearer idea of the agricultural damage inflicted by weather shocks 
and stresses, in March 2010 I asked Mr. Balungira to re-interview some of the 
individuals we had spoken to the previous year.  The aim was to supplement what 
they had said in 2009 with their reports of their farming experiences during the year 
that followed.  Mr. Balungira talked to 23 farmers (15 men and 8 women), all of 
whom had been interviewed during the original fieldwork period; in 2010 they were 
informally selected from that original sample on the basis of their availability for 
interview.  The relevant information is contained in Table 4.2. These data are not 
necessarily representative of 2009 farming outcomes in the village, but they do 
indicate that the loss of food crops to destructive rainfall was widespread among this 
group of farmers that year. All except one reported crop loss due to some type of 
weather shock or stress, mainly heavy rain, and only four reported losses due to dry 
spells, confirming that destructive rainfall is by far the more significant threat to 
farming.  Table 4.2 also contains data on agricultural coping techniques, which I 
discuss later in the chapter. See Appendix 8 for comments on the information 
contained in the table. 
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Table 4.2: Reported agricultural losses from rainfall and delayed rains/dry spells and 
coping measures taken (2009) 
 
Name No. of plots & 
estimated acreage   
Loss of 
food 
crops 
(rainfall) 
Loss of 
food crops 
(delayed 
rains or 
dry spell) 
Reduced 
coffee 
harvest 
(due to 
rainfall) 
Coping and adaptation measures 
1 Rachel N.  4 plots, 4 acres √ √  Trenches 
2 Elizabeth N.  1 plot, 1 acre  √  Runoff pits   
3 Paul M. 1 plot, 0.5 acre √   No information 
4 James L. 3 plots, 3 acres   √  √ Trenches 
5 George M. 1 plot, 1.5 acres   √  √ 
Has planted trees in places affected by 
runoff.  Has trenches, but they are 
ineffective due to intensity of rain 
6 Fred W. 1 plot, 2.5 acres   √   
Runoff pits and trenches. Pits filled up with 
soil and so did not prevent damage entirely 
7 John M.  1 ‘very small’ plot   √   
None, but plans to plant elephant grass 
around boundary 
8 Conrad B. 2 plots, 2.25 acres  √   
None; his land is prone to flooding and 
‘there is nothing I can do about it’ 
9 Ezra K. 3 plots, 3 acres √   
Uses trenches and elephant grass, but says 
they are ineffectual during intense rainfall.  
Thinking of planting eucalyptus instead  
10 Patrick N. 3 plots, 1.25 acres   √  None 
11 Gertrude N. 2 plots, 3 acres     
Did not dig trenches; says people only dig 
trenches in years of especially high rainfall  
12 Ida N. 1 plot, 0.5 acre  √   Runoff pits 
13 Nyree M. 2 plots, 0.75 acre  √   
Runoff pits and trenches, but still lost crops 
due to high rainfall 
14 Gregory N.  3 plots, 4 acres   √ 
Runoff pits, trenches and elephant grass.  
Has planted trees on land next to stream 
15 Sandra N. 4 plots, 1.25 acres  √   
None.  Her land is susceptible to flooding 
and ‘there is nothing you can do about it’ 
16 Wilfred T  2 plots, 1.5 acres  √   
Trenches, but ineffective due to intensity of 
rain 
17 Julia N. 
4 plots (No 
information on 
acreage) 
√   
Trenches ineffective because they were 
badly-made 
18 
Emmanuel 
W. 
2 plots, 1.5  √   Trenches and runoff pits, but ineffectual 
19 Benjamin J.  1 plot, <0.5 acre  √   No information 
20 Geoffrey M  3 plots  √   Runoff pits  
21 Harold B. 2 plots, 1.5  acres  √   Trenches – has found them very effective 
22 Samson N.  8 plots, 8 acres   √    Drainage channels limited crop loss 
23 
Catherine 
N.  
1 plot, 1 acre 
 
 √  
None, but plans to terrace for second 2010 
season following heavy rain in first season. 
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The small size and number of landholdings (several farmers in the table only own 
one plot) heightens vulnerability to destructive rainfall, because having only a single 
plot means that there is no possibility of spreading the weather risk among different 
gardens, which can be a useful tactic in an area of spatial variation such as Bubufu 
with its mix of steep hillsides, gentle slopes and riverbanks. Two farmers figuring in 
the table have particularly interesting stories in this regard.  John M. (no. 7) said he 
lost an entire season’s bean crop when his one ‘very small’ garden next to the Singye 
was flooded. Years before, his garden in the upper village had been destroyed by a 
landslide (Chapter 5) and he had been forced to sell a third plot to pay for medical 
treatment (Chapter 6).  Benjamin J. (no. 19) said that crops in his only  garden, which 
was a mere half an acre, suffered from runoff from the feeder road that runs 
alongside it.  The problem became worse when the road was widened in 2009 
without any compensation for the encroachment or the increased losses from runoff.  
Benjamin was not the only village resident who suffered from the road-widening 
project, and this is not the only instance I shall cite of government initiatives and 
actors harming individual human security.  These two men were caught at the 
intersection of different types of shock, the impact of one shock rendering them more 
vulnerable to others.   
While farmers with only one plot are highly vulnerable to the impact of heavy rain, 
farming several scattered plots does not entirely eliminate weather risk.  This is 
because the diverse impacts of destructive rainfall may offset the benefits of spatial 
variation.  For instance, James L. (no. 4 in the table) and Julia N. (no. 17) said they 
had lost crops both to runoff in hillside gardens and to floods in valley gardens.  Julia 
N. and her husband (wealth rank 2) had rented steeply-sloping land which they knew 
was vulnerable to runoff because there was no other land available and they wanted 
to grow more food.  This is one way that land scarcity heightens exposure to weather 
risks. However, not all farmers are prepared to farm such high-risk land, perhaps 
because they are less able to afford to waste inputs.  For instance Ezra K. (no. 9), 
who was classed as belonging to the lowest wealth rank, sold a food garden in 1999 
due to repeated crop losses from runoff.   
Whereas crop loss from destructive rainfall is a short-term shock, the problem of soil 
erosion is more gradual, though no less dramatic. 
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‘We shall be left with sand’: Soil erosion 
 
Figure 4.1: The Singye after rain 
Figure 4.1 shows the Singye after rainfall, its waters muddied by the silt washed 
down from hillsides and crumbling riverbanks.  Soil erosion did not come up as often 
as crop loss or landslides in individual interviews, and in the group discussions it was 
never mentioned except as a contributor to poor harvests, hunger and poverty by men 
in wealth rank 3. This may reflect the question we put to people, which invited them 
to focus on risks rather than current stresses or ongoing problems.  Soil erosion is not 
a ‘bad thing that might happen’, as the question was put to them, but a serious 
ongoing problem.  
Elijah N: extract from interview transcript  
When it rains heavily…it will also wash away topsoil and we shall remain 
with sand…In the end, nothing that one plants will grow, because the rain 
will have destroyed the soil and all the crops will die.  Hence people will be 
perpetually poor, and whatever they plant they will be wasting their time. 
Data from one season (e.g. as in Table 4.2) cannot show the effects of soil erosion on 
soil fertility and agricultural productivity over time.  Soil erosion is a factor in 
supply-induced land scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1999), because it combines with 
overcultivation and landslides to reduce long-term soil fertility.  It has been identified 
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as a huge problem in Uganda as a whole (Republic of Uganda, 2007) and as a driver 
of poverty (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2000).   
Be that as it may, the fact remains that only a handful of people raised soil erosion as 
an issue during the individual interviews.  As well as attributing that in part to the 
type of questions asked, I suggest that it may also have been linked to gender 
inequality in the community because all the interviewees who spontaneously 
mentioned soil erosion were men.  Based on her research in another part of Manafwa 
District, Kagoda (2008) claims that women are not aware of soil erosion as a threat, 
which she attributes to their low level of education and exclusion from agricultural 
extension activities.  Adult women’s literacy rates are lower than men’s in my study 
area (Chapter 3).  Also, my discussions with local government officials and a perusal 
of visual materials displayed in local government offices
8
 suggest that soil erosion 
features prominently in official discourses, and my own observations concur with 
Kagoda’s findings (2008) that very few women are party to these discourses.  These 
gender inequalities regarding access to information may explain why the issue of soil 
erosion does not tend to be salient for women, unlike crop losses due to runoff and 
flooding.  Alternatively, rather than being ‘unaware’ of soil erosion, which implies a 
cognitive deficit, married women may simply be less concerned than men about the 
long-term health of the soil. I discuss this possibility in the next section, where I 
consider the effectiveness of physical coping measures to control runoff and erosion, 
and how even the simplest coping tactics are not available to all farmers.  
4.4 Physical measures to control runoff: limitations and access 
The last column of Table 4.2 shows the various physical measures used by 23 
farmers in 2009 to deal with runoff and soil erosion, namely trenches, elephant grass, 
rainwater collection pits and tree-planting.  Trenches and pits capture runoff, while 
elephant grass, which is a large, strongly-rooted plant, has multiple uses.  It acts as a 
physical barrier to prevent soil being washed away and also as animal fodder, a 
boundary marker and a natural fence.  Rainwater collection pits have been introduced 
                                                 
8
 For instance, a poster in the sub-county office warns villagers against farming on the riverbanks 
because it hastens erosion. 
 
  
79 
to the village in the last few years by researchers from the National Agricultural 
Research Organisation (NARO) and Makerere University, working under the 
auspices of the Nile Basin Initiative, a multilateral programme funded by Nile Basin 
nations and international donors.  The NARO researchers are experimenting with the 
pits in selected gardens and demonstrating their value to farmers.  I discuss tree 
planting separately in section 4.5.  
 
Figure 4.2: A rainwater collection pit  
Pits (Figure 4.2), trenches and elephant grass are mainly used on slopes.  Only 
elephant grass offers any protection from the effects of flooding near the river, as its 
roots help to stop soil being washed away.  On hillside plots, though, these 
techniques offer little protection.  The data in Table 4.2 show that 7 of the 15 farmers 
who used pits and trenches in 2009 found them only partially effective.  Once full of 
mud, pits and trenches have to be emptied; otherwise they overflow the next time it 
rains.  A glance at Figure 4.2 suggests that digging them out is a strenuous and even 
a dangerous task.  Moreover, some villagers pointed out that they are potential death-
traps for anyone who should happen to fall into them; small children and drunks 
were seen as especially at risk.  
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Social variation in coping measures 
Some physical coping measures are not equally accessible to all farmers in the 
village, for various reasons.  First, even a simple measure such as digging a drainage 
trench requires basic tools, which not all villagers possess.  Lack of farming inputs 
was mentioned in several interviews (e.g. interview with Paul M.) and during PRA 
sessions both the men’s groups identified the provision of tools as a priority for 
government support (Table 4.3).  Even where tools are available, the physical labour 
involved in digging and emptying pits and trenches means that these measures 
cannot be practised by the elderly and infirm, who must pay someone else to do it for 
them if they can afford it.  The strength, energy and time required are also seen as 
preventing women from undertaking these measures themselves.  Men and women 
commonly expressed the view that women are too feeble to carry out any kind of 
heavy labour:  
Catherine N: Extract from interview transcript 
[Digging drainage channels] is hard work for a woman. They dig three or two 
and half feet down the ground, so being a woman I cannot manage.  
Zebediah M: Extract from interview transcript 
Men [dig trenches and pits] because women can only help with the planting 
of elephant grass. They can’t dig to the depth recommended, because they are 
not strong. 
In fact many of the village women are very muscular, and some women farmers are 
actively involved in agricultural coping measures.  I do not take the discourse on 
women’s weakness at face value, but I can understand that in a community where the 
women already do most of the farming work, as well as being responsible for 
domestic work and childcare, the notion of their feebleness may protect them from 
additional arduous labour by directing the responsibility for it to their husbands.  The 
following were also mentioned as barriers that prevent, disincentivise or discourage 
women from digging and maintaining trenches and pits: time poverty linked to the 
gender division of labour; male household head’s control of land-management; and 
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lack of practical know-how.  I briefly discuss each of these in turn below, citing 
evidence from one interview in particular. 
Catherine was a de facto female household head.  Her husband had been living in a 
town on the Kenyan border for several years and had another wife there.  Catherine 
said that they were not on good terms; he rarely visited the village and had not been 
supporting her and their children very well since his second marriage.  This is by no 
means an unusual situation for female-headed households in Bubufu.  Catherine 
repeatedly said that she had no time to spare for agricultural coping measures: ‘work 
limits me’.  Both men and women often cited married women’s time poverty as a 
reason for their not getting involved in any kind of time-consuming work over and 
above the normal demands of farming, due to their responsibilities for childcare and 
cooking, feeding livestock and keeping the house and compound clean.  This is 
particularly the case for female household heads, even though they generally derive a 
larger share of their income from farming than their male counterparts (Dolan, 2004).  
Being tied to the home also prevents many married women from learning about 
farming innovations such as rainwater collection pits. When I asked Catherine if she 
had any ideas about how she could protect her crops from runoff, she nodded 
towards neighbouring gardens:   
Catherine N: extract from interview transcript 
I know out there they have got a plan, but being always around the home, I 
haven’t any ideas myself.  Maybe if I went out [sometimes].  In order to learn 
anything, somebody else has to tell you about it.  Therefore I have no plans 
against calamity. 
Lack of agricultural extension advice for poor farmers in the village, in particular 
women, is a related factor. When I asked Catherine if she would be interested in 
attending training on agricultural coping measures she said she would, although she 
doubted that her absent husband would allow her to go because of her responsibilities 
in the home.  Another woman, Esther N., said during an interview that her husband 
decided what coping measures to use as he had the requisite know-how through his 
contact with the National Agricultural Advisory and Development Service 
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(NAADS), which I discuss below. During PRA sessions, married women in wealth 
ranks 1 and 2 called for training in how to prevent land slippages in their gardens.   
Dolan (2004) and Tripp (2004) argue that women’s lack of control over the land they 
farm is a barrier to sustainable farming practices in Uganda, and Tripp (2004:13) 
cites Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Programme assessment studies in 
eleven districts showing that this is a major concern in relation to poverty reduction.  
While they see the problem of one of decision-making control over land, Kagoda 
(2008), writing of the Mount Elgon area, focusses on married women’s lack of a 
long-term stake in farms, arguing that it acts as a disincentive to sustainable farming.   
These problems of; female household heads’ lack of time, lack of access to 
knowledge, lack of control over land and lack of a long-term stake in it are well-
recognised in the feminist political ecology literature as constraints on agriculture 
(e.g. Rocheleau et al, 1996).  Since women do most of the farming in this 
community, as in many others in the region, there are clear implications regarding 
climate adaptation.   
Before moving on to look at agricultural diversification I want to briefly discuss the 
use of ‘rainmakers’, individuals credited with the ability to control local rainfall, as a 
coping measure.  Only one person, Sandra N., who was married to one of the 
wealthiest men in the village, mentioned using a rainmaker to try to stop destructive 
rainfall: 
Sandra N: extract from interview transcript 
We usually pay them USh20,000 to 30,000, assuming we are two or three 
people ...we tried it one time when there was a lot of poverty, but we did not 
succeed, so we realised that it is God who gives rain and there is nothing we 
can do about it.  We were about ten people who had planted greens and 
tomatoes; rain destroyed it all. So we have now given that up, although we 
did use to believe that someone could stop the rain and we could harvest 
whatever we wanted. 
An elderly widow, Penelope K., said that it was widely believed in the village that 
the Orange mobile phone company had employed a rainmaker to keep the rainy 
season at bay until they finished building their new mast at the top of the ridge.  Faith 
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in rainmakers’ powers is probably more widespread than these infrequent references 
suggest.  As with other traditional beliefs, I interpret the relative silence on the 
subject in the light of Goffmann’s concept of ‘performance’ (1969).  Confronted by a 
white person and educated Gisus from the regional capital, I think most people 
wanted to present themselves to us as ‘modern’ individuals rather than ‘backward’ 
traditionalists, so they refrained from talking about traditional beliefs such as in 
rainmakers.  
I now turn to on-farm diversification as a response to destructive rainfall and 
declining agricultural productivity.  Again, I analyse differences in access to the 
available options.  I also consider the role of government bodies in supporting 
diversification.  
4.5 On-farm diversification as adaptation 
Attempts to diversify on-farm production in the village can be divided into two 
categories; eucalyptus cultivation and the search for new, profitable cash crops.  
Switching from food crops to eucalyptus is a widespread adaptation to runoff and 
flooding (Table 4.2), although it is motivated by other considerations too.  For 
instance, several farmers interviewed in 2010 said that they had already planted 
eucalyptus on land vulnerable to runoff or floods.  After the repeated failure of 
physical coping measures, Esther N. and her husband also considered switching to 
eucalyptus:   
Esther N: summary from notes  
They dug trenches and planted [elephant] grass because their garden is steep, 
so when there is a lot of rain it carves gulleys.  Despite these measures when 
it rains a lot the rainwater still carries away the soil, so they are contemplating 
planting eucalyptus trees on that land.  
Appendix 9 presents villagers’ views on the various advantages and disadvantages of 
growing eucalyptus.  With a pro-poor adaptation perspective, a major limitation is 
that the trees cannot be grown alongside food crops because they soak up any water 
in the soil.  This means that growing eucalyptus is only available as an adaptation 
strategy for those with larger landholdings, because all the farmers in the village 
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want to grow some food crops for subsistence and sale.  Looking beyond the more 
obvious advantages and disadvantages, the popularity of eucalyptus as a cash crop is 
tied to a wider trend: the monetization of food.  In Chapter 7 I make the case that 
villagers’ increasing reliance on bought food is undermining married women’s intra-
household bargaining position and hence their social status. By crowding out the 
production of subsistence food, growing eucalyptus may be an adaptation that is 
indirectly inimical to women’s human security.   
Many farmers in Bubufu are also keen to diversify in other ways, and gender is an 
important influence in their choices.  Married women favour dry-season small-scale 
horticulture alongside watercourses, from which they earn a small income.  It was 
clear from interviews that some women place considerable faith in these enterprises 
as a first step towards alleviating household poverty.  I discuss some of the intra-
household tensions around control of this income in Chapter 10.  Dry-season 
horticulture is not immune to weather shocks, however; many people lost 
horticultural produce during the unseasonal floods of February 2010, which took 
them by surprise.  On the whole, men are interested in acquiring improved varieties 
of existing crops such as cassava, and those in the higher wealth ranks also see new 
cash crops, particularly vanilla, as a possible way out of poverty.  However, villagers 
have great difficulty in accessing the requisite planting material, and this is one of the 
forms of support they want from the government (Table 4.3)  
The lack of good quality planting materials is only one instance of the sheer lack of 
resources that cripples agriculture in the village.  Farmers find their farming efforts 
undermined by a formidable array of obstacles, as in this example:  
Julia N. and Milton W: summary from interview transcripts 
Julia and Milton farm four plots, two of which are alongside the Singye.  
Whenever the Singye floods it washes away part of those plots, which shrink 
in size every year as a result.  Another of their plots is on a steep slope, and 
when there is heavy rainfall the soil there gets washed away. In the first 
season of 2009 they had poor harvests of maize and beans due to runoff, soil 
exhaustion and their inability to buy fertilizer.  The second-season bean 
harvest was also poor because of heavy rain.  As for groundnuts, they only 
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harvested two basins because they had bought the seeds in a shop: shop-
bought seeds are handled a lot, and sometimes become contaminated with 
paraffin from the shopkeeper’s hands.  They did not harvest much cassava 
because Milton had to go to Mbale for the stems to plant, and they got bruised 
in the ‘taxi’ on the way back.  On the other hand, the potatoes did well and 
the coffee harvest was good, which Milton attributes to regular weeding.  
Julia said that their trenches were ineffective because they were too far apart; 
her husband had hired someone to do it but had not supervised him properly.  
She also explained that they had decided to plant eucalyptus trees on their 
land near the river after repeatedly losing food crops to flooding.  The first 
few years they tried it they planted them during the rainy season, but every 
year the small saplings were washed away.  After that they decided to plant 
them during the dry season and water them, which has been much more 
successful.   
Julia and Milton went to considerable trouble and expense to make their farming a 
success, using improvisation and continual adjustments rather than any fixed 
indigenous knowledge system (Richards, 1993).  They were, however, hemmed in by 
the day-to-day limitations of their milieu. The impacts of weather shocks and stresses 
should not be considered in isolation from these other problems.  During the PRA 
sessions villagers were clear about the type of farming support they would like to see 
from the government to help them to overcome these limitations (Table 4.3).
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PRA group Priorities for support 
Women in wealth ranks 1 & 2 Provision of seeds for horticulture 
Tree-planting projects 
Livestock projects 
Provision of agricultural inputs  
Micro-credit schemes 
Women in wealth rank 3 Provision of seeds 
Livestock programmes 
Men in wealth ranks 1 & 2 Provision of seeds, planting material and training to enable 
farmers to grow new crops and varieties, e.g. vanilla and Nigerian 
cassava  
Provision of farm implements, e.g. hoes, spades and pesticide 
sprayers 
Support with marketing of produce  
Improved tracks/feeder roads in upper village to facilitate transport 
of produce to markets 
Men in wealth rank 3 Agricultural extension advice to control runoff 
Loans for purchase of tools and inputs 
Provision of seedlings for new crops, e.g. vanilla 
Provision of improved varieties e.g. plantains  
Provision of eucalyptus and coffee seedlings 
Table 4.3: What farmers need in order to improve agricultural productivity 
 
Given the fundamental difficulties that farmers struggle with and their own priorities 
for farming support, what assistance do they receive from agricultural extension 
services?  I now consider the role of the National Agricultural Advisory and 
Development Service in helping poor farmers to improve their agricultural 
productivity and adapt to climatic challenges.  
The National Agricultural Advisory and Development Service  
In March 2010 President Museveni gave a speech at a political rally in Manafwa 
District.  He told his audience that he wanted poverty to be eradicated by ‘the  
practice of modern agriculture’ based on improved varieties and breeds: ‘Mr. 
Museveni called on the people of Bugobero to emulate Mr. Sam Wakinya of Bududa 
who rears pigs, cows, and goats, grows bananas, coffee and carries out fish and bee 
farming that give him high income’.  Referring to another farmer who had a twenty-
acre plot, the President said he would urge the NAADS to meet the investment needs 
of such farmers (Office of the President, Uganda Media Centre, 2010).   
  
87 
This speech reveals NAADS’s bias towards better-off farmers and why it fails poor 
farmers across Uganda.  Impressive through the achievements of twenty-acre farmers 
may be, they provide little encouragement for the many farmers in Bubufu with less 
than a single acre.  NAADS is basically an agricultural extension service which is an 
implementing mechanism for Uganda’s Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture.  
But according to the Chairman of the lower village, Zebediah M., ‘When NAADS 
started they told us it is the poor who would benefit, but it is those who are already 
well off that have benefited’.  Mr. Eastwell B., the NAADs extension worker for the 
sub-county, said that although he did try to help poorer farmers who were not 
members of NAADS he did so ‘on humanitarian grounds’ rather than as part of his 
professional duties, because they fall outside the programme’s target group.   
While NAADS officers occasionally distribute free seedlings and even livestock to 
villagers in Bubufu, this is done through a few demonstration farmers, most of whom 
fall into the highest wealth category.  I heard of a consignment of plantain suckers 
that had been given to one of these men for distribution to other farmers and was 
never seen again.  As the man is a lineage elder as well as a big local landowner he is 
hard to challenge: this is an excellent example of how local political environments 
can distort NAADS’ operations.  As for women farmers, I only saw one (Margaret 
B.) attend the two NAADS meetings I observed.  According to Margaret, NAADS 
officials are frustrated that their advice is not implemented because the men who 
attend the meetings do not pass on information to their wives, who actually do the 
farming.  She told me that one NAADS official had begged men to send their wives 
to his demonstrations instead of attending themselves, but the situation had not 
changed.  Women’s exclusion from agricultural extension services in sub-Saharan 
Africa is well-documented in the relevant literature (e.g. Due and Gladwin, 1991; 
Doss, 2001).  I highlight it here as an example of how local gender relations prevent 
women farmers from improving agricultural productivity and thus adapting to 
worsening environmental conditions including runoff, flooding and soil erosion.  
Several researchers have drawn attention to NAADS’s shortcomings in relation to 
poverty reduction (Bahiigwa et al, 2005; Hickey, 2005; James, 2010).  Hickey 
(2005) argues that NAADS’ targeting of better-off farmers is symptomatic of the 
government’s general bias towards the economically active rather than the poorest 
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farmers, who are excluded from national poverty programmes.  Researchers involved 
in the second Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Process (Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002) called for NAADS 
performance targets to be changed so that officers could direct assistance to poor 
farmers, including women, while Ellis and Bahiigwa describe Uganda’s delivery of 
local agricultural extension services as ‘wholly wanting’ (2003:1010).  On a more 
positive note, NARO started an experimental farm in the village in 2010; and the 
donor-funded Territorial Approach to Climate Change project launched in 2010 aims 
to support the planting of a million trees in the Mount Elgon area (Integrated 
Regional Information Networks, 2010).  It will be interesting to see whether the 
benefits of the programme percolate down to Bubufu’s poorer villagers.   
In this section I have considered agricultural diversification and the move to 
agroforestry with a climate adaptation perspective.  Due to their lack of resources, 
villagers are severely limited in their ability to diversify their on-farm livelihood 
activities, and the popular activity of growing eucalyptus is not available to the 
functionally landless or villagers with very small plots.  In general, poor farmers and 
women farmers receive minimal support for diversification from government 
agencies.  
In the next section I consider sand and stone harvesting, a non-farm livelihood 
activity that turns soil erosion and even landslides to advantage but which again is 
limited to a certain section of the population.   
4.6 Turning adversity to advantage (for a few): sand and stone harvesting  
Some Bubufu villagers, mainly young men, have exploited runoff and erosion by 
collecting sand and stones from the bed of the Singye and selling them for building 
purposes.  Albert N., in his early twenties and newly-married, told me that this 
innovation began after the torrential rains and landslides of 1997.  Some of the 
landslides higher up the ridge blocked the course of the stream resulting in an 
increase of sediment and pebbles in the water lower down.  Ever since then people in 
Bubufu have taken advantage of this when it rains heavily, as in early 2010:  
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Albert N: extract from interview transcript 
Because of the heavy rainfall, people in Bubufu have been able to collect a lot 
of sand from the Singye.  When people begin collecting sand from the Singye 
then you can tell that the rain up the ridge has been heavy and it has washed 
away the soil. 
There is high demand for the sand and stones for public construction projects and 
house-building (interview with Ernest M.), and this is a good example of how, in 
some circumstances, people can turn an adverse climate impact into opportunity.  Put 
crudely, the livelihood loss of farmers living higher up the slope has become a 
livelihood gain for some people lower down the valley.  Sand is sold either by the 
basin or by the truck-load with the poorest collectors selling it on a piecemeal basis 
and so obtaining a lower price than people who can afford to accumulate large 
quantities before they sell it.
9
 In this way the benefits of the trade depend on existing 
wealth status.   
Some villagers emphasised the physical effort involved in the work and the fact that 
only young men with little or no land have the time and energy to do it, although 
women and girls sometimes help to carry sand and stones up to the roadside for a 
small fee.  This is how Albert N. explained the fact that women did not engage in the 
business:   
Albert N: extract from interview transcript 
The problem is about their backs bending for long; they are easily affected, 
thus trouble. The carrying of heavy loads is for men, and the main reason is 
women aren’t used to it. They have never got into the habit and they have 
never seen any other women doing it.  They have been lazy, and also they 
have no time to do that kind of thing, what with cooking, looking after the 
children and all the other things that may need their attention. 
In a separate interview another man, Patrick N., focussed on women’s domestic 
                                                 
9
 Jennifer M. priced a basin of river sand at USh500-1500 depending on the level of demand and the 
amount.  Ernest M. and Nelson M. priced larger amounts at USh10-15,000 for a small truck load and 
up to USh25,000 for a large truck-load.   
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duties as a barrier:  
Patrick N: extract from interview transcript 
Why women do not pick sand is because when the man goes to pick the sand 
the woman has to remain and keep the home.  
Both Albert N. and Patrick N. were useful exponents of the local ideology 
surrounding the gender division of labour, as they had decided opinions on what 
married women should and should not do.  Although their views may have been 
more extreme than those of some other men, I became very familiar with the type of 
comments they articulated.  The themes of women’s laziness, physical weakness and 
domestic duties tended to come up in any men’s discussion of women’s economic 
activity.  I explore the contesting discourses of married men and women in Chapter 
7.  The point I want to make here is that this set of ideas militates against women 
benefiting from sand and stone harvesting at anything except a trivial level, although 
this activity is the only positive adaptation to destructive rainfall yet seen in the 
village. 
As for Albert himself, harvesting sand is an important activity in his livelihood 
portfolio along with another livelihood activity popular with young men: making and 
selling bricks.  Based on the seasons, he systematically divides his year between 
Bubufu and a town near the Kenyan border, where he does building work and has 
bought land.  He stays in Bubufu during the rainy season because of the opportunity 
to collect sand.  In the language of Thomas et al (2007), Albert takes advantage of 
both spatial and temporal variability.  Yet, despite his foresight, energy and 
resourcefulness, Albert was a victim of the unexpected El Niño-related rains of early 
2010, which destroyed four thousand of the bricks he had made, two thirds of his 
total output for that ‘dry’ season.  
4.7 Summary 
The evidence I have presented in this chapter shows that, in the words of my research 
question, climate threats are indeed a significant threat to human security in my study 
location.  Farming on steep slopes and riverbanks, which is unavoidable due to land 
scarcity, intensifies the negative effects of heavy rain, illustrating the mutuality of 
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societies and their environments (Hilhorst, 2004).  If meteorologists’ projections of 
more frequent and destructive rainfall events in the Ugandan highlands (see 
Introduction) turn out to be accurate the results are likely to include even deeper food 
insecurity and income poverty.   
I have emphasised how destructive rainfall damages agricultural output in 
combination with many other agricultural problems.  While I have already mentioned 
some of these, such as the lack of farming inputs, not all have received attention in 
this chapter.  In particular, the crop diseases banana xanthomonas wilt and cassava 
mosaic have seriously affected food security in the village in recent years, as in many 
parts of East Africa (Tripathi et al, 2009; FAO Newsroom, 2007).  It is one of the 
mysteries of my fieldwork that they were not mentioned more often in interviews and 
discussions.  I cannot explain this except by surmising that other threats may have 
eclipsed them or that farmers simply take them for granted and so did not see fit to 
mention them during interviews.   
While there is some evidence of social variation in the priority that villagers give to 
destructive rainfall, it is very slight.  The consensus that it is a major threat is not 
surprising given the covariate nature of the risk, its high probability and the extent of 
the destruction it can wreak.  Physical coping measures offer only partial protection 
against destructive rainfall, so whether they actually qualify as ‘coping’ at all is a 
moot point.  Perhaps ‘alleviation measures’ would be a better description.  Given the 
range of basic constraints to farming, any technical climate coping and adaptation 
measures are likely to be ineffective on their own; they need to be part of a 
comprehensive strategy aimed at promoting sustainable agriculture for food security.   
The fact that brick-making and horticultural activities were badly damaged by the 
unusual rains of February 2010 shows how adaptive individuals expose themselves 
to ‘surprise’ climate events, which are said to be characteristic of anthropogenic 
climate change (Forster et al, 2007), unless their chosen diversification activities are 
non-farm (Ellis, 2000; Goulden, 2006).  There is considerable social variation 
regarding access to all coping and adaptive activities.  Even simple actions like 
digging a trench or obtaining seeds of a new variety depend on cash, land, time and 
access to labour power, all of which are mediated by wealth, gender and life-stage 
and thus are beyond the reach of some villagers.  The social and cultural patterns that 
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permeate agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa are well-recognised in other knowledge 
domains (Fairhead and Leach, 2005), but their implications for climate adaptation 
have yet to be fully absorbed.   
As well as implementing practices that are unequivocally responses to weather 
shocks, such as digging trenches and cultivating eucalyptus, many villagers also 
engage in non-farm income opportunities.  Mindful of Bryceson’s (2002) strictures 
and in keeping with Thomas et al (2007) I am reluctant to frame such activities 
solely as response to climate threats, so I do not consider them here.  I discuss some 
of the social tensions that can blight these activities in Chapter 10.   
All the coping and adaptive strategies discussed in this chapter are planned and 
implemented at the individual and household levels.  The tradition of individual 
landholdings which, according to Heald (1998), is absolutely crucial to Gisu 
masculine identity seems to militate against the collective climate adaptation 
solutions documented elsewhere (e.g. Thomas et al, 2007: Ensor and Berger, 2009b).  
It is interesting that Jenkins et al (2010) found that a group of Gisu elders seemed to 
‘look with a little envy’ on a neighbouring ethnic group, the Acholi, because their 
communal approach to land management has facilitated sustainable land use.   
Because current national policy goals marginalise poor farmers they are not 
conducive to pro-poor climate adaptation initiatives such as the South African 
community horticulture projects described by Thomas et al (2007).  In general, 
Ugandan farmers do not see government agencies or officials as supportive (Ellis and 
Bahiigwa, 2003:1010) although in Bubufu the NARO initiative may be a ray of light 
in the gloom.  
Several of the themes of this first chapter recur throughout the thesis.  In the next 
chapter I discuss two recent landslide crises in the village and analyse how villagers 
responded to them. 
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Chapter 5: ‘Landslides bring worrying’ 
 
5.1 Introduction  
In 2009, Elijah N., an elderly man, described the destructive power of landslides and 
gave me an insight into the fear they instil:  
Elijah N: extract from interview transcript 
Landslides bring worrying.  When [a landslide] happens, it kills people.  It 
also destroys people’s land hence causing them to lack land, and all the food 
crops that one has grown will be buried, and also if it finds a house it buries it 
with all the livestock. 
In this chapter I analyse men and women’s stories of how landslides affected them 
during the crises of November 1997 (Section 5.2) and March 2010 (Section 5.3).  I 
concentrate on the social differentiation in their experiences and the influence of 
Gisu gender ideology on both short-term coping and longer-term social outcomes.   
The underlying causes of landslides in Bugisu, as in other parts of the East African 
highlands, include high population density, the associated slope disturbance and 
deforestation, steeply sloping hillsides and geological factors (Ngecu et al, 2004; 
Knapen et al, 2006).  Under these basic conditions landslides can be triggered by 
heavy rain or by slope excavation, for instance to create flat areas for house-building 
(Ngecu et al, 2004; Knapen et al, 2006).  In this way landslides are the products of 
interactions between communities and their environment (Hilhorst, 2004).  The 
landslide crises of 1997 and 2010 were both related to the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation.  Judging from villagers’ individual accounts and the high priority they 
gave to discussing landslides during the PRA sessions it is clear that landslides are 
indeed highly significant in their lives during the rainy season.  Because of unusually 
heavy rainfall they were especially serious threats in those particular years.  
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5.2 ‘There was a year we got very worried’: 1997 
 
Figure 5.1: Close-up of the 1997 landslide scarp 
In Chapter 2 I included a photograph of a scarp in the upper village which marked 
the site of a fatal landslide in November 1997; Figure 5.1 presents a closer view.  
Cracks had appeared in the earth there some five years before, but during that 
month’s heavy rains they widened and multiplied:   
Maurice S: summary from interview transcript  
For four days people thought the land would break but nothing happened, so 
people stopped worrying.  But on the fifth day in the night around 3 a.m. the 
land broke and people were killed.  Five died, all from the same family, and 
only two bodies were recovered.  The other three bodies have never been seen 
to this day. 
Several villagers told me that they were connected to the victims by kinship or 
friendship.  The non-recovery of some of the bodies seemed to deepen their sense of 
horror, and I discuss a possible reason for this below.  During the same period 
smaller landslides, known as ‘mini-landslides’, occurred all over the upper slopes of 
the ridge, threatening humans and livestock, damaging or destroying  houses and 
gardens and forcing families to flee from the upper village.  About 60 people were 
killed in Mbale and neighbouring Kapchorwa districts.  ‘That year we got very 
worried’, said Gregory N.  Along with many other interviewees now living in the 
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lower village (e.g. Ezra K. and Margaret B.), he was one of those who had to 
evacuate their homes on the upper slopes.  
If villagers judge that a landslide is about to happen near their house they may have 
time to dismantle them and carry the building materials downhill for reuse.  Even 
then it will take time before the house can be rebuilt.  If a garden is caught up in a 
landslide the effects are twofold.  One is the loss of standing crops swept downhill or 
inundated by soil from above.  Even more important, because the impact is more 
enduring, is the loss of cultivable land itself.  Cuthbert J. said of 1997: ‘In the parts 
that were affected by the landslides the soils were carried away and whatever one 
plants in such soils cannot grow: this soil is not productive.’  Jennifer N. described 
such land as ‘a stony surface that cannot be cultivated’.  Some people, such as John 
M., had to abandon landslide-afflicted gardens altogether: this heightened his 
vulnerability to later destructive rainfall events (Chapter 4). 
According to Cuthbert W., the loss of land, damage to property and the expense of 
relocating in 1997 have led to long-standing hardship for many of those involved, 
including impacts on succeeding generations:  
Cuthbert W: extract from interview transcript  
Since the people who were affected by the landslides moved downhill, the 
level of education has gone down in most of the families. You find that a man 
struggling just to feed his children, let alone buy scholastic materials and 
paying school fees for them.    
The results of the participatory wealth-ranking exercise (Appendix 3) confirmed that 
the 1997 landslides had caused lasting damage to material wellbeing in the village.  
A high proportion of households situated in the upper village were assigned to wealth 
rank 3, a legacy of the loss of property and land in 1997.  In the words of government 
researchers working in the area, landslides ‘make people move into poverty’ 
(Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002:24).  
In early 2010 it seemed that a similar crisis was unfolding.  
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5.3 ‘The land here could break any time’: 2010 
On 1
st
 March 2010, after weeks of heavy rain associated with another El Niño event, 
an avalanche of mud and rock killed an estimated 300 people in Bududa district, just 
a few miles away from Bubufu (BBC News, 3
rd
 March 2010).  When Mr. Balungira 
visited Bubufu just after this disaster, he found that people were very worried indeed.  
While a sub-county directive issued on 28
th
 February did not identify Bubufu as an 
area of particularly high risk there were unmistakeable warning signs on the steeper 
slopes in the form of cracks in the earth and  unusual flows of water.  According to a 
national Ugandan newspaper, ‘gaping cracks that slither through gardens, 
compounds and under rock’ and ‘mini-landslides’ were affecting seven sub-counties 
in the region (Edyegu, 2010).   
People still living on the upper slopes were at most risk, at least in the short-term.  
These were mainly poor people who had no other land on which to build their 
houses; a classic example of social vulnerability (Blaikie et al, 1994; Wisner et al, 
2004).  However, they included a man classed in the highest wealth rank.  He had 
built a large house of permanent materials, and his wife said that this investment was 
a disincentive to moving even though ‘mini-landslides’ had occurred around it 
(interview with Clara N.)  
The chairman of the upper village, Emmanuel W., was monitoring the general 
situation.  In some houses, he said, such was the volume of water welling up through 
the floor that families had been forced to dig channels to let it flow out: ‘You  find 
people eating while beside them water is flowing past.’  Figure 5.2 shows a house 
exposed to a landslide: water flowing from holes in the slope was seen as an 
especially bad sign.  As for the majority of villagers who lived in the lower part of 
the village, many were worried about the hillside gardens on which they depended 
for their livelihoods.  Memories of 1997 were revived, and the Bududa disaster 
brought home the potentially catastrophic consequences of landslides with renewed 
force.  
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Figure 5.2: A house threatened by a landslide  
Mr. Balungira spoke to several people whose homes were endangered.  The 
following brief accounts illustrate what the residents of the upper village were 
dealing with:   
Reading the signs (summaries from Mr. Balungira’s notes) 
Jasmine N. said that ever since 1997 water had welled up through the floor at 
the start of the rainy season, but this year it had started as early as February: 
‘Sometimes it floods the whole house and we have to find a way of drawing it 
out’.  She said that she was very worried because ‘when you see the soil in 
the house becoming wet and looking like mud you get worried that any time 
the house can fall.’ 
Close by there were large cracks in the walls of the house belonging to 
Wilbert N. (Figure 5.3), and water was welling up though the floor there too.  
In itself, this was nothing new; he said it had happened every year season 
since 1998, but this year it had started earlier than usual because of the 
unseasonal rain.  He had noticed that water was coming through the floor 
with greater force than previously and it was clear in colour, which, he said, 
meant that a landslide was imminent.  Back in 1996 the very same signals had 
prompted him to leave his previous house higher up the ridge, and soon 
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afterwards a landslide had indeed struck.  He had learned a lesson from this 
experience and was making plans to leave: ‘Now, when I see such signs, I 
cannot linger’.   
 
Figure 5.3: A crack in the wall of Wilbert M.’s house 
Although Wilbert was preparing to move, other villagers similarly exposed were 
hanging on.  I now turn to the consideration of how affected householders responded 
to such risks, drawing on stories from 1997 as well as from what people told Mr. 
Balungira in March 2010.   
5.4 Reacting to the landslide threat 
In considering villagers’ reactions to the threat of landslides, I start by describing 
how their first tactic is to remain in their homes and try to manage the situation.  I 
then consider what happens if and when households eventually have no choice but to 
evacuate, concentrating on how the short- and longer-term outcomes of that decision 
are mediated by wealth and gender.  
‘Standing firm’ 
What is striking about the stories in the previous section is that in March 2010, 
fearful villagers remained in landslide-threatened homes despite the discomfort, 
inconvenience and, above all, the risk.  The cracks and flowing water that were 
pointed out to Mr. Balungira are genuine indicators that a landslide may be 
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imminent: for instance they are in keeping with an eye-witness account of what 
happened before one of the largest landslides of 1997 (Knapen et al, 2006:162). It 
seems, then, that for people such as Sheila and Jasmine the question was not if a 
landslide might affect them but when it would strike.    
Monitoring well-known indicators year after year, householders seem to have 
become expert in a form of ongoing risk management.  For instance, what Wilbert 
M. said about the force and colour of the water flowing through his house suggests 
that some people, at least, think they can judge the level of risk at any one time.  The 
memories and judgement of older men also seem to be useful in predicting where a 
landslide might happen.  One of the oldest villagers, Gregory N., said that his 
grandfather had warned him against living in a certain location in the upper village 
because of a landslide that had happened there in 1922.   
 So landslides in Bubufu involve features of both continuous stresses and one-off 
shocks.  Up to a point they are stresses that can be managed, until something triggers 
them and they become shocks, although hardly in the sense of unexpected events.  
This speaks volumes about the degree of risk that villagers live with on a routine 
basis, and signals that sharp distinctions between disasters and everyday life may not 
be appropriate in Bubufu (Wisner et al, 2004).  But while expert folk judgement may 
be critical to survival, landslides can and do wreak catastrophe. So what compels 
people to live in the shadow of risks like these?  
For one thing, in the absence of government support for evacuation the risk of 
landslides is counterbalanced by the highly uncertain outcomes of leaving, as the 
next extract suggests:  
Edwin W: extract from interview transcript 
Even when someone knows that a landslide might happen there is nothing he 
can do.  It might be the only land that he has and he might have grown his 
cassava there, and when he thinks of going somewhere else he is not sure he 
will be able to get food there.  So he decides to stay, and it is God who 
decides whether the landslides will bury him or not. 
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Edwin expresses fatalism and focuses on food insecurity as a disincentive to moving 
away from a landslide-threatened area: this was also mentioned by other 
interviewees.  Like Edwin, several other villagers also described feeling powerless in 
the face of the threat of a landslide.  Sometimes they compared that with their self-
perceived competence with regard to other, apparently less intractable problems.   
At the same time, some men also used the phrase ‘standing firm’ or ‘remaining firm’, 
alluding to the strength of character that Gisu men associate with manhood, and it 
may be that this ideal of standing firm encourages and sustains male household heads 
to stay put in their homes.  George M., for instance, put it this way:  
George M: extract from interview transcript 
There is nowhere we can run to. Other risks are not so worrying, because if 
one is alive and engaged in productive work one can find formidable 
solutions for them, unlike landslides. This is a very big problem because you 
can’t run away, you just remain firm. 
Like George, several other people living in exposed locations also said that they had 
nowhere else to go.  Some said they could only expect assistance from kin in 
situations of dire and immediate need:  
Sheila N: extract from interview transcript 
I cannot carry my family and take them to another person because that person 
will have to feed them, so we just have to remain here.  However, if there was 
a landslide close by, perhaps some of my relatives would call me to stay with 
them so that I did not die.  If you go to them for help just because you are 
worried, they might think that you want to move in with them [and are using 
the landslide threat as an excuse]. They may tell you ‘it is normal for water to 
come out of the house, so there is no need for you to run away’.   
Jasmine N. and her husband had a similar story, but in their case the difficulties were 
compounded by the unusually large size of their household:  
Jasmine N: my summary from Mr. Balungira’s interview notes 
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As well as their six children, Jasmine N. and her husband had her husband’s 
sister, who had left her husband, and her two children living with them, 
making eleven people in the house.  ‘We have only decided to stay because 
we have nowhere we can run to’ she said, and this was corroborated by her 
husband when he was interviewed later: ‘We are worried because we might 
die like our friends in Bududa’. He explained that he only had one plot of 
land, and pointed out that the large size of the family militated against anyone 
offering them temporary refuge: ‘The problem is that sometimes you can run 
away and the landslide does not happen and, given the small pieces of land 
that most of us have, you cannot burden someone else because you fear a 
landslide might happen.  But when it actually happens someone might feel 
pity for you and help you’. 
In these remarks there is a suggestion of pride and forbearance in ‘you cannot burden 
someone else’.  It reflects the Gisu ideal of self-reliance as well as the recognition 
that poverty severely constrains the assistance that can be given, so it would be unfair 
to impose on kin.  There is a fear of being seen as a parasite and perhaps seeming 
cowardly or foolish if, in fact, a landslide does not occur after you have thrown 
yourself on a relative’s mercy.  On the other hand there is also some expectation that 
if a threat becomes acute, or in the aftermath of a disaster, kin will eventually step in 
to help.  Even in such an extremity though, Sheila and Jasmine seem to express some 
doubt about this: ‘perhaps some of my relatives would call me...so that I did not die’ 
and ‘someone might feel pity for you’.   
Maurice S., who was also threatened by landslides in March 2010, explained his 
decision to hang on until the last minute by explaining what had happened to some 
villagers in 1997:   
Maurice S: summary from transcript 
People went and stayed with relatives, but later conflicts developed because 
someone cannot keep you for a month when you are not doing anything to 
support the household.  That is why some people decided to come back to 
their original homes. 
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Wisner et al (2004) remark that, although assistance from kin can be a very 
important source of support, after disasters these norms often change very quickly 
(102).  To some extent this is due to the covariate nature of risk from natural hazards 
(Dercon, 2005).  In both November 1997 and February 2010, hillside communities 
all over the area were facing the same problems, including the natal villages of some 
Bubufu wives, limiting the number of potential safe havens available to a family 
menaced by cracks in the walls.  In a context of shared risk and widespread material 
hardship, the Gisu discourse on self-reliance serves to legitimise the withholding of 
support from needy kin as well as having the practical effect of keeping them away 
from the door for as long as possible.  
Self-reliance is a particularly strong cultural ideal for Gisu men, and I now turn to the 
effects of landslide crises on masculine identity, comparing male household heads’ 
experiences with those of their wives.  First I look at what happens in the short term 
if a family has to evacuate its home, then at the longer-term outcomes.  
Evacuation: a gendered experience 
When a family is forced to evacuate a house, the pain of sudden displacement affects 
the spouses in different ways, mediated by their gendered roles and responsibilities.  
This is true whether the cause is a landslide or some other natural hazard such as a 
storm.  This is what Albert N., a young married man, had to say on the subject during 
the men’s group discussion:  
Albert N: extract from group discussion transcript   
It affects the man so much when landslides happen.  We say the man builds 
the house, the man buys the land where the house is built, and when you have 
food and it is destroyed it is the man’s responsibility to provide more.  The 
whole impact of the problem is pushed onto the man.  When the house is 
damaged and breaks down the men are most affected, because they have to do 
anything possible to see that the house is put right, while the woman has an 
option of going back to her native home for refuge. For the men it is not easy 
to take refuge in somebody’s home. So you do anything to see that your 
house is back in shape.   
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Gisu wives usually come from villages close by and keep up strong ties with their kin 
after marriage, and this is an important cultural characteristic in relation to 
displacement.  After a crisis such as those caused by landslides, they can return to 
their natal village with relative ease (La Fontaine, 1962; Heald, 1998).  Husbands are 
expected to look after themselves.  Jasmine N., whom I have already cited, said that 
that if there was a landslide close to the house she would take her children to stay 
with her mother: ‘As for my husband I do not know where he will go.  He is an adult 
and he will think of somewhere.’  There is a Gisu taboo forbidding contact between a 
man and his wife’s mother (La Fontaine, 1959:26), and I speculate that this may also 
prevent men from seeking refuge with their wife’s kin.  Although no-one explicitly 
mentioned mother-in-law avoidance during interviews, perhaps that was because it 
belongs to the doxa, ‘that which is taken for granted’ (Bourdieu, 1977:166) of Gisu 
culture.  While wives have the option of taking refuge in their natal village, however, 
I do not accept Albert’s implication that they escape their share of the pressure when 
landslides threaten.  After all, Sheila and Jasmine’s comments (above) suggest that 
married women cannot always count on a warm reception from their kin. 
Another interesting feature of this extract is Albert’s articulation of the notion that 
male household heads have exclusive control of and responsibility for their 
households.  This is mirrored in married women’s discourses.  Married women often 
used the phrase ‘my husband’s house’ to refer to the house where they themselves 
lived.  If they do not regard their homes as ‘theirs’, it follows that if it is damaged or 
destroyed the onus of dealing with the crisis falls on their husbands.  Older married 
women sometimes articulated conjugal dependence, as when Esther N. told me, ‘I 
am like a child to [my husband], because it was he who brought me here’; this may 
be a discursive tactic to underline their husbands’ responsibility for them (Jackson, 
2007).   
Albert was not the only man to stress the responsibility that is the normative 
corollary of a household head’s exclusive control of his household.  For instance 
Albert’s comments prompted Ezra K., who was also participating in the discussion, 
to describe his own experience when a storm blew the roof off his house.  His 
remarks apply to any situation in which a house has been badly damaged or 
destroyed:  
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Ezra K: extract from group discussion transcript 
I want to speak from experience about the problems men face.  Once I had 
my house roof blown off by the wind: we were lucky not to die. I wondered 
where I would take the family but I decided to stay in the same place until I 
built another house, because I felt I could not carry my family to another 
person’s house.  I thought I would be crushed, but I slowly overcame this 
problem. 
Is Ezra’s statement a genuine reflection on a time of intense personal stress or a 
skilful deployment of a masculine discourse designed to legitimise Gisu men’s 
control of their households?  It is probably a mixture of both.  When I interviewed 
Ezra K.’s wife she talked of storm damage to her sweet potato mounds and did not 
mention the roof.  My point is that even in the short term, experiences of disasters 
such as landslides are strongly differentiated according to gendered roles and 
responsibilities and the gender division of labour.   
I now turn to longer-term experiences of displacement, starting with the resettlement 
and then analysing some of the gender dimensions of household fragmentation. 
In the longer term: Resettlement  
After finding temporary refuge the question is what to do next.  In 1997, local 
government distributed food relief and other items to some displaced families, but no 
assistance was available to support relocation.  In the main, what to do next 
depended on individual men’s access to resources.  In 1997, the better-off men who 
had had to abandon houses on the upper slopes, such as primary school teacher 
James L., were eventually able to buy land downhill and rebuild; several now live 
near the schools.  But even where resources are available there are other problems to 
do with relocating outside one’s own village.  Table 5.1 contains a list of some of the 
issues that were mentioned during individual interviews and group discussions. 
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Economic\financial Security Social Cultural 
Cost of having to set up a 
new home  
Short-term food insecurity 
Risk of failing to establish 
new livelihoods 
Cost of having to buy food 
(if moved to town) 
Men migrating alone risk 
contracting HIV\AIDS 
Difficulties of buying land 
outside own lineage area  
Being targeted 
for physical 
violence by 
members of the 
host community  
For men migrating 
alone, risk of moving in 
with a new wife and 
forgetting the family in 
the village 
Turning to theft and 
being lynched (young 
people) 
Disputes with 
neighbours  
Accusations of 
witchcraft  
Reluctance to eat 
unaccustomed staple 
food  
Difficulty adjusting 
to the new people 
and environment 
Anxiety about dying 
and being buried 
away from the 
village  
Language 
difficulties 
Table 5.1: Risks and problems associated with resettling in a new area 
 
One of the problems most often mentioned was that newcomers are often confronted 
by hostility from existing residents.  For instance, according to Jessica W., she and 
her husband Noel M. had been subjected to violent attacks  including arson since 
moving to Bubufu from a landslide-affected zone higher up the slopes: ‘We are new 
people in this area ... so maybe they are threatening us to see whether we are firm or 
whether we will leave.  And some of them might say that this land is in their area and 
it ought to be theirs.’   
Only one man talked about ancestral land in relation to relocating.  I have already 
mentioned how, in March 2010, Wilbert M. noticed certain indications that a 
landslide was about to strike his house:   
Wilbert M: summary from Mr. Balungira’s interview notes  
To escape the threat of a landslide engulfing his house, Wilbert M. planned to 
move with his wife and children to the second of his two plots, from which he 
had been driven by a landslide in 1997.  Although he agreed with Mr. 
Balungira that it was not an ideal solution, he claimed that very few people 
would be willing to move away from the upper village altogether, even if the 
government offered to relocate them:  
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‘Most people here say that they want to die on their father’s grave.  
People here believe in ritualistic things, for example when someone falls 
sick he wants to sacrifice a hen at the father’s grave so that he recovers.  
If he moved far away from the father’s grave he would not be able to 
perform these rituals. The ancestors might say you abandoned them 
because you wanted to save your own life, and they might decide to claim 
it.  It is taboo for someone to sell land with a grave and go away; 
everyone in the community would condemn it.  Although the weather can 
be bad, you cannot sell your land and go somewhere else if that land has a 
grave on it. There are two brothers in this village who sold the land where 
their father was buried and bought land in [a nearby village] instead.  
Their father died after being bewitched so they sold the land for fear of 
being bewitched as well. Each of [the brothers] lost two of their children 
and whatever they did, they could not succeed.’ 
 Beliefs surrounding ancestors are a crucial aspect of African attitudes to land 
(Reynolds Whyte, 2005; Kagoda, 2008; Shipton, 2009).  Wilbert M.’s comments 
suggest that they may be a barrier to relocation, even in situations of considerable 
physical risk.  The risk from landslides is weighed against the risk of provoking 
ancestors’ wrath.  Wilbert M. wanted to avoid antagonising his ancestors for reasons 
of rational self-interest, given his belief system.  Kagoda, on the other hand, stresses 
tradition and symbolism: ‘Land stands for continuity of ownership since it is a burial 
ground where all clansmen are buried and consequently a central place for the spirits’ 
(2008:365).  What Wilbert M. said about the necessity of performing rituals on 
graves may explain the significance that people attached to the non-recovery of 
bodies after the 1997 landslide.   
Customary land tenure systems are said to tie people to farming because they do not 
give people secure ownership of their land and so prevent the development of a 
market for land (Ellis, 2006:395).  In Bubufu, land tenure is secure, at least for men.   
Wilbert M. highlights the psychological force of values and beliefs that bind men to a 
locality even if their land is physically insecure.  Such beliefs are a version of the 
affective ties to place that Adger et al (2009) argue may be barriers to climate 
adaptation.  Because Gisu men inherit land from their fathers while their wives’ 
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access to it is contingent on marriage (La Fontaine, 1979: Heald, 1998), men may 
well feel these bonds to ancestral land more strongly than women.  I was not able to 
explore these beliefs and I have no way of knowing whether Wilbert M. was 
idiosyncratic or representative in his views about ancestors.  However, as in the case 
of rainmakers (Chapter 4), I interpret the prevailing silence on these issues in the 
light of Goffmann’s theory of performance (1969).  Talking about ancestors is seen 
as not ‘modern’, and Wilbert M. himself might not have raised the topic had I been 
interviewing him, rather than Mr. Balungira.   
In the longer-term: Household fragmentation 
In 1997, if a married man with a house on the upper slopes could not afford to buy 
land in a safer area a common response was to break up the household, at least for a 
while, with the husband seeking work elsewhere and the wife and children going to 
her natal village:  
Emmanuel W: summary from interview transcript  
During the 1997 rains, Emmanuel W. told his wife to take their three 
youngest children to her natal village ‘since things were not easy’.  He went 
to Kenya and found casual farm labour there and the older children in the 
family were sent to stay with various relatives.  After eight months in Kenya, 
he decided to return home: ‘My life was not so good as I was worried, but I 
just made myself strong and began digging [farming], as it was my home and 
I had nowhere else to go.’  
Out-migration, particularly of men, has long been a feature of life in Bugisu (Chapter 
2), but male out-migration is usually regarded as a last resort (Heald 1998:94), due in 
part to the rooting of Gisu masculine identity in the control of lineage land.  The 
1997 landslides forced men like Emmanuel to turn their backs on this tangible and 
crucial aspect of their gendered identities, at least for a time.  On the other hand, a 
District official told me that the men who leave the area immediately after a disaster 
to look for work have better access to food than their wives and children left at home.   
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In Emmanuel’s case his family was only split up for a few months, but whereas he 
later returned to resettle in the village, Elizabeth N.’s husband, who also left the 
village in 1997, did not.  
 
Elizabeth N: summary from interview transcripts and observation  
Elizabeth lived in the upper part of the village, having moved there from 
another part of the ridge after a landslide had damaged her husband’s land in 
1997.  After the landslide her husband went to Kampala to find work.  He 
took another wife there and his visits to the village became rarer.  When I 
spoke to Elizabeth she said that he had not visited her for over a year.  
Elizabeth was struggling to support herself and her children, due to the small 
amount of land she had to farm (about an acre) and the lack of financial 
support from her husband.  She sent her oldest son to see him in Kampala to 
ask for his school fees, but her husband refused to help. The house where she 
lived with her six children was one of the most ramshackle in the village and 
her children were very shabbily dressed.  She had dropped out of a rotating 
savings and credit association before her turn came round to get a pay-out as 
she could not keep up the monthly contributions.   
Elizabeth’s current problems cannot be wholly attributed to the disruption of 1997.  
However, the chain of events does suggest that by forcing her husband to look for 
work outside the village the landslide crisis underlies her poverty today.  She 
personifies the creation of female-headed households ‘dependent upon uncertain 
male remittances’, one of the long-term gendered effects of disasters that Enarson 
identifies (1998:166).   
Be that as it may, when I raised the matter of male migration during a women’s 
group discussion several participants explained the advantages of the ‘split 
household’ pattern for wives and children.  On the whole they centred on food 
security and being able to care for their children better in the village than in town.  
Although two women mentioned the risk of being abandoned in the village with the 
children, Teresa J. spoke of the security and relative independence it gave married 
women should their husbands take a second wife in town: 
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Teresa J: extract from women’s group discussion 
Men are sometimes unpredictable because when you get to town, instead of 
staying together with you and the children he can get other women and start 
mistreating you.  That’s when you start to think ‘if I had stayed in the village 
on my own, even if my husband was having affairs I wouldn’t be suffering’. 
While abandoned wives and their children are often the poorest households in a 
community (Dolan, 2004), for the women concerned their situation may be 
preferable to an even more precarious life in town with an uncaring or abusive 
husband, far from their kin.   
Before ending this chapter I want to comment briefly on the government’s response 
to the landslide crisis of 2010, and in particular to the Bududa landslide.   
5.5 ‘What do you expect?’  Government blames the poor  
When she was interviewed on the radio after the Bududa landslide Ms. Kabakumba 
Masiko, the Minister of Information and National Guidance, said ‘We did not expect 
this disaster but it was bound to happen’ (Ladu, 2010).  For months the national 
newspapers had carried predictions by Ugandan meteorologists that there would be 
heavy rains, with unequivocal headlines such as: ‘El-Nino rains begin, more areas to 
get landslides’, with the Mbale region specifically mentioned (Tenywa, 2009).  Yet 
when Mr. Balungira spoke to the village chairmen during his visit in 2010 there was 
no mention of any advance warning from the government and there were no 
government plans to support evacuation.  At the sub-county office, Mr. Balungira 
was shown a letter from the parish chief to the District authorities, calling on them to 
‘take urgent action’ to avoid ‘an expected catastrophe’ (Appendix 10).  The despatch 
of this letter had been delayed for several days due to the absence of the parish chief, 
whose approval and signature was required before it could be sent off.   
After the landslide in Bududa, President Museveni visited the scene dressed in battle 
fatigues and carrying an AK-47, a costume which provoked some mockery in the 
media (Lusima, 2010).  This is what he had to say to the shocked and grieving 
population:  
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This place is called Nametsi, meaning the granary of water and this is what 
God intended. But look at it, you have destroyed all the trees on the slopes of 
the hills that hold the soils, you have cultivated and settled on the hills, what 
do you expect? Once you harass nature, it also harasses you (Mafabi, 2010a). 
Although it may have been an especially insensitive example of the genre, President 
Museveni’s words typified the elite discourse in Uganda which tends to blame the 
poor for their own misfortunes (Hickey, 2005).   
A few days after the Bududa landslide, Ugandan newspapers also reported that three 
local government officers including the sub-county chief had been arrested after local 
people denounced them for stealing blankets intended for displaced people (Mafabi, 
2010b).   
Taken together these two stories indicate that, at the very least, poor people in my 
study area cannot expect much support from either national or local government 
representatives when climate-related disasters strike.  In the case of the blanket thefts 
it is clear that local government agents themselves can embody a threat to poor 
people’s human security, even during calamities.  Governance that is inimical to poor 
people is an important contributory factor in their insecurity. 
5.6 Summary 
Based on the evidence here there can be little doubt that landslides have to be 
counted among the most damaging impacts of weather shocks in the village.  Writing 
of the enduring appeal of land in African society, Berry cites an African woman 
telling a researcher that ‘a piece of land never shrinks’ (Mackenzie 1993, cited in 
Berry 2002:639).  On the contrary, land in Bubufu often shrinks, and landslides 
contribute even more starkly than soil erosion to ‘supply-induced’ land scarcity 
(Homer-Dixon, 1999: 15).  Given that land underpins both livelihoods and cultural 
life, what does this mean for human security?  And, using responses to landslides as 
a proxy for responses to climate change, what are the implications for climate 
adaptive capacity?   
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From a human security approach it is possible to identify some of the socio-cultural 
dimensions of landslide crises.  A lack of reliable support from either kin or 
government keeps villagers in highly-exposed locations until the last possible 
moment.  I interpret the accompanying discourse around self-reliance as both a 
genuine incentive to ‘stand firm’ and a device to legitimise the lack of support from 
other community members.  Focussing now on governance, at the local level disaster 
relief is subject to the depradations of elected officials, while at the highest level 
environmentalist rhetoric is used as a weapon against poor people.  Landslide crises 
interact with Gisu cultural norms, values and intra-household gender relations to 
produce culturally-constructed, gender-specific stresses in addition to the material 
outcomes of food insecurity and poverty.  Traditional beliefs about ancestral land and 
normative self-reliance may affect men more than women.  On the other hand, the 
gender division of labour, better mobility and income-earning prospects for men and 
the male ownership of land combine to create vulnerable de facto female-headed 
households in the village.  In Chapter 4 I drew attention to the barriers that de facto 
female household heads face in adapting to destructive rainfall; the potential for a 
vicious circle of climate vulnerability is clear.   
Some of the content of both this and the previous chapter has covered ground already 
well-travelled by the rural development, food security or disasters literatures.  
Nevertheless, both chapters are necessary first steps towards answering my main 
research question and building up a picture of the interaction between threats, 
responses and generic adaptive capacity.  In the next chapter I turn to a problem that 
may at first sight appear to be unrelated to weather risks; the cost of medical 
treatment.  However, I argue that climate vulnerability and the costs of healthcare are 
closely linked. 
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Chapter 6: ‘Sickness needs money’: Corruption, healthcare 
charges and climate vulnerability 
 
6.1 Introduction 
We are always worried about sickness...because our income is low. (Milton 
W.) 
In Chapters 4 and 5 I started to answer the first part of my research question by 
arguing that the impacts of destructive rainfall, in particular crop loss, soil erosion 
and landslides, are major contributors to human insecurity in the village in 
interaction with other problems.  Yet although the likely impacts of destructive 
rainfall in the coming rainy season were causing apprehension and anxiety when I 
talked to villagers in 2009, they were overshadowed by fears of ill-health and its 
consequences. This is not surprising, as studies from other parts of Africa also show 
that ill-health generally looms large in people’s perceptions of risks and stresses (e.g. 
Smith et al, 2000; Tschakert, 2007; Bunce et al, 2010).  In the context of rural 
Tanzania, Cleaver remarks that the material impacts of ill-health are ‘obvious but 
often understated’ (2005:897).   
In response to open-ended questioning, Bubufu adults mentioned health risks much 
more often than other kind of risk.  For example 81 per cent of adults interviewed 
mentioned health problems as a threat to their human security compared to 59 per 
cent of adults who mentioned any type of weather risk.  Also, if asked to identify 
their biggest worry adults identified illness and injury more than anything else. 
Finally, all four PRA-style discussion groups ranked ill-health among the top four 
threats.  Villagers brought up the costs of healthcare and the abusive treatment they 
sometimes receive from government healthcare staff; these problems were clearly 
important elements of their anxieties.  In this chapter, I investigate the corrupt and 
coercive behaviour of healthcare staff that, apart from the pain and debility of illness 
in itself, underlies villagers’ fears about ill-health.  I draw attention to some 
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implications for climate adaptive capacity.  I also briefly consider the gendered 
nature of men and women’s experiences of these problems.  
The next section contains information on health indicators and healthcare provision 
in the study area in order to establish the context, after which I summarise evidence 
on corruption in the Ugandan health sector generally (section 6.3).  In section 6.4 I 
provide evidence of the heavy financial burden villagers have to bear when they seek 
medical treatment due partly to corruption in the health service, and in section 6.5 I 
argue that expenditure on health can cause long-lasting climate vulnerability.  I also 
examine gender differences in how these problems are experienced (section 6.6.) 
before concluding the chapter.   
6.2 Overview of health status and local services  
The Manafwa District Health Sector Strategic Plan II (MDHSSP II) 2005-2010 is the 
most recent document I have been able to obtain giving health indicators and 
information on health services in the District (Manafwa District Local Government 
Directorate of Health Services, 2005).  It contains several targets with baseline 
figures derived from what used to be Mbale District health sub-districts, before 
Manafwa District was carved out of Mbale District in 2005.  However the reliability 
of the data is doubtful: for instance, the under-5 mortality rate given in the plan, 
49/1,000, looks like a gross underestimate compared to the World Health 
Organisation’s national figure of 135/1,000.  I use figures from the Plan only where 
they are not obviously at odds with national data, and even then with the caveat that 
they may be inaccurate.  
Local health care provision  
The MDHSSP II refers to ‘significant’ problems in staffing, equipping and supplying 
sub-county health centres, and K. sub-county is mentioned as being poorly served by 
health facilities compared to most other parts of the district (Manawa District Local 
Government Directorate of Health Services, 2005:4).  There is no parish-level health 
centre serving Bubufu, although according to the MDHSSP II all parishes should 
have one: people complained about this during group discussions.  The sub-county 
health centre is situated in a village higher up the ridge, which can only be reached 
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from Bubufu on foot.  Villagers estimate that it takes between 40 minutes and 2 
hours to get there, depending on which part of the village one starts from and the 
condition of the walker.  It is said to be poorly equipped and with untrained staff.  In 
the district as a whole only 49 per cent of health posts were filled by appropriately 
qualified personnel in 2005 due to its difficult terrain, remoteness and endemic 
poverty, all of which deter qualified health workers from working in the area 
(Manawa District Local Government Directorate of Health Services, 2005).  On the 
positive side, treatment at the sub-county health centre is free, which is why some 
residents use it despite these well-known problems: however, many villagers go to 
Bududa Hospital if they need a diagnosis or if an illness is serious.  It is situated a 
few kilometres away and is accessible by shared taxi and boda-boda.  It takes 40 
minutes to walk there from the Growers’ Society near the bottom of the village.  
According to villagers, waiting times and standards of care at the hospital are poor 
and the Manafwa District Health Sector Strategic Plan II alludes to severe 
shortcomings in facilities and staffing (Manawa District Local Government 
Directorate of Health Services, 2005:8).  
The government health system is only one source of healthcare for villagers, the 
alternatives being a traditional healer, a diviner and private drug shops and clinics.  
Several villagers (e.g. John K. and Maggie B.) claimed during interviews that faith in 
diviners is fading: modern education, government sensitisation programmes and the 
spread of Pentecostalism were put forward as reasons for this trend.  I was also told 
that a few ‘uneducated’ people in Bubufu consult Pentecostalist pastors when they 
are ill (interview with Maggie B.)  Working among the Nyole people in another part 
of south-eastern Uganda, Reynolds Whyte found that while ‘Western’ biomedicine 
was popular, people in her study area often hedged their bets by trying both 
biomedicines and traditional sources of assistance, these being either a diviner or a 
herbal medicine practitioner (1997).  As with other traditional beliefs, people in 
Bubufu tended not to talk about the use of traditional healers and diviners to me or 
my assistants, although one woman did:  
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Catherine N: extract from interview transcript  
There are ...diseases that are uncertain. Some of the uncertain diseases are 
native diseases whereby people implant certain things like bones in children’s 
stomachs.  You have to go to a native doctor for those bones to be removed. 
According to the Local Government Directorate of Health Services, a ‘significant 
proportion’ of the local population self-medicates, goes to private clinics or consults 
traditional healers (2005: 4).  Self-medication is not unusual in Uganda, nor is it a 
recent phenomenon: Reynolds-Whyte cites a Ugandan Red Cross Survey of 1985 
that found that 41 per cent of rural people seeking medical treatment went to a 
private clinic or drug shop rather than a government facility (1991:134).  The health 
authorities encourage home medication for children by training parents in the use of 
basic drugs and supplies that people are advised to keep in the home.  Private clinics 
and drug shops provide an attractive alternative to local government health facilities, 
which are characterised by long waiting times, poor service and lack of supplies.  On 
the other hand these private providers are often staffed by people with very little 
training (Rutebemberwa et al, 2009a), and I heard stories of incompetent, ineffectual 
and sometimes life-threatening treatment from private providers.  For instance, 
Josephine K. told me how a private clinic fitted her child with a saline drip, but fitted 
it incorrectly, so that the child became severely dehydrated (interview with Josephine 
K.) 
Having sketched the provision of government health services and the other options 
available, I now discuss evidence of corrupt practices in the Ugandan health system 
which underlie much of the human insecurity that ill-health creates.  
6.3 Corruption in government health facilities 
It is no secret that Uganda’s government health sector is riddled with corruption at all 
levels.  This is in keeping with the general situation in Uganda, where the extent of 
embezzlement has been a cause of concern on the part of international donors 
(Biryabarema, 2010a).  In 2005 the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria suspended its grants in Uganda following the theft of funds by Ministry of 
Health officials.  In 2009, some of these officials were being tried and the court 
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proceedings were headline news.  More recently, the man in charge of one of 
Manafwa’s health centres was investigated by police following the disappearance of 
X-ray machines, an ambulance, gas canisters and drugs (Were Tinka, 2010).  Two 
specific forms of health staff corruption impact directly on people in Bubufu: the 
extortion of unofficial payments from service users and the stealing of drugs and 
supplies by health workers who then divert them to their own clinics and shops and 
direct patients to buy them there.    
Despite the abolition of user fees in 2001, health service users throughout Uganda 
are expected to make substantial payments to staff at various stages of treatment 
(Transparency International 2006; Bazaka et al, 2010).  After user fees were 
abolished in 2001, the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure among poor 
people in Uganda did not fall (Xu et al, 2006) and these authors speculate that this 
was due to patients having to buy drugs and medical supplies as well as making so-
called ‘informal payments’. Doctors and nurses often justify their demands by 
claiming that the government supply of drugs and equipment have run out, and 
patients are required to buy drugs and items such as saline drips, rubber gloves and 
disinfectant either directly from the health facility or from shops and private clinics 
(Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002).  Stories of health 
workers harassing and abusing patients who cannot pay enough to satisfy them are 
common (e.g. McPake et al, 1999:860).  Such behaviour on the part of front-line 
staff is sometimes attributed in the literature to their poor pay and benefits.  In a 
study of health workers in 18 health facilities in 9 districts, Hagopian et al (2009) 
found widespread dissatisfaction with pay and conditions: nurses, in particular, were 
unhappy with their compensation packages.  According to a study in the Mount 
Elgon area, local health workers were demoralised by the abolition of user fees or 
‘cost-sharing’ in 2001 (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
2002).  Although I acknowledge these difficulties for health workers, what I focus on 
in this chapter is the way they are able to extract cash from people usually poorer 
than themselves, because of the highly unequal power relations between health staff 
and patients, and the part this predatory behaviour plays in rendering poor villagers 
vulnerable to shocks and stresses other than ill-health.    
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Poor people suffer disproportionately from health sector corruption, as they are less 
able than the better-off to pay bribes or turn to private healthcare providers 
(Transparency International, 2006).  In Bunyole, not far from Bugisu, Reynolds 
Whyte (1997) found that the Nyole people in her study community worried about the 
costs involved in visiting government health facilities and often preferred to use 
private healthcare providers, as this removed the uncertainty of dealing with 
government health facilities and made them feel more in control (1997:211).  
Informal payments are a brake on progress towards government health targets.  For 
instance, in Uganda as a whole, under-the-counter charges are associated with delays 
in seeking healthcare for children with fevers (Rutebemberwa et al, 2009b).  This 
militates against the District health authorities’ target of increasing from 30% to 80% 
the proportion of febrile children taken for professional care within the first 24 hours 
of their fever (Manafwa District Local Government Directorate of Health Services, 
2005:15).    
6.4 Paying the price of illness   
During interviews conducted in 2009 and 2010 and during a women’s group 
discussion, people brought up the difficulties they face paying the many charges 
levied in Bududa Hospital.  They also complained about being directed to private 
clinics and shops to buy drugs and supplies said to be unavailable at the hospital.  
When describing their experiences at the hands of hospital staff, interviewees gave 
details of continual demands for payment for medicines, drips, plastic gloves and 
sheets, antiseptic and even major surgical procedures.  People gave a range of prices 
for the same item and it was clear that bargaining with hospital staff could bring 
charges down: Table 6.1 contains information on prices charged.   
Jessica W. highlighted how even small charges can deter health service utilisation.  
She explained that nurses even ask patients to pay for notebooks in which to keep 
their clinical records: ‘You can therefore end up worried because you can want to go 
the hospital but you fail because you do not have 100 shillings’. Several other 
villagers also talked about being deterred or prevented from accessing healthcare 
services due to lack of cash, and it was clear that villagers’ anxieties about income 
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poverty (Chapter 7) were to some extent worries about not being able to access 
healthcare (e.g. interviews with Milton W. and Rita N.).   
Although many of the charges are quite small, villagers complained that they quickly 
accumulate, especially during a stay in the ward.  As for the excuses health staff gave 
for making these charges, people were well aware of the true reason behind many so-
called ‘stock-outs’ of drugs and supplies, as in these extracts: 
Irene K: extract from interview transcript 
I think this is what they call ‘corruption’ [note that she uses the English word] 
because even though a doctor gets a salary, he thinks it cannot solve all his 
problems, so he tries his best to squeeze the patients until he gets something 
from them.   
Jennifer N: extract from interview transcript 
The nurses ask for money although the government says they should continue 
treating you regardless...  You feel it is not right, because this is a government 
hospital, and yet you have to pay. This hurts; you feel pressure because they 
won’t even help us, the needy.   
As I listened to people talk about these matters I realised that the charges, with their 
attendant pressure and the fear of ensuing impoverishment, often overshadow actual 
health problems themselves, at least in the case of adults.  Serious illnesses, in 
particular when they affect children, are a different matter. In such cases anxiety 
about the illness itself is compounded by the pressure of having to pay.   
Table 6.1 is based on a small number of Bubufu villagers who were interviewed by 
Mr. Balungira about their experiences of the government health system in April and 
May 2010.  The table contains information on the health problems for which 
treatment was sought, where it was sought and the type and cost of the treatment 
received, as well as how the interviewees paid for it.  I do not claim that it provides a 
representative picture, but it gives a snapshot of the types of ill-health affecting the 
inhabitants of Bubufu and the cost of accessing biomedical healthcare.   
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Table 6.1: Ill-health, treatment and medical payments May 2009-April 2010 (approximate) from a sub-sample of villagers 
 
Name Illness Place of treatment  Type of treatment  Cost (USh) Sources of cash  
Sam K., wealth rank 3, for 
daughter 
Malaria Private clinic then Bududa 
Hospital 
Drugs and drip, hospital stay 53,000 Distress sale of beans and cash saved from 
milk sales 
George M., wealth rank 2, for 
himself  
Malaria Home treatment then Bududa 
Hospital 
Anti-malarial drugs, 1 week in 
hospital plus drugs and drip 
20,000 Borrowed from friend and subsequently 
repaid from crop sales  
James L., wealth rank 1, for 
his grandson 
Malaria Home treatment with drugs 
from shop 
Anti-malarial drugs 2,300 Pension  
Ezra K., wealth rank 3, for his 
daughter 
Malaria Sub-county health centre  Free - 
Milton W., wealth rank 3, for 
wife and two children 
Malaria 
followed by  
wife’s 
miscarriage  
Bududa Hospital Anti-malarial drugs and drips 80,000 for 
children 
70,000 for 
wife 
Money gifts from friends/workmates  in 
Kampala 
Patrick N., wealth rank 3, for 
himself 
Malaria Bududa Hospital Three days in hospital  70,000 Money saved from  coffee sales 
Grace B, de facto FHH, 
wealth rank 3, for daughter 
Malaria  Bududa Hospital  20,000 Remittance from husband working in 
Kampala 
Elizabeth N., de facto FHH, 
wealth rank 3, for herself  
Gynaecologic
al problems 
Sub-county health centre, 
Bududa Hospital and private 
clinic in Mbale 
 44,000 Remittance from husband working in 
Kampala 
Gertrude N., de facto FHH, 
wealth rank 1, for 
granddaughter 
Malaria and 
chest 
infection 
Bududa Hospital Two weeks in hospital plus 
drugs and drip 
20,000 Remittance from husband working in 
Mbale 
Ida N., de facto FHH, wealth 
rank 3, for herself  
Malaria Bududa Hospital Stay in hospital plus drugs 
and drip 
30,000 Borrowed from her brother then worked for 
him for three weeks as repayment 
Nyree M, living with 
husband, wealth rank 3, for 
herself 
Malaria Sub-county health centre, then 
referred to Bududa Hospital 
Anti-malarial tablets; also 
prescribed a drip  
Free  Asked husband for money for drip but he 
told her he had none 
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Among other things, the table shows frequent diagnoses of malaria, which in itself is 
one of the most commonly self-perceived risks in Bubufu.  Malaria is the single most 
important cause of morbidity and mortality in Uganda, accounting for 25-40 per cent 
of outpatient visits to health facilities, 15-20 per cent of hospital admissions, and 9-
14 per cent of all hospital deaths (United States Agency for International 
Development, 2009).  In Manafwa District malaria accounts for the majority of 
children’s deaths (Wakhongo, 2008); the malaria case-fatality incidence for under-5s 
in the area is around 4 per cent (Manafwa District Local Government Directorate of 
Health Services, 2005:6).  Like the other biggest health threats that villagers 
perceive, cholera and accidental injury, malaria is associated with rainy seasons.  
There has been a marked rise in the incidence of malaria in the East African 
highlands since the 1980s (Hay and Simba, 2002).  While there is debate about the 
cause of the increase, some scientists have indicated that rising temperatures 
associated with climate change are interacting with drug resistance to increase 
incidence (Artzy-Randrup et al, 2010).   
The near-silence on HIV/AIDS during the interviews needs commenting on here.  In 
2008/9 the estimated national prevalence rate was 6.7 per cent (Ministry of Health, 
2010), yet it was mentioned in passing by only one or two villagers, which seems 
puzzling.  Other researchers in Bugisu have noted the same thing and attribute it to 
the sensitivity of the topic (Economic Policy Research Centre, 2001b).  Jones, on the 
other hand, explains the low profile of HIV/AIDS among Ugandan villagers in Teso 
by pointing to the absence of local HIV/AIDS-related funding initiatives in the 
political economy of his study area (2009:17).  As I did not come across any 
HIV/AIDS initiatives in my study location either, this is also a plausible explanation.   
Bubufu farmers’ incomes are seasonal, which contributes to the pressure of paying 
for medical treatment, but not only farmers complained about the possibility of 
falling ill when there was no cash available.  For instance Milton W., a young man 
with two young children, earned cash on a seasonal basis as a builder.  Yet he told 
me the risk that worried him most was illness, because ‘you will need money to get 
cured’.  He contrasted this with hunger, which he said could be dealt with more 
easily: in other words, in his experience it was easier to obtain food than cash.  Rose 
N. said illness was her biggest worry:  
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Rose N: extract from interview transcript 
Because you might have a sick child and find later that the child has become 
lame because of that illness.  And because I don’t have money to pay for 
treatment in such a case, so that the child can become whole again.   
Such is the salience of medical payments as a perceived threat that several people 
defined poverty as the inability to pay for medical treatment.  For instance, Elspeth 
B. said that of all things she feared income poverty the most, ‘because with poverty, 
you might get ill and lack the money to go to hospital’.  Causal links between 
poverty and ill-health also work the other way: during a wealth-ranking exercise in a 
nearby village, villagers defined the very poor as people who have to sell land to 
meet contingencies such as medical costs, after which the household slides into 
poverty (Economic Policy Research Centre, 2001a). I discuss how medical payments 
lead to heightened vulnerability to climate shocks in the next section.   
6.5 Pathways from ill-health to vulnerability  
There are well-trodden routes linking healthcare expenditure to heightened climate 
vulnerability as well as vulnerability to other shocks and stresses.  Table 6.1 shows 
that Sam K. paid USh53,000 for treatment when his baby son contracted malaria.  I 
give more details of this story, which is a sad one, as an example of the connections:  
Sam K: from interview notes 
In August 2009, Sam K. and Rachel N.’s baby began suffering from malaria.  
They took him to a private clinic where they spent about USh15,000, but after 
four days without improvement they were referred to Bududa Hospital.  The 
reason they decided to take him to a clinic at first was because they thought it 
was not a serious case.  Their journey to Bududa cost USh7,000. In Bududa 
Hospital they paid USh8,000 for drips to be put in the baby but there was still 
no improvement. They were then told that he needed a blood transfusion 
which would cost USh5,000, so Sam hurried back to the village to sell some 
beans to raise the money for it.  He sold 50 kilograms of beans. The 
transfusion did not work either, so then the doctors advised them to take the 
baby straight to Mulago Hospital in Kampala rather than to Mbale [the best 
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hospital for the region].  Sam did not have the money to take the baby to 
Kampala so he came back home again to try to sell their cow.  Before he 
could do so, the baby died. 
The accumulated costs of the baby’s treatment were considerable, even though it was 
ineffective. While I do not have details of Sam and Rachel’s cash incomes that year, 
the following information puts their expenditure in perspective.  Sam K. owns about 
an acre of land and rents three other plots, while Rachel has a small plot given to her 
by her father. Rachel reported the total extent of their farm as 4 acres (Table 4.2, 
Chapter 4).  According to Wilfred T., beans were selling at USh1,000 per kilogram 
in August 2009.  That means Sam would have been paid about USh50,000 for the 50 
kilograms he sold to finance the baby’s treatment.  If the crisis had occurred in June 
he would have only got half that, because at that time of year many people are keen 
to sell some of their newly-harvested beans and so the price is low.  Those beans 
amounted to one third of the household’s total bean harvest for 2009, which was 150 
kilograms.  The 50 kilograms Sam sold represented the household’s entire harvest for 
the second season, because the second season’s harvest was low that year due to 
heavy rainfall that flooded some of their land (see Table 4.2).  Another way of 
judging the scale of the payments relative to household income is to compare them 
with the wages Sam and Rachel usually received USh1,500 each for a day’s casual 
farm labour.  Between them they would have had to work for over 35 days to earn 
the USh53,000 their baby’s treatment cost them.  So it is possible to see here how at 
the household level, crop loss due to destructive rainfall and health expenditure 
compound one another to create and deepen poverty and food insecurity, and thus 
vulnerability to succeeding shocks.   
Even Noel M., a teacher, said he feared illness partly ‘because every little bit of 
money that I get will be going towards meeting medical expenses’.  The vast 
majority of villagers do not draw a regular wage, but they have various ways they 
can raise money to pay for treatment, as Table 6.1 shows.  They may have saved the 
proceeds of coffee or milk sales, like Sam K. or Patrick N.; they may borrow from 
relatives or friends; or in the case of de facto female household heads, obtain money 
from absent husbands.  I also heard of cases where people had to divert capital from 
their businesses.  For instance, Wilfred T., Rose N.’s husband, told me that he had 
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been forced to sell the stock of his small shop in 2006 in order to pay for his wife’s 
medical treatment.  It was several years before he was able to get back into business 
buying and selling scrap metal, a business which required very little capital.  Thus 
his healthcare payments interfered with his attempts to pursue a non-farm livelihood 
activity and so protect himself from some of the risks inherent in farming.  
Where no cash is available and a loan cannot be obtained, assets have to be disposed 
of at short notice, the usual sequence being to sell produce first, then livestock, and 
as a last resort in serious cases, land.  For instance, Julia N. said that illness leads to 
poverty ‘because if a child is ill and you have grown your beans, you will have to sell 
them to pay for the child’s treatment.’  In order to pay for Irene K.’s Caesarean 
section and subsequent stay in hospital, her husband, the Sub-County Vice 
Chairman, had to first borrow money and then sell a cow to repay the loan. In 
Bugisu, as in other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, one of the reasons people invest in 
livestock is as self-insurance against such emergencies (Ashley and Nanyeenya, 
2005). Cows in particular also serve as collateral for loans to cover emergencies 
(interview with Gregory N.).   
‘If you don’t have a cow, you sell part of your land’, said Irene K.  The distress sale 
of land to pay for healthcare is probably the clearest link between health system 
corruption and climate vulnerability in the village.  John M., no. 7 in Table 4.2, is a 
case in point.  A middle-aged man living alone, he lost an entire season’s bean crop 
when his ‘very small’ garden next to the Singye was flooded in 2009.  Years before, 
he had been forced to sell his other plots in order to pay for medical treatment for 
himself.  That sale of land heightened his subsequent agricultural exposure to the 
impact of destructive rainfall, so that in 2009 his distress sale of land was still 
affecting his well-being.  Several other villagers also told me that they had been 
forced to sell land at one time or another to pay for medical treatment, including 
Nyree M., who sold a plot of land her father gave her in order to pay for her own 
medical treatment, and Jason K., who broke both legs in a boda-boda accident in 
Mbale.  The distress sale of land is an important driver of the economic 
differentiation common in the area (Bird and Shinyekwa, 2005:104); a minority of 
men are able to accumulate land at the expense of others who slide into landlessness.  
According to Martin K., this process is happening in Bubufu too:  
  
125 
Martin K: from interview notes   
In this community people do not want to help others, so when one is sick and 
he has no way of getting money what he does is to sell his land. Why people 
do not want to help others when they are sick is that they want them to reach 
the extent of selling their land so that they buy it. 
I am not so much interested in economic differentiation here as in the way that 
distress land sales are a direct link between healthcare payments and climate 
vulnerability because they prevent  farmers from spreading weather risks such as 
crop loss or mini-landslides.   
I now turn to aspects of social differentiation in experiences of paying for healthcare.  
Although the scramble to pay for medical treatment came up as an important theme 
in interviews with men and women alike, their relations to household resources mean 
that they experience this pressure in different ways.  In the next section I analyse the 
gender differences, focussing on the pressures that married men and women, 
including de facto female household heads, experience in relation to paying medical 
expenses.  
6.6  Gendered pressure, gendered discourses 
Although caring for sick family members is part of women’s gendered social role, 
most people take the view that the final decision on what type of treatment to seek, as 
well as paying for it, was the responsibility of male household heads.  As Agatha B. 
put it, husbands should make these decisions because ‘they are the ones who look 
after the family’, and in any case they control most of the household’s cash income 
and assets.  As in other aspects of decision-making, the degree of consultation 
between wives and husbands differs from household to household; there is no single 
template for intra-household gender relations, even in the same community (Francis, 
2000).   
Several male household heads portrayed themselves as anxious, harassed and 
weighed down by the responsibility for finding the money for treatment, as here:   
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Patrick M: extract from interview transcript 
Like I am sitting here, they can call me and tell me that a child is ill, but when 
I left home the child was OK.  They are things we are always anxious about, 
because they can happen at any time...When there is illness, I don’t have 
enough income, and this can cause me to lose a person, just because I don’t 
have money.   
This resonates with other men’s accounts of the pressure they endure when 
landslides or storms threaten their household (Chapters 4 and 5), and can be seen as 
belonging to the same discourse of masculine responsibility.  While men dwelt on 
the theme of pressurised husbands and fathers, women expressed a different point of 
view.  Several of the older women said that their husbands were reluctant to allow 
them to take sick children for medical treatment, even in cases of serious illness (e.g. 
interviews with Maggie B. and Bridget M.).  Wakhongo (2008), too, found that male 
household heads were often slow to commit money to medical treatment for their 
wives and children.    
The fact is that trying to get cash to pay for medical treatment places stress on both 
women and men, although their experiences are somewhat different. Because they 
are at home for most of the day, women are usually the first to notice that a child is 
ill. Even if the husband is living in the village rather than working elsewhere, men 
are often away from the home during the day, ‘doing business’, socialising and in 
some cases drinking.  If a child’s symptoms become serious while the husband is 
away from home, the mother has to get a message to the husband and persuade him 
to provide the necessary cash.  Noel M., whose job as a teacher in another village 
means that he is rarely at home, volunteered that illness within a family tends to 
affect wives more than husbands: 
Noel M: extract from interview transcript 
In most cases men are not at home, so when a child falls sick...it is the woman 
who will have to find a way of treating the sick child before the man comes 
back. 
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Several of the cases listed in Table 6.1 concern de facto female household heads who 
paid for treatment with money obtained from their husbands, and several women 
talked about how difficult this could be.  For instance, Catherine M., whose husband 
lives in a border town with another wife and rarely visits the village, told me that she 
often worried about paying for medical treatment: ‘You can get sick yourself, but 
your husband doesn’t bother to get you treated.  And also a child can fall sick and the 
husband doesn’t bother to send assistance’. She said she had no other source of 
financial assistance in a crisis, as her natal village was quite far away.  She was also 
concerned about the impact on the household’s food security and prosperity because 
of her inability to farm during illness:    
Catherine M: extract from interview transcript 
You may prepare a garden but then you fall sick and can’t sow or plant.  Then 
you will have not fulfilled your dream, therefore calamity.  You may get ill in 
the growing season when others are sowing, but you will be nursing yourself 
and will be too weak to do anything in the garden. Your children may also 
fall sick and you will have no time to go to the garden because you are 
nursing them.  Later you will lack food, hence poverty.  In this case there may 
be no way of one accumulating anything that can help you do away with 
poverty...when you’re ill, you can’t do anything in life.  
De facto female household heads may be particularly exposed to the dynamic 
interconnection of healthcare payments, food insecurity, poverty and vulnerability 
with the destructive impact of rainfall because of their lack of access to cash and 
reliance on their own physical labour.  The topic in the next section concerns all 
women of childbearing age, although few of them discussed it: I now consider how 
the behaviour of healthcare staff affects women’s experience of childbirth in the 
local hospital.   
Giving birth in Bududa Hospital: money or mistreatment   
During the individual interviews only two women raised the issue of paying for 
medical assistance during pregnancy and childbirth.  When I subsequently raised this 
topic myself during a group discussion, however, my question unleashed many 
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complaints.  Women described poor standards of care in the maternity ward of 
Bududa Hospital and how they endure demands for cash, threats and abuse during 
labour.  It was clear that the experience of attending antenatal clinics or going to the 
local hospital to deliver could be humiliating, demoralising, disempowering and 
sometimes dangerous.  Although very few women voiced these issues spontaneously, 
it is important to give their complaints an airing because the conditions and treatment 
they face damage their human security.   
Only 18 per cent of births in the district take place in health facilities (Mafabi, 2007), 
and women’s poor perceptions of giving birth in hospital militates against the 
MHSSP II target of increasing this to 50 per cent (Manafwa District Local 
Government Directorate of Health Services 2005:6).  For instance, according to 
Wakhongo, poor standards of care and inadequate health facility coverage are among 
the factors that deter women from giving birth in government health facilities 
(2008:124).  While I could not obtain District figures for maternal mortality, the 
national rate is an estimated 435 per 100,000 births based on the annual average for 
the years 2000-2009, although the World Health Organisation acknowledges that 
country-reported data are unreliable (World Health Organisation, 2010).  According 
to the national Health Sector Strategic Plan III, perinatal and maternal conditions 
account for 20.4 per cent of the total disease burden in Uganda (Ministry of Health, 
2010:11).  In short, childbirth in Uganda carries very serious risks for mother and 
child.   
The issue of unnecessary and expensive Caesarean sections came up during the 
women’s group discussion and to a lesser extent in individual interviews.  This 
operation can be a cause of long-term pain and debility, detracting from women’s 
ability to farm (e.g. interviews with Esther N. and her husband’s niece, Heather N.).  
According to Irene K., doctors persuade women to undergo unnecessary Caesarean 
sections in order to enrich themselves: ‘As we have heard on the radio, this problem 
of operations is down to doctors...when they operate you have to pay a lot of money’.  
She said that the operation itself cost about USh50,000, although other people gave 
the price as much higher and stressed that the cost of surgery is just the start of the 
expense involved: ‘after that you keep on paying for other things until they discharge 
you.’   
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Women also described a regime of apparently general mistreatment in the ante-natal 
clinic and maternity ward of the General Hospital:  
Theresa J: extract from group discussion  
When you are due [to give birth] they still mistreat you, saying they need 
money in order to help you.  When you say there is no money, they say ‘you 
are giving yourself to death, but if you want to give birth then it is all up to 
you’. There may be no gloves, toilet paper, and no polythene bag and yet you 
have no money, so the nurses leave you without help and you die. Or you 
give birth to a child who gets tetanus and it dies.  
Lilian M: extract from group discussion  
You may be ill from just one month after conception until you give birth.  
When you go to hospital the nurse may scold you, saying: ‘Why are you in 
that shape?  Why did you leave yourself in that shape?  You shouldn’t have 
got pregnant for you are too old.’  She may have been telling you this during 
the ante-natal checks but when it comes to giving birth she will ill-treat you to 
the maximum, knowing that the male doctors don’t care about women’s 
problems.  They should be of help to us as nurses.  And this can affect your 
childbearing. 
As well as jeopardising lives and well-being, extortion, harassment and abuse also 
undermine women’s dignity, one of the core elements of human security (UN 
Commission on Human Security, 2003). 
The low proportion of women who give birth in the hospital only partly explains why 
I heard few complaints about inadequate service and bad treatment during the 
individual interviews and PRA sessions with groups of women.  When I questioned 
their initial silence, women gave the following reasons for it: that people only 
perceive a threat when it is imminent, so that women only mentioned childbirth risks 
to me if they were actually pregnant; women dwelt particularly on economic issues 
because they thought I might be able to ‘assist’ them; and finally, the assumption that 
our research interests excluded women’s reproductive health concerns. 
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Most of these explanations are plausible, and it is likely they all helped to banish 
reproductive health risks from the agenda.  However, I want to concentrate on the 
suggestion that our research focus excluded women’s gender-specific concerns.  This 
seems odd, given that the open-ended interview style was designed to enable 
interviewees to raise any threat they wanted to discuss and that Uganda’s maternal 
and infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world (World Health 
Organization, 2009).  Although the PRA sessions were meant to focus on 
community-level risks, reproductive health risks need not have been excluded, since 
these problems affect all women of child-bearing age.  I interpret the women’s 
silence on reproductive health threats as an example of women as a ‘muted group’ 
whose specific interests and priorities are marginalised by the dominant masculine 
discourse (Ardener, 1975).   
The childbirth experiences of Lydia M. were quite different from the harrowing 
stories I had heard about hospital births, which might seem paradoxical as she gave 
birth to both her children at the side of the road.  On both occasions she had set out to 
give birth in the hospital, accompanied by a neighbour carrying a ‘birth kit’ (a pack 
of essential items such as a plastic sheet and plastic gloves).  When she started to 
give birth en route her neighbour spread the sheet on the ground and used the gloves 
to help with the delivery.  According to Lydia, everything had gone well and she 
seemed to find nothing remarkable about her birth experiences.  Perverse though it 
may seem to an outsider, Lydia’s relaxed attitude to childbirth was related to the fact 
that she had not reached the hospital in time: it meant she was spared the 
mistreatment other women endured there.   
6.7 Summary 
Across Uganda, healthcare payments cause financial catastrophe for poor people (Xu 
et al, 2006).  The nub of my argument is that worries about health are often worries 
about expenditure: as Elizabeth N. told me, in Bubufu ‘sickness needs money’.  The 
need to pay for medical treatment in turn arises from coercive demands from local 
health staff, linked to the systematic stealing of medical supplies from the 
government’s health system.  So fears about ill-health are, at least in part, rooted in 
the abuse of the highly unequal power relations between healthcare staff and patients 
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in the local hospital, one of the most important local governance institutions in the 
area.  My evidence indicates that married men and women tend to experience these 
pressures in different ways due to men’s greater access to cash and their control of 
household resources.  
The bland vocabulary of the medical social science literature, with its ‘informal 
economic activities’ (McPake et al, 1999), ‘drug leakages’ (Xu et al, 2006) and 
‘informal payments’ (Bazaka et al, 2010) obscures considerable human suffering.  
Frontline health workers, like the people associated with other governance 
institutions, are social actors who sometimes play a distinctly negative role in poor 
villagers’ lives.  The corrupt and coercive behaviour of health workers in Uganda 
seems to have a surprisingly low profile in the wider development literature, given its 
significance as a driver of rural impoverishment and its salience in poor people’s 
subjective experiences of insecurity. Why is this?  Perhaps academics and 
development professionals are reluctant to criticise scarce, poorly-paid and hard-
pressed health workers, or perhaps they see these problems as moral issues that do 
not belong to technical development discourses.  Framing the problem as one of 
unequal power relations, I see the behaviour of health workers as one element in a 
bigger picture of conflicting interests and contestations.  Through various pathways, 
having to pay for their healthcare heightens people’s climate vulnerability by 
weakening their capacity to cope and adapt.  Selling land to pay for healthcare is an 
obvious example.  As well as the material impacts of the payments, poor people 
often endure humiliation and distress when they attend the general hospital, which is 
a human security issue too.  
In the next chapter I continue the themes of gender differentiation and asymmetrical 
power relations.  I explore some gender aspects of income poverty and food 
insecurity, which are the routine stresses that permeate the lives of many people in 
the village. 
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Chapter 7: Household-level food insecurity, income poverty 
and conjugality 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As in Chapter 6, in this chapter I also address the role of asymmetric power relations 
in creating and perpetuating climate vulnerability and human insecurity.  In that 
chapter the arena was a key local governance institution and the mechanism driving 
the process was the levying of unofficial healthcare charges.  Here, I turn to another 
arena in which asymmetric power relations are played out: the household.  I analyse 
the socio-cultural dynamics of conjugality in relation to household-level food 
insecurity and poverty.  I discuss the spouses’ different perspectives on these 
problems, which are related to gendered structural positions and power relations 
within the household.  I also point to the role of conjugal power relations in helping 
to create household-level food insecurity and poverty.  Finally I argue that a long-
term social trend may be underway whereby married women’s household bargaining 
position and social status are deteriorating.
10
   
I have already made some allusions to the severe and widespread poverty that 
characterises the village.  Most, if not all, of the human security issues I analyse in 
this thesis converge in these problems, and villagers also prioritised hunger and 
poverty as both risks and stresses in their own right.  Seventy-nine per cent of adult 
men and twenty-six per cent of adult women identified household food shortages as a 
threat; I explore possible reasons for this striking and, on the face of it rather 
puzzling, gender difference.  Income poverty, on the other hand, was mentioned as a 
threat by roughly equal proportions of men and women; 35 per cent of women and 
                                                 
10
 This chapter is very much a co-construction by the study participants and me as the researcher, by 
which I mean that my own positionality as a gender and development specialist has led me to frame 
the topic of food insecurity and income poverty in terms of conjugality.  This does not mean that I see 
gender relations as the primary driver of food insecurity and income poverty in the village, only that I 
am interested in investigating how unequal gendered power relations can create or exacerbate these 
problems in specific households. 
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26 per cent of men.  While people usually talked about food shortages and income 
poverty as if they were separate, I deal with them together in this chapter because in 
fact they now overlap.  This is due to the monetisation of food, a trend that underlies 
the discussion in this chapter and which seems to be harming married women’s 
social position.   
I begin by analysing the changing relationship between food security and subsistence 
agriculture (section 7.2).  In section 7.3 I focus on contrasting conjugal perspectives 
regarding food insecurity and poverty. In section 7.4, I consider the dynamics of 
conjugal power relations and household-level food insecurity and poverty.  This 
leads to a discussion of divorce (section 7.5) in which I argue that women’s attitude 
to leaving a marriage may have changed because their declining social status is 
linked to the monetisation of food.  I show the relevance of this analysis to my 
research question.   
7.2 The merging of income poverty and hunger  
In this section I start by briefly discussing the seasonal nature of household food 
shortages.  I go on to argue that the moral economy in Bubufu is changing as 
subsistence agriculture, although still crucial to household livelihood portfolios, 
diminishes in importance.   
In Bubufu people used the word intsala (hunger) when talking to me and my 
assistant about household-level food shortages of varying depth and duration.  At one 
end of the spectrum was the odd missed meal, while some individuals and 
households sometimes experienced a whole day without any food at all.  More 
serious were longer periods of surviving on only one meal a day.  Periods of eating 
posho or matoke with no relish other than bean leaves were mentioned quite 
frequently.  Bean leaves are regarded as a very inferior relish as they are reputedly 
hard to digest.  Although during my time in the village I saw many bunches of beans 
hanging up to dry in compounds, the use of household granaries to store millet and 
cassava has been discontinued.  Among those old enough to remember them, the 
consensus was that the last granaries disappeared in Bubufu 15 or 20 years ago, 
although I heard that they were still in use in a few other villages.  An elderly widow, 
Penelope K., remembered how in her youth, people used to store several bags of 
  
135 
maize after the harvest; ‘But nowadays everything is bought, and if you don’t have 
any money then you don’t get’.  
The gap between finishing off food produced in the second season and harvesting 
produce from the first season is still called the ‘hungry month’, although for many 
people it now lasts longer than a month, due to a combination of land scarcity and 
poor agricultural productivity.  Traditionally the hungry month fell in April: when I 
visited Ezra K, in late March, he told me that there would only be ‘three houses 
cooking’ in the whole village that day.  But according to Patrick N., who gave his 
age as 29, the hungry season had spanned both April and May ever since he could 
remember: 
Patrick N: extract from interview transcript 
It is in June when [people] start getting the first beans and they begin eating 
their own food, but around April and May the situation in which they live is 
not usually good. 
Periods of food insecurity are common in many communities in the area (Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002; Wakhongo, 2008).  Climate 
variability is a factor in determining the length of the hungry season, but some 
households are vulnerable to a shortage of food all year round, including those 
headed by elderly widows and widowers.  The customs of allocating land to sons 
during a man’s lifetime on the one hand and stripping widows of their land and other 
assets on the other create food insecurity and poverty in old age. While some elderly 
people receive regular support from kin or neighbours, several sources indicate that 
support for the elderly in Bugisu is sometimes given grudgingly (Heald, 1998) and is 
always constrained by poverty (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development, 2002:2).   
I now turn to the changing relationship between household food shortages and 
subsistence agriculture.   
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‘Eating from your pocket’: The need to buy food  
Interviewees tended to name food shortages and income poverty as distinct threats.  I 
interpret this as a throwback to the old days when food needs used to be met by 
subsistence farming: nowadays households must supplement their own production by 
buying food for at least part of year.  In Teresa J.’s words, ‘We who live in the hills 
have to buy almost everything, just like in town’.  Mr. Wellington D., the sub-county 
Vice-Chairman and a respected community member in Bubufu, said that there were 
only two or three households in the whole village that did not have to buy food on a 
regular basis and that most had to buy food for at least one of their two daily meals.  
Whitehead and Kabeer (2001) point out that the large multi-household compounds 
that characterise West African societies provide some protection against food 
insecurity.  Conversely, the Gisu pattern of living in nuclear families may have the 
effect of heightening individual households’ exposure to sporadic food shortages. 
A phrase I sometimes heard to describe this was ‘eating from your pocket’, and it 
was clear that it had negative connotations.  Posho, in particular, has to be bought, 
because although it is a popular staple, no-one in Bubufu grows enough maize to be 
able to store it for future consumption.  The fluctuating price causes problems for the 
villagers when prices are high.
11
  The price changes are related both to local 
conditions, such as heavy rain and flooding which impede transport from Mbale, and 
broader factors, including demand for Ugandan maize flour from neighbouring 
Kenya.  It is government policy to protect the price that large farmers receive for 
their maize, reflecting the national policy orientation towards promoting commercial 
agriculture (Biryabarema, 2010b).   
When did people start to ‘eat from their pockets’?  In Bubufu it seems to be quite a 
recent development.  For instance, Alex W., who gave his age as 39, claimed that 
during his boyhood all the household food needs were met from subsistence 
agriculture.  On the other hand, as far back as 1959 La Fontaine observed that the 
Gisu used their income from cash crops to buy food when their subsistence food 
harvests were poor.  For the poorest income quartile of households in three Mbale 
                                                 
11
 The local price of posho has fluctuated sharply in recent years.  For instance, in 2008 it rose from 
USh 400-500 shillings to USh3,000 per kilogram within the space of a few months.  In early 2009 the 
price per kilogram was USh1100-1200, but by early 2010 it had fallen to USh700.   
  
137 
District villages, subsistence consumption by value was found to represent only 
33.4% of households’ total income, falling steadily across the income quartiles to 
only 23.2% in the highest quartile (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003:17).   
Writing of another part of south-eastern Uganda, Bunyole, Whyte and Kyaddondo 
(2006:174) argue that the need to buy food is leading to a ‘conceptual delinking’ of 
food security and subsistence farming.  In Bubufu, the goal of self-sufficiency in 
food survives as a cultural ideal rather than a realistic goal.  This is reflected by 
contradictions in people’s statements.  While they tended to talk about food shortages 
and income poverty as if they were distinct threats, what they went on to say 
suggested that in fact they overlap:  
Milton W: extract from interview transcript 
Poverty has caused hunger because when you don’t have money you won’t 
survive hunger, and also we don’t have enough [subsistence] food, because 
there has not been enough rain, so our cassava and sweet potatoes have not 
done well. 
Belinda M: extract from interview transcript 
These days, if you can’t pull cash out of your pocket to buy posho, you go 
hungry.   
Gerald K., the son of a widow, was struggling to find the fees to stay in secondary 
school.  He was unique in identifying low rates of pay for casual labour as the cause 
of household food shortages and income poverty, rather than the land shortage or 
farming problems:  
Gerald K: extract from interview transcript 
What causes people not to have food is because people don’t have good 
earnings to enable them to buy food or sugar.  Here in the village you have to 
work before you can buy soap or paraffin, and to get such things you have a 
lot of sweating. 
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Gerald’s comments suggest the existence of a rural ‘proletarian’ class, which is 
supported by Bird and Shinyekwa’s comments on three villages in the area 
(2005:104).  La Fontaine (1962) also observes that poor Gisu men with little land 
were forced to work as casual labourers for the better-off men in their communities.  
If there really is a proletarian class in Bubufu this it would mean that the link 
between subsistence agriculture and food security has been completely ruptured for 
some people.  In both Belinda and Gerald’s cases though, their need to engage in 
casual farm labour was bound up with their life-stage and it seemed to be a 
temporary situation for them.  Belinda, an elderly widow, claimed that she received 
no support from her son, although some of his children are living with her.  Gerald 
had not yet inherited any land; his mother and grandmother farmed the land he 
should eventually inherit.  In other words, neither of these individuals seemed to be 
members of a permanent proletarian class.  Many other people, both men and 
women, also did casual farming labour from time to time as a component of their 
livelihood portfolios.  None of the interviewees in this study were completely 
landless, so I have no evidence that there is a proletarian class in the village.  
However, landlessness had driven many others out of the village to join the urban 
proletariat.   
The experience of income poverty 
While income poverty is a cause of household food shortages, conversely the need to 
buy food contributes to the income poverty that blights many Bubufu residents’ lives.  
The only figures I can find on this are rather old.  According to some studies, around 
60 per cent of rural households’ expenditure in Uganda goes on food (e.g. Okidi and 
Mugambe 2002:14, cited in Bird and Shinyekwa 2005; and Ugandan Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and  Economic Development 2000, cited in Whyte and 
Kyaddondo 2005:180).  I did not ask anyone to define income poverty, but it is 
possible to infer what it means in people’s everyday lives from individual interviews 
and group discussions.  Table 7.1 contains a list of the features of income poverty 
that people mentioned.  
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Lack of food or poor quality food.    
Inability to pay for healthcare without selling land 
Lack of basic farming implements, e.g. hoes and pangas 
Lack of household necessities, e.g. paraffin for lamps, firewood, matches and salt 
Physical discomfort while sleeping due to lack of mattresses and bedsteads 
Poor housing; dilapidated, leaking roof (banana-fibre roof rather than tin roof, or old and leaking tin 
roof) 
Inability to protect the household from landslides by relocating (people living on upper slopes) 
Being cold and wet during the rainy season due to lack of suitable clothing 
Going barefoot, which is especially undesirable during rainy seasons due to mud  
Inability to accumulate productive assets such as land, livestock and start-up capital  
Inability to protect against malaria due to lack of mosquito nets 
Poor health due to poor diet and restricted access to medical care  
Children’s restricted access to education due to inability to pay school fees and primary and 
secondary schooling costs, e.g. exercise books, pens and school uniforms 
Shabby and ragged clothes (mainly women)  
Lack of basic furniture and house ware, e.g. chairs, mattresses, cups and plates (mainly married 
women) 
Inability to pay bridewealth leading to delay in marriage or defilement charges (young unmarried 
men) 
‘Divorce’ by wife due to material deprivation  (male household heads) 
Having to undertake high-risk work, specifically digging pit latrines (male household heads) 
Table 7.1: What income poverty means in Bubufu 
 
The list in this table contains a mixture of capabilities and functions of various types.  
The earlier items on the list refer to basic physical needs, while those lower down are 
what Sen (1993:31) calls ‘more complex’ functions.  Some of these are gender-
specific; I discuss this in relation to married women in section 7.3 and in relation to 
young unmarried men in Chapter 9.   
As Table 7.1 indicates, an important feature of income poverty in Bubufu is that it 
prevents the accumulation of productive assets such as livestock and start-up capital 
for micro-enterprises, widely regarded by rural Africans as the building blocks of 
material prosperity (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003).  In Bubufu, people sometimes talk 
about households ‘developing’ – using the English word – but having to buy food 
can prevent this incremental process.  As Irene K. commented, ‘even if you work 
hard, if you are buying food for both meals a day, you cannot develop’.   
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In the context of broad social policy debates, Sen (1993:41) argues the importance of 
influences other than income in individuals’ capabilities.  From the standpoint of a 
person living from day to day in Bubufu, on the other hand, where access to even 
basic social services need to be paid for, income is perceived as the key to 
capabilities. For instance, explaining why she worried more about poverty than about 
sickness, crop theft, food shortages or heavy rains, Maggie B. observed: ‘When you 
have money, all those problems can be solved’.  Accordingly the struggle to obtain 
cash through crop sales, waged employment, business activities, remittances or 
‘assistance’ from relatives was a common topic, as other researchers in rural Uganda 
have also found (Reynolds Whyte, 1997;Whyte and Kyaddondo, 2006).   
Next, I consider married men and women’s perspectives on household food 
shortages and income poverty, and argue that intra-household gender relations 
strongly shape the experience of these problems.  
7.3 ‘Women sit at home, men don’t care’: Contrasting conjugal perspectives  
In this section I analyse Gisu gender ideology in relation to food insecurity and, to a 
much lesser extent, to income poverty, for two reasons.  First, I show that married 
men and women’s experiences of food insecurity and poverty are heavily influenced 
by their gendered positionality and their conjugal relationships.  Second, I argue that 
the discourses through which gender ideology is articulated in themselves shape men 
and women’s material experiences of these problems.  I begin with the dominant 
ideology as articulated by married men, although, as I point out later in the chapter, 
not all men subscribe to this ideology. 
Married men’s point of view: ‘Women look to their husbands’ 
Just as married men stressed their responsibility for coping with landslide threats 
(Chapter 5) and medical costs (Chapter 6), some depicted themselves as weighed 
down by the responsibility of provisioning the household and meeting financial 
needs such as school fees for children at secondary school:  
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Ezra K: extract from interview notes 
April is the hungry month. Women look to their husbands to buy food.  Every 
morning you have to get up and look for work.  When you get back, you find 
your children crying [from hunger], and you start crying too. 
Robert M: extract from men’s group discussion 
In looking for school fees you find the women don’t care and wait for the 
men to do so, thereby men have to face the problem alone.  You find the men 
have a bigger responsibility than the women.  
Noel M: extract from interview notes  
Hunger affects men more than women, because these days people mostly buy 
[food] and it is the man’s responsibility to buy food. 
These comments exemplify the typical masculine discourse on the gendered 
dimensions of food shortages and poverty; they are corroborated by a survey in a 
nearby village that found that men were responsible for buying maize flour 
(Economic Policy Research Centre, 2001a:23).  My evidence is also in keeping with 
studies from other parts of Africa indicating that responsibility for providing food, 
which falls on women during ‘normal’ times, is generally transferred to men during 
periods of food insecurity (Jackson, 2007).   
However, what Patrick N. said needs to be considered alongside his wife Ida’s 
account of her own experience of food shortages.  She told me that before leaving his 
second wife in Mbale and returning to the village Patrick had been sending very little 
money for the family upkeep, so that she and her children had been living on a very 
restricted diet from October to December 2009.  Whether they are able to fulfil them 
or not, men’s obligations for household provisioning may explain the apparent 
puzzle of why a much higher proportion of men (79 per cent) than women (26 per 
cent) identified food shortages as a threat to human security.  My interpretation is 
that the need to buy food puts pressure on male household heads during the hungry 
season and whenever there is a household food shortage.   
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Closely linked to the notion of heavily-burdened male household heads is a 
stereotype of idle and unsupportive wives.  Here is Noel, the teacher, again: ‘Most 
women just sit at home and wait for the man to provide, except those who are 
working or doing some business.’  Noel said that his wife Jessica was ‘just a farmer’, 
which seemed unfair as she had recently worked both as a part-time nursery school 
assistant and as petrol pump attendant in nearby Bududa.  In fact she was the only 
woman I came across who had worked in waged employment other than casual 
farming work.  Ezra K. used the job of digging pit latrines, which have to be sunk 
very deep, to contrast men’s strenuous and sometimes risky labour with women’s 
perceived inertia at home:   
Ezra K: extract from group discussion transcript 
Men face a high risk when digging a pit latrine and ...when you get to a depth 
of 20 metres (sic) the risks are so high that each day you survive is a bit of 
good luck.  The wife many not know what you are going through, and will be 
expecting you in the evening as usual with the necessities, but instead she 
may hear you have had an accident. 
As he ended this comment, other men in the discussion group laughed wryly.  For me 
this emphasised the performance element of such group discussions, although I do 
not deny that men’s efforts to earn money do sometimes incur risks that their wives 
do not share.  Another man reiterated Ezra’s point:  
John K: extract from group discussion transcript 
We have to dig pit latrines to get money to stop poverty in the home, but as 
we do it the problems we face are: we can lose our lives, we may be hurt, and 
much more. 
During this discussion Ezra K. also invoked the ideal of the ‘patient wife’, that is, the 
wife who endures hardship quietly and supports her husband when times are hard.  
He was immediately backed up by Robert M., so I quote them both here.  It was clear 
that in some men’s eyes Bubufu wives commonly fall short of the ideal of the patient 
wife, being far too quick to return to their natal villages when things go badly.  In the 
second extract, below, Robert highlights how a ‘late start’ to the main growing 
season puts pressure on conjugal relations.   
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Ezra K: extract from group discussion transcript 
Another thing that can befall the men is if you don’t have a patient wife in a 
time of hunger, it normally mistreats us to the extent of not knowing what to 
do in order for the family to feed.  So if you have a woman who is not patient 
you may be left with the children, an even worse problem.  
Robert M: extract from group discussion transcript 
To emphasise that, you may have a wife in the home but in this season there 
is a lot of hunger.  If you don’t have a patient wife she may go and leave you 
with the children.  But if you are two heads you may help one another; a man 
will be out to look for money, while the wife is trying to make ends meet at 
home. Now in such a time our hope is in farming, and there is no other way 
apart from farming.  When you grow crops like beans, maize and bananas 
you are hopeful that if the rains come early you will be able to get something 
to eat and all will be well, but you find that this has not happened. We 
therefore find life very hard, but the women will not be patient with us.  
The ethnographic literature adds weight to these men’s perceptions of conjugal 
vulnerability, with several writers commenting that Gisu wives tend to be more 
assertive than married women in many other African societies.  For instance, 
according to Roscoe, Gisu women ‘were not so docile as wives in other tribes, and 
unless a husband asserted himself vigorously, there was constant bickering’ (Roscoe, 
1924:35).  Both Heald (1998) and La Fontaine (1959) argue that poor men in 
particular are highly dependent on their wives because they need their labour power 
and child-bearing potential to help them to achieve their gender-specific functionings 
as Gisu men. As Heald points out (1998), heading a prosperous household with many 
children is the main source of masculine prestige in Bugisu.   
In terms of Sen’s co-operative conflict model (1990), Gisu wives seem to have quite 
a strong breakdown position if their husbands fail to provide, thus enhancing their 
bargaining power within marriage.  They usually come from villages close by, and 
this proximity to their natal villages enables them to maintain strong ties with their 
kin after marriage.  My household survey shows that most of Bubufu’s married 
women were from other villages in K. sub-county, neighbouring sub-counties or an 
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adjacent district.  La Fontaine (1962) and Heald (1998) both comment on the ease 
with which Gisu women are able to divorce their husbands and return to their kin 
should things go wrong.  When this happened, Heald claims, it was usually seen as 
the fault of the husband (1998:100).  In addition, Gisu women generally have no 
problems in remarrying after a divorce.  La Fontaine quotes a Gisu saying; ‘A 
woman can always find a husband but a man who cannot keep a wife is indeed 
unfortunate’ (1960:115).  In section 7.5 I look at the reasons women give for leaving 
their marriages, but here I consider married women’s discourses about their 
husbands’ behaviour in relation to food insecurity.   
‘Men don’t care – well, maybe just a few’ 
Whereas the men talked of unsupportive wives, the women spoke of selfish and 
irresponsible husbands. The phrase ‘Men don’t care – well, maybe just a few’ came 
from Teresa J. and encapsulates the dominant women’s discourse on food shortages 
and poverty.  That discourse is also well-represented by Heather N., a young 
unmarried woman living with her aunt and uncle, during the same discussion:  
Heather N: extract from group discussion transcript 
According to my observation hunger affects women more, because when a 
man roams around he can meet a friend and he tells him ‘I’m feeling hungry. 
How much money do you have?  Lend me something and I will repay you 
tomorrow’.  When they give him he goes and eats. After a short while he can 
meet another friend and he asks him ‘I’m hungry. What have you been eating 
in that café, so that I can also eat?’As for the wife, it could be that she has not 
eaten anything since she picked a few bean leaves; sometimes you can even 
lack salt.  You might have a baby six to nine months old, who cannot eat bean 
leaves. You wonder what to feed the child, but there is nothing. You think of 
breastfeeding the child but you find that your chest is dry.  When you try to 
ask the man he says ‘Do you want me to cut off my hands and sell them so 
that I can buy posho for you?’ Then he starts to abuse you; ‘I don’t know why 
I married an ignorant woman, this is the problem with marrying women who 
are not educated. Get the hoe and dig!’  
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Heather told me on another occasion that her uncle, Ezra K., who I have also quoted 
in this chapter, treated his wife well.  So her story of husbands’ selfish behaviour and 
marital strife may be based on hearsay and observations of village households other 
than her uncle’s.  It is supported by other women’s stories and remarks collected 
during the fieldwork.  Wakhongo heard similar stories from the children she 
interviewed.  Some complained that their fathers ate outside the home, leaving them 
to go hungry, or that when they did come home they ate up most of the food 
(Wakhongo, 2008).  One of the phrases that Heather used above, ‘when a man roams 
around’, suggests that men and women’s mobility patterns are partly responsible for 
the gendered nature of food insecurity.  These patterns are linked to the gendered 
division of labour.  In an individual interview Irene K. argued that married women 
experience food shortages and poverty more sharply than their spouses because: 
‘They are the ones who sit at home and know the misery the family goes through, but 
the men are usually out’.  A local government officer commented that, after 
landslides, male household heads who leave the village to seek work have better 
access to food than their wives and children who remain (Chapter 5). 
While some married men in Bubufu undoubtedly take their food provisioning 
obligations very seriously, there are others who put their own interests and leisure 
first.  For many in this latter group, drinking is their leisure pursuit of choice. Data on 
payment rates for casual farm labour reveal interesting differences related to gender 
and age. Women are usually paid a kilogram of posho together with oil and 
vegetables for sauce, or the cash equivalent of all these ingredients.  In March 2010 
this amounted to USh1,000; USh500 for a kilogram of posho and the rest for oil and 
vegetables. Tying women’s pay rates to the price of food means they are subject to 
large fluctuations; for example in early 2009 the price of posho (USh1500 per 
kilogram) was three times higher than in March 2010.  On the other hand, women are 
guaranteed a family meal in return for a day’s work.  Traditionally, men are paid 
with a two-litre can of local beer or the cash equivalent, which in 2011 was 
USh2,000.
12
  In the context of waged farm labour it seems that women, rather than 
men, are defined as the household’s food providers, which is at odds with my other 
                                                 
12
 Unfortunately I have no data on the price of local beer in 2010.  The relative pricing of posho and 
local beer over time and the effects on men’s payment preferences for casual labour, if any, would be 
an interesting research topic.  
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evidence on gendered roles in food provisioning; married women’s casual farm 
labour seems to be regarded as a substitute for their subsistence farming role rather 
than as an income-earning opportunity. The gender dichotomy in payment 
preferences is not clear cut; although young men and older men (presumably those 
without young children) are paid in beer or its cash equivalent, some married men 
prefer to be paid in the cash equivalent of posho and sauce so that they can feed their 
children (Interviews with Fred W. and Milton W.).   
 
Figure 7.1: Beer drinking party 
Paying for farm labour with beer parties is an old custom in Bugisu (La Fontaine 
1959:16) as in other parts of East Africa, although women did not use to take part in 
them (Heald, 1998:85).  In Bubufu the custom seems to be undergoing a process of 
monetisation that is not yet complete. The change is connected to the 
commercialisation of drinking, which in turn has a strong bearing on the gender 
dimensions of food shortages and poverty.  As I mentioned in Chapter 2, there are 
several bars in the village.  Groups of men, and a few women, congregate in them 
from the morning onwards, drinking from shared pots of beer.  People also hold 
private beer parties (Figure 7.1).  More than once I saw drunken men staggering 
through the village or slumped in a stupor at home.  Women in the discussion groups 
complained about their husbands spending money on drink, and other studies in 
Uganda have found men’s drinking to be a causal factor in household poverty and 
  
147 
marital breakdown (Dolan, 2004: Bird and Shinyekwa, 2005).  On the other hand; 
the evidence given above about payment rates for farm labour above suggests that 
not all husbands conform to the women’s stereotype of the squandering drinker;   
heavy drinking is nothing new in the area (Purvis, 1909; Roscoe, 1924); and beer and 
spirit-making is an easy-entry, profitable livelihood activity for some women (see 
Figure 7.2).   
 
Figure 7.2: Woman selling malt at the parish trading centre 
Food insecurity may also lead in one way or another to domestic violence associated 
with husbands’ drinking.  Although participants in one of the women’s discussions 
claimed that domestic violence was common, only one woman mentioned it in her 
individual interview, and in this case it was closely related to food shortages:     
Rose N: extract from interview transcript 
Your husband can leave you at home when you are feeling hungry because he 
has not left food.  When he comes back and asks for food and you tell him he 
did not leave any food he can beat you...The other thing is he can get some 
money and he decides to go away and leaves you hungry. He could have 
other women outside, and when he comes back and you try to ask him for 
food he can beat you. 
  
148 
A neighbour told me that Rose’s husband often beat her.  According to Heald 
(1998:64), domestic violence is not condoned in Gisu society.  Traditionally it is seen 
as an offence against the wife’s father that infringes an important intergenerational 
relationship between male affines.  In keeping with this, I heard that if neighbours 
hear a man beating his wife they often call out this warning to try to get him to stop: 
‘Why kill someone’s daughter?’  Whether condoned or not, Bird and Shinyekwa 
(2005:109) found that domestic violence was ‘reportedly widespread’ in the three 
villages they studied and was strongly associated with male alcohol consumption.  It 
also featured in several of the marital breakdowns that I discuss later in this chapter. 
So far I have concentrated on gendered positionality in relation to food insecurity. 
Experiences of income poverty are also gendered to some extent, as Table 7.1 shows.  
Owning a decent outfit, a few chairs and eating utensils are complex functionings 
that matter to married women rather than to their husbands.  Often when I arrived in 
a compound to interview someone there would be flurries of activity as women 
dispatched children next door to borrow something for me to sit on.  Elizabeth N. 
said that she had sold a third of her entire 2009 harvest of beans to get money for a 
set of chairs, as she had always had to borrow chairs from neighbours whenever she 
had visitors.  Women’s savings objectives are illustrative of their priorities; women 
members of the village’s revolving savings groups often spend their payouts on a set 
of plates or cups.  A male local government officer I interviewed sneered at this on 
the grounds that cups are not a productive investment.  This misses the point.  Teresa 
J. talked of asking her husband for money to buy new plates, and her embarrassment 
when such things are lacking:   
Teresa J: extract from women’s group discussion 
You can tell him to give you some money so that you can buy plates in the 
house or something good.  As you know for us women, when a visitor comes 
home it is you who gets embarrassed. You can get a plate to serve your visitor 
thinking that the plate is good, yet it is not good and you get embarrassed.  So 
you might tell him to give you some money to buy something good in the 
house so that when a visitor comes you are not embarrassed and she can go 
back and say that your house has nice things. However your husband might 
not like that idea. 
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While men can meet their friends in bars or the trading centre, women are bound to 
the home.  Although it may not be a productive expenditure in the short-term, buying 
chairs and plates means that women can entertain visitors with dignity.  In material 
terms, it enables them to maintain social bonds and networks that, among other 
things, provide informal insurance (see Chapter 8). 
In this section I have argued that spouses have different, gendered experiences of 
food insecurity and poverty.  While I found women to be a muted social group in 
relation to some issues (e.g. reproductive health, as discussed in Chapter 6), ‘muted’ 
is not the word I would use to describe married women’s discourse on household 
provisioning.  Perhaps the difference is that these matters have traditionally been 
seen as areas of legitimate contestation for wives, while concerns around their 
reproductive health have not.  In the next section I make the case that the unequal 
power relations that imbue Gisu conjugality contribute to household-level food 
insecurity and poverty in some cases, as well as shaping gendered perspectives on 
them.   
7.4 ‘You are not the man in this house’: Men’s disposal of food crops as a 
threat to food security  
The local sale of food crops is a major and in some cases the main source of cash 
income for rural households in south-eastern Uganda (Whyte and Kyaddondo, 2006).  
In three Mbale District villages an average of 59 per cent of household income came 
from crops and livestock, and there has been a move away from the traditional cash 
crop, coffee, to the sale of food crops (McDonagh, 2005). This change is linked to 
the dismantling of marketing parastatals and the diminishing size of landholdings: in 
small gardens it makes more sense to grow food crops, which can be either eaten or 
sold, rather than coffee, which can only be sold (Economic Policy Research Centre, 
2001a).  On the demand side, land shortages, weather shocks and stresses and 
declining soil fertility have all combined to create a local market for food such as 
beans and maize.  ‘Nowadays’, Ernest M. told me, ‘every crop is for sale’.  
The monetization of food crops in the area seems to have begun about 20 to 30 years 
ago.  Villagers in Bunabuso village, Bududa District, told researchers that the 
monetization of maize and beans started in the mid-1980s and that the sale of these 
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crops had become more important ‘by the day’ (Economic Policy Research Centre, 
2001a:25).  That timeframe matches Whyte and Kyaddondo’s (2006) observations in 
Bunyole.  On the other hand, La Fontaine (1960:119) mentions Gisu men selling 
surplus food crops in the 1950s.  The comments below suggest that the monetization 
process is still regarded as something new in Bubufu and illustrate men’s 
involvement in and attitudes to growing and selling food crops.  The third statement, 
by Ernest M., illuminates the changing status of beans in particular.   
Albert N: extract from interview transcript  
The system changed when everything became commercial.  Anything that 
was planted could be sold, so men began to plant anything there was a market 
for.  
Gordon N: extract from interview transcript 
Men never used to grow beans.  They thought that beans were useless, 
because they were just for food and one would not sell them to get money.  
But these days crops like beans are being sold. 
Ernest M: extract from interview transcript 
It is coffee that men are usually interested in.  However, these days men have 
also begun to make decisions regarding the sale of beans, which was not the 
case before.  What has brought about this change is that people have found a 
market for beans, so they get money out of them.  In the past, people just 
grew beans to eat at home, and when someone visited you the normal thing 
was to give them some beans as he was leaving; but these days no-one will 
give you free beans, because they can sell them.  
The only food crop that men do not sell is sweet potatoes.  As Irene K. remarked, 
‘men do not grow sweet potatoes because no money comes out of them’. For some 
reason they are still regarded as a woman’s crop, reflecting the LADDER survey 
finding that 94.3% of sweet potatoes were consumed in the household (Ellis and 
Bahiigwa, 2003:1005).   
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So what are the implications for household food security? There is an obvious 
positive side to the opportunities that this local market in food represents.  For 
instance, Mary M. talked about people managing to pull themselves out of temporary 
poverty by selling beans.  Roland J. highlighted the importance of income from the 
sale of food crops in a context of scarce non-farm livelihood options: 
Roland J: extract from group discussion transcript 
There is no other way of supporting ourselves apart from farming, because 
we look at planting, say beans and maize, as our work, and when these crops 
grow well then we can buy some soap, get something to eat and look after our 
children by buying them school exercise books. 
However, married women complained about their husbands selling food crops the 
women had grown for domestic consumption and using the proceeds for their own 
leisure, jeopardising food security for other household members:  
Heather N: extract from group discussion transcript 
Sometimes when you grow the cassava and it’s almost ready, [the husband] 
comes and says ‘This cassava seems to have matured. Why don’t we sell it 
and buy some posho?’  It could be you have not eaten any of that cassava. 
After he takes it away to sell, you won’t see him again. 
Walter P., a male household head in his late 30s, was the only man I came across 
who challenged the prevailing gender ideology on this issue:  
Walter P: summary from interview transcript 
Walter prided himself on ‘cooperating’ with his wife, which he attributed to 
his mixing with educated people when he was young.  But he said that this 
kind of conjugal relationship was rare in the village, and he was critical of 
how other Bubufu men treated their wives: ‘It’s not unusual to find a woman 
crying by the path because her husband has sold an animal without consulting 
her or because he has sold all the beans she helped to grow without telling 
her’.  He linked such behaviour to men’s drinking.  The passion that Walter 
displayed when talking about the issue seemed to spring from his own 
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experience as a boy.  He said that his father had sold food that his mother had 
grown without consulting her, denying her even a new dress from the 
proceeds.  He spent some of it on school fees for one of Walter’s older 
brothers. Walter, on the other hand, had to drop out of school at Senior Grade 
1 due to lack of money for fees, and clearly he still resented this injustice.   
Walter’s difficult boyhood relationship with an unsupportive father seemed to 
underlie his identity as a dissenter regarding Gisu male supremacism, and his 
anecdote illustrates the intergenerational tension often found between Gisu fathers 
and sons (La Fontaine, 1959; Heald, 1998). When I asked if things had changed since 
his parents’ generation he said that, if anything, marital relations tend to be worse 
now: because of men’s drinking, wives have to do all the work and poverty is 
widespread.   
Women’s accounts of male household heads appropriating household resources for 
their own use are corroborated by evidence from several other studies in south-
eastern Uganda (e.g. Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 
2002; Bird and Shinyekwa, 2005; Iversen et al, 2006; Whyte and Kyaddondo, 2006).  
In another study in Bugisu, Verschoor (2008) found that 62.8 per cent of crop sales 
were completely controlled by male household heads.  Researchers working on the 
Second Participatory Poverty Assessment in the area found that men’s exclusive 
control of food crops seriously undermined food security, and advocated that Village 
Chairmen should arbitrate in cases ‘where household resources are being vandalised 
by men’ (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002:26).  
Whyte and Kyaddondo (2006) argue that, in Bunyole, categories and rights regarding 
food crops are becoming confused and gendered spheres of authority regarding food 
are breaking down.  Similar changes to the moral economy of food provisioning and 
conjugality seem to be occurring in Bubufu.   
In households with severely asymmetric decision-making power it would be 
surprising not to find examples of what Jackson, paraphrasing Scott (1985), calls 
‘everyday forms of conjugal resistance’ (2007:2).  Both men and women told me 
how in households where conjugal relations were poor, wives sometimes pilfered 
crops under the control of  the male household head, especially newly-harvested 
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coffee beans.  Miranda M., whose absent husband, by all accounts, treated her 
harshly, had a very jaundiced view of conjugal relations in the village.  She told me 
that wives rarely saw the money their husbands made from selling coffee, and ‘if the 
wife has some tea but no sugar, she might steal some of the coffee beans to buy 
sugar.’  Other people also spoke of women and children stealing a few coffee beans 
during harvesting and drying, giving this as the reason why some men insist on 
picking and drying the beans themselves. 
While women and children taking a few coffee beans is regarded as a transgression 
of masculine rights, Gisu gender norms are used to legitimate husbands’ 
appropriation of household resources.  Walter, whom I quote above, mentioned 
husbands selling livestock and food crops without consulting their wives.  During 
one of the women’s group discussions I asked the participants which of them 
personally owned livestock.  My query triggered several stories like this: 
Myrtle S: extract from group discussion transcript 
I agreed with my husband that I should bring my cow and rear it from his 
home. One day he came back from the bar and told me to give him my cow 
so he could sell it, and he would pay it back when he got his money which 
was tied up somewhere. I told him ‘Look, my children have nothing. We only 
have one piece of land and I brought that cow here for them, not for you’.  He 
told me; ‘If that is so, remove your cow from my house. You are not the man 
in this home and I will not allow you to graze your cow in my garden.’ 
Although I heard several very similar stories from other married women, I should 
stress that there are also some households in the village where the husband is quite 
happy for his wife to have her own cow and even helps to collect fodder for the 
animal (e.g. Joan B.)  
Gender norms as discursive tools 
In many of the extracts I have presented in this chapter the male household heads 
who figure in them draw on Gisu gender ideology regarding the control of household 
resources; e.g. ‘You are not the man in this home’. Here is another example of the 
tactic in use, this time to justify the appropriation of food crops: 
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Ernest M: extract from interview transcript 
The man may decide to sell matoke on his own, and when the woman tries to 
ask him why he sold it, he tells her: ‘Did you bring any matoke here with 
you? 
Explaining why women find it harder than men to raise capital for small businesses, 
Nelson M. said that married women cannot sell a cow ‘because it does not rightfully 
belong to her according to the rights of the family here’.  Ezra K. added:   
Ezra K: extract from group discussion transcript  
Everything in the home is the man’s property, including the wife.  She can 
only look after the property, but she does not have the authority to sell 
anything.   
Other men in the group nodded and laughed, although there was a slight air of 
embarrassment, presumably due to my presence. Husbands legitimise their behaviour 
by invoking a fundamental tenet of Gisu gender ideology, namely the idea that 
married women are living in ‘their husbands’ homes’.  Women seem to accept this 
idea, on the surface at least.  For instance Esther N., the middle-aged wife of Ezra K., 
told me that her husband made all the decisions regarding investment and business 
matters, adding, ‘I am like a child to him, because it was he who brought me here.’ 
Women in another community told researchers: ‘The garden is his, so the crops are 
his and the money is his’ (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development, 2002:26).  As I mentioned in Chapter 5, Jackson (2007:116) argues 
that ‘ideas of legitimate dependence’ can be useful discursive tools for married 
women: they may deploy them to nudge husbands into fulfilling their provisioning 
responsibilities.   
‘Listening to each other’: Intra-household altruism and cooperation   
The men’s and women’s stories presented above paint a grim picture of conjugal 
relations riven by conflicts of interests and the abuse of power and poisoned by 
mistrust.  But as well as stories of marital discord, I also heard stories of households 
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where men’s ultimate authority is tempered by consultation and cooperation with 
their wives.   
The disposal of coffee beans serves as a gauge for the degree of cooperation and 
pooling within Bubufu households.  Most male household heads jealously control 
their coffee bushes and the proceeds from the sale of the beans.  ‘Coffee is for men, 
because they are owners of the home’ said Alice B., an elderly widow, reflecting a 
common view among older women as well as most men.  According to Ernest M., if 
men allowed their wives to control the coffee income they would spend it all on 
cosmetics rather than on household needs, school fees and the like.  But even though 
coffee is definitively a masculine cash crop, some wives were allowed to pick it and 
spend the money on household necessities (e.g. Ida N).  Ezra K. even allowed his 
older children to pick and sell the coffee beans from his few bushes so that they 
could buy exercise books.  When estimating their coffee harvests, people talked in 
terms of basins rather than sacks, so coffee might be a very small element of 
livelihoods in some cases.   
Wives’ involvement in decisions about the disposal of coffee beans and other 
resources ranges from merely being informed, as when a husband tells his wife he is 
going to sell something, to his asking his wife’s permission before a sale.  In between 
there is a middle ground of consultation, as illustrated in these summaries from 
interview transcripts and notes:’ 
Walter P., who was so critical of the way other men treated their wives, said 
that in his household he was the one who ultimately decided whether an 
animal should be sold, but that he usually tried to bring his wife round to his 
point of view before going ahead.   
Patrick N.’s wife had a goat, which she had bought after selling beans. He 
had allowed her to do this, but he pointed out that this did not mean that she 
had a permanent right to the beans.  The reason he had agreed to her 
suggestion was that he had realised that if his wife bought a goat it would be 
good for the whole family. 
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After making his remark about coffee profits and cosmetics, Ernest M. said 
that in the case of other crops most men at least inform their wives when they 
decide to sell something and in some cases also tell them what they intend to 
use the money for.  He also talked about spouses deciding together about the 
sale of livestock.   
De facto female household heads differed greatly from one household to another in 
the degree of agency they were able to exercise in farming matters, with some taking 
the lead in planting decisions (e.g. Gertrude N.) and others having to ask their 
husbands’ permission to make even small changes (e.g. Catherine N.).  So while the 
norm of men’s exclusive control of resources is intact and powerful, in practice male 
household heads exercise their control in different ways, often making concessions to 
their wives, albeit within well-defined parameters.  The idea of spouses ‘listening to 
each other’ (a phrase used by Agatha B.) has its own normative power in the 
community, especially among women, countering and modifying masculine 
unilateralism.   
I have argued that the abuse of conjugal power relations, facilitated by the dominant 
gender ideology, produces or exacerbates household food shortages and poverty.  I 
now return to the subject of divorce in Bubufu in relation to these issues. 
7.5 Divorce: Impatient wives or mistreated wives?  
Earlier in the chapter I presented men’s perceptions that marital insecurity arises 
from wives’ tendency to abandon their husbands whenever times are hard.  I now 
present the alternative, distinctively women’s discourse on divorce.  My purpose is to 
compare contemporary divorce stories with evidence from past ethnography in order 
to argue that women’s social status, and thus their human security, has been 
weakened by the declining importance of subsistence farming in livelihoods.  
I came across several cases of women leaving their husbands; for instance I 
mentioned the case of Josephine K., who left her husband after he inflicted physical 
violence on her, in Chapter 5.  Some divorces were said to be due to the husband 
starting a relationship with another woman.  The majority however, featured 
husbands’ failure to fulfil the material aspects of what Whitehead (1981) calls ‘the 
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conjugal contract’. The examples that follow are based on interview transcripts and 
notes.  In the first, I have added evidence drawn from other sources to underline the 
typicality of the story:   
Summaries based on interview transcripts and notes  
Dan W. and his wife divorced on 20th December 1995. He now lives alone 
except for two small grandsons.  He said that his wife had left him because he 
could not afford to buy her a new outfit for Christmas due to a poor coffee 
harvest that year. As Lilian M. put it during a group discussion: ‘You may get 
married and work hard with your husband…knowing that if things turn out 
well you’ll be able to dress nicely and buy some land.  If that doesn’t happen 
you may find you can’t stand it and that might make you leave the home’.  
Alex W. and his wife Beatrice had eight children.  She complained repeatedly 
to her parents that her husband was not providing for her and the children and 
was beating her.  Eventually they came and took her back to her natal village.  
Beatrice’s story highlights the strength of the tie between a wife and her kin.   
When I met her in 2009, Teresa J. was an angry young woman.  Harold B., 
her husband, had taken a second wife and had given her a cow that Teresa 
and he had acquired together.  Although he had a shop in the local trading 
centre, he had reduced his financial support to Teresa and their two small 
children.  After quarrels and domestic violence, Teresa had left her children 
with her parents-in-law and started work in a hotel in Mbale.  Although her 
mother-in-law had tried to persuade her to return, she refused.  In 2010 
Harold himself followed her there, apparently to try to get her to come back.  
When his second wife heard this she smashed up and burned most of the 
furniture and bedding and went back to her natal village.   
Taken together, these and other divorce stories I heard suggest that married women 
in Bubufu have relatively strong fallback positions.  Some indicate that they can also 
deploy considerable bargaining power: witness the efforts made to get Teresa back to 
the marital home. But all the wives concerned in these cases had endured material 
hardship due to their husbands’ lack of support, and several had suffered domestic 
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violence, before they left their husbands.  As Teresa remarked: ‘You do not go at 
will, but because you are mistreated.’   
For married women, divorce is sometimes a response to household food insecurity.  
Not all women choose this strategy, though. I talked to women who were still in their 
marriage even in the absence of material support from husbands. For instance Sandra 
N., who I quoted earlier in connection with giving up petty trading on marriage, told 
me that her husband was not sending her money from Kampala.  She showed me an 
exercise book where she kept a record of her many debts with local shopkeepers and 
friends. When I asked her why she stayed on, she replied: ‘I’m just following the 
Bible, because it says a woman leaves her maiden home and goes to a man to 
become one with him.  If I don’t have the best of husbands, I can’t help it’. 
These stories challenge the prevailing masculine view on divorce in Bubufu, namely 
that divorces are caused by impatient wives.  They also seem to be at odds with 
ethnographic accounts that emphasise the ease with which Gisu women leave their 
marriages (La Fontaine, 1959; Heald, 1998).  While one might expect male and 
female villagers to have different points of view on marriage, the discrepancy with 
the ethnography is more puzzling. There are several possible explanations.  First, 
Roscoe (1924) and La Fontaine (1959) compare Gisu women’s position with that of 
women in other African societies, so their judgements are relative.  Second, there is 
the possibility of either masculine bias on the ethnographers’ part or feminine bias on 
mine.  Heald’s work (1998) in particular is concerned almost exclusively with the 
experiences of Gisu men, which she justifies on the basis that the Gisu ‘tribal 
universe’ is constructed around men (1998:146); women’s experiences are 
marginalised.  For my part, I have tried to present the statements of both men and 
women in an even-handed manner.   
There is another possibility, namely that the balance of conjugal power has changed 
since La Fontaine and Heald conducted their studies due in part to declining 
subsistence food production, which in turn is driven by a combination of factors.  My 
argument draws on Sen’s cooperative conflict model of households (1990), which I 
have briefly alluded to already.  Food self-sufficiency is an impossible dream 
nowadays due to land scarcity and declining agricultural productivity, the latter in 
turn partly due to destructive rainfall.  Married women can no longer rely on 
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subsistence farming to provide them and their children with food security from day 
to day.  Meanwhile, the monetisation of food undermines their perceived 
contribution to the household and thus their bargaining position: in some men’s eyes, 
women ‘just sit at home’ and are ‘just farmers’.  Sen argues that wives’ ability to 
earn cash outside the home is a critical variable in conjugal bargaining, in part 
because it can enhance their perceived contribution to the household (1990).  
However married women in Bubufu are constrained in their attempts to earn income, 
as I discuss in Chapter 10.  
What of married women’s fallback position (ibid), namely their ability to leave their 
marriages?  I think this is weaker today than in the 1950s and 1970s when La 
Fontaine (1959) and Heald (1998) were working among the Gisu, due to today’s 
widespread food insecurity and poverty.  In Chapter 2 I pointed out that Bugisu is far 
less prosperous now than in the 1950s, for instance.  A married woman who returns 
to her natal village nowadays may not be so easily accommodated with land as she 
would have been in the past.  In short, the same trends, events and pressures 
(including land scarcity, constraints on farming, environmental degradation and the 
impacts of destructive rainfall) that impact on wives’ bargaining position within the 
home also damage their fallback position.  As well as detracting from married 
women’s ability to provide for themselves and their children, another outcome is a 
decline in their status within the household.   
7.6  Summary  
Food shortages and income poverty are more closely interconnected than they used 
to be in the village due to the many pressures on subsistence farming and the need to 
buy food.  The central problem, land scarcity, is compounded by the impacts of 
destructive rainfall and numerous other constraints on farming (Chapter 4).  Married 
men and women’s experiences of food insecurity and poverty are heavily influenced 
by Gisu conjugality.  Norms regarding spouses’ roles and responsibilities, control of 
resources, involvement in household decision-making, division of labour and 
mobility all mean that they experience hunger and poverty in different ways.  But the 
gendered nature of their experience is not just a matter of different perspectives.  
Abuse of conjugal power relations, sustained by Gisu gender ideology and a 
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powerful hegemonic discourse (‘the land is his and the crops are his’), actually 
contribute to food insecurity for less powerful household members.  However, this 
does not happen in all households, the personalities and relationships of spouses 
being very important in this regard.   
In this context of severe insecurity, many women in the village fight hard for their 
conjugal entitlement to food for themselves and their children.  However, their intra-
household bargaining positions have been weakened over time and the combined 
effects of land scarcity and destructive rainfall also play a part in this.  Comparing 
women’s subjective accounts of conjugality today with ethnographic evidence on 
divorce, I have suggested that married women’s bargaining power within the 
household may be declining, in association with the monetisation of food.  Since the 
impacts of destructive rainfall feed into the decline of subsistence farming in 
household livelihoods they are helping to skew conjugal power relations.  This is a 
human security issue, because of both the negative material outcomes for women and 
their children and the undermining of women’s dignity.  What is happening now in 
Bubufu indicates that climate change could have serious social consequences for 
married women. 
In the next chapter I investigate the pervasive issues of crop theft and physical 
insecurity, particularly men’s, which are examples of the ‘dark side’ of community 
relations. 
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Chapter 8: Theft, violence and maladaptation 
 
8.1 Introduction  
Late one night in 2009, Ernest M. confronted a burglar eating his beans:  
Ernest M: summary from interview notes 
Around midnight on the morning of 9
th
 April, a man broke into Ernest’s 
outhouse kitchen.  Ernest went out to find him eating some cooked beans he 
had been keeping overnight ready to sell in his bar the next day.  The intruder 
hacked at him with a machete and Ernest sustained several superficial cuts, 
which he showed me the next day when I met him on the track.  After a tussle 
the man ran away but was caught by neighbours responding to Ernest’s 
shouts.  One of them broke the thief’s leg with a hoe.  He was taken to the 
police station in a wheelbarrow, and the police later took him to hospital.  
As I was listening to this story a young man who was passing by chipped in 
and told us that it was not the first time the man had been caught stealing.  He 
said that that he was unmarried, about 30 years old and lived with his parents 
in Butoto.  He was their only child but he had no land.  He had already had 
most of his teeth knocked out in a previous beating administered because of 
his stealing.  Another young man laughed at this and shouted excitedly; ‘Why 
did they only break his leg?  You should kill thieves, not just injure them’.  
This provoked laughter and agreement among the people clustered around. 
I use this anecdote to introduce the topics of crime and villagers’ responses to crime, 
which, I argue, may themselves threaten human security.  Physical conflict can also 
arise from struggles between male kin over resources, especially land.  I frame these 
tensions and conflicts as maladaptive responses to specific forms of human 
insecurity.   
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Crop theft is a major issue in the village, without any noticeable social variation.  
Fifty-eight per cent of adult men and thirty-nine per cent of adult women identified 
the theft of standing crops or livestock as a threat, and several of the men interviewed 
said that that theft was their biggest worry.  The threat of physical violence worries 
more men than women.  When asked about threats during interviews, 31 per cent of 
men brought up the threat of being physically attacked compared to only 9 per cent 
of women.   
In the next section (8.2) I discuss crop theft and its relationship to household-level 
food security.  In section 8.3 I discuss physical violence as a risk affecting men in the 
community.  Then I consider a range of villagers’ attitudes and responses to crop 
thieves and house robbers (section 8.4).  In section 8.5 I document in some detail the 
innovation of tracker dogs as a means to catch crop thieves and how this novelty may 
lend itself to abuse.  I synthesise my argument in section 8.6.  Throughout the 
chapter, the evidence on which I base my analysis is one-sided because, 
unsurprisingly, no-one identified themselves as a thief during the fieldwork.   
8.2 ‘It makes you lose hope in farming’: Crop theft as a threat to food 
security 
Crop theft is more frequent during the hungry season, so the timing of most of our 
interviews (many of which took place during April and May 2009) may have inflated 
its importance in villagers’ minds.  However there is no doubt that crop theft was 
indeed very common; 64 per cent of the people (18 out of 28) whom Mr. Balungira 
interviewed in 2010 said that food, (mainly maize, matoke and cassava), had been 
stolen from their gardens over the past year.  Cassava is especially easy to steal 
because it can be uprooted quickly.  As well as stealing food to eat or sell, people 
sometimes steal plantain suckers and foliage to feed to their cows.  I also heard of 
items such as pangas or piles of bricks being stolen, corroborating Heald’s statement 
that petty pilfering was endemic in her study area (1998:138).  However, the theft of 
crops worries people more because of its impact on food security.  The victims I 
heard about ranged from one of the village’s largest landowners, who reportedly lost 
16 bunches of plantain between February and March 2009, to some of the poorest 
households in the village such as those of Edith K. and Gregory N:  
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Edith K: summary from interview notes 
When I interviewed Edith K., an elderly widow, in April 2009, she told me 
that a bunch of matoke had been stolen from her the night before.  She had 
heard the thieves and raised the alarm from inside her house, but none of the 
neighbours had intervened, although male villagers have a legal duty to 
respond to such alarms.   
Gregory N: summary from interview transcript 
Gregory N. is 71 and in poor health.  He has several dependants living with 
him.  In 2009 he had matoke, cassava and potatoes stolen.  He never caught 
the thief, except on one night when he heard someone trying to cut his 
matoke.  When he got up and opened the door, the man ran away and left the 
matoke behind. 
While such individual instances of crop theft may seem trivial, they are significant 
blows to the food security of people with small land-holdings.  When she was 
interviewed in April 2009, Jessica W. had just had a lot of cassava stolen. She said 
that she worried about crop theft more than anything else, lamenting:  
Jessica W: extract from interview transcript  
I had sat comfortably knowing that even if other people were going to suffer 
from hunger, I was not going to, because I had my cassava.  But in the end 
when they stole the cassava, it means I am also going to suffer from hunger 
like other people. It also makes you lose hope in farming.  You don’t feel like 
going back to dig because you think they will steal again like they did before.  
Some people were targeted several times in the same growing season and lost a 
substantial portion of their harvest: 
Julia N: extract from interview transcript  
In 2009 we got 70 kilograms of maize.  The harvest was good, and we should 
have got more, but thieves kept stealing it because we left it to dry in the 
garden before harvesting.  Because the thieves were finishing the maize we 
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decided to harvest it before it had dried and dry it on the roof instead.  If it 
had not been for the thieves we would have got about 150 kilograms. 
Like Julia, farmers often respond to crop theft by immediately harvesting whatever 
was left, both to pre-empt further losses and to spite the thieves.  For instance, this is 
what James L. did on seeing that thieves had stolen half of his cassava:  
James L: extract from interview transcript  
I got angry and dug up what remained, saying that they wouldn’t take it all 
and leave me with nothing...I just removed it before it was ready because I 
did not want to make a loss. 
Reacting to crop theft by digging up one’s own crops before they are mature involves 
reduced harvests, lost investment and extra labour.  Mary M. did the same thing 
when her own cassava was stolen.  She also told me that that she had decided to 
switch from cassava to growing yams instead, which she saw as an adaptation to both 
heavy rainfall and crop theft:  
Mary M: extract from interview transcript.  
If it continues raining very heavily, then I might decide to grow a lot of yams.  
They can’t be stolen because I can cut off the leaves so when a thief comes at 
night he won’t be able to find them.  If I had thought of cutting off the 
cassava stems down to the ground they would not have stolen my cassava.   
Mary claimed that some people were thinking of switching from food crops to 
agroforestry, because ‘there is no way a thief will cut down a tree without the owner 
hearing it fall’, although one man (Samson N.) had had some trees stolen.  If so, this 
is a strong indication of the seriousness with which crop theft threat was perceived.   
Having one’s cow stolen was another concern.  This fear was articulated less often 
than anxiety about crop theft, presumably because not all households have a cow in 
the first place.  It is overwhelmingly men who own cows, which explains why more 
men than women mentioned cattle theft as a risk.  Women are much more likely to 
own hens, and accordingly a few women expressed concern about their chickens 
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being snatched.  Although the loss of a hen may seem a small matter, a hen 
represents the first rung on the asset accumulation ladder by which villagers try to 
climb out of poverty.   
I turn now to the topic of physical violence among men.   
8.3  Men’s fear of attack 
Men rather than women prioritised violent assault as a perceived human security 
threat; I speculate on the reasons why women did not do so at the end of this section.  
Young unmarried men in particular were keenly aware of the risk of getting into 
disputes of various kinds: rows over land with their brothers and other male kin, 
arguments with neighbours over straying livestock or a dangerous flaring of drunken 
aggression. Out of nine young unmarried men who were asked directly about their 
perceived human security threats, six prioritized violent conflict.  This is in keeping 
with Heald’s analysis of murder cases in the 1960s, which finds that the majority of 
murder victims were men killed by other men.  Purvis (1909) and La Fontaine (1959) 
define Gisu violence as violence among men.  This pattern is at least partly due to the 
contested nature of kin relations among men in Bugisu, which can escalate into 
violence where land is concerned (La Fontaine, 1962; Heald, 1998).  For instance, 
Martin K., a 20-year old man who was still at school, described how the 
capriciousness of a father could produce long-lasting friction among brothers:  
Martin K: extract from interview notes  
There are some fathers who give land to one of their sons, but after some time 
they change their mind and give it to another son and this causes the sons to 
fight each other and pull out pangas.  These children also stop respecting their 
parents.  They will develop grudges with them and quarrel with them all the 
time. 
The potential for land allocation to generate conflict is also illustrated by the typical 
story below. 
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Patrick N: extract from interview notes 
Patrick’s brother had begun farming on his land without his permission.  One 
day when Patrick was digging the brother also came with a hoe and began 
digging too.  They quarrelled, and the brother tried to hit him with his hoe but 
Patrick managed to grab it off him.  Then the brother went to the police and 
had Patrick arrested. The lineage elder explained to the police officers that it 
was a land issue that the elders could sort out.  Patrick was released.  The 
lineage elders sat and declared the land was officially his. 
As well as disputes within the family, young men also perceive conflict with other 
men in general as a risk to their human security:  
Peter M: extract from interview transcript 
You may be talking to someone, joking, but all of a sudden you quarrel and 
abuse one another.  I don’t know [the causes of these quarrels].  You can be 
conversing well with that person, yet behind your back he speaks ill of you. 
Peter may have been vulnerable to aggression because he had only lately arrived in 
the village and was regarded as an outsider.  However it is not only perceived 
outsiders who are vulnerable.  Other young men also felt they were at risk: 
Conrad B: extract from interview transcript  
You can be walking home and somebody beats you up…It mostly happens 
when one day you say something in all innocence, but on the other side it 
offends somebody.  He can waylay you and hit you with a stone.   
This problem of drunken brawls came up frequently in conversations with young 
men. An incident in August 2009, when a bar owner in the village killed his young 
cousin, Melvin J., after an evening of drinking, suggests that they were not 
exaggerating this risk.  I give the outline of that story later in the chapter, but it is 
enough to say at this point that it conforms to the pattern observed by La Fontaine 
(1959) of drunken killings resulting from festering grievances rather as than random 
acts of violence.   
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What about older men?  Their concerns about violence were different from the young 
men’s in that they arise from their control of, and responsibility for, household 
assets:  
Ezra K: extract from interview notes  
Ezra’s main worry is theft and being murdered: he worries a lot about that.  
He has a cow with a bell, and at night he sometimes lies awake hearing the 
bell tinkling and imagining that thieves are making off with the cow.  But he 
dare not go out to check because if there really are thieves out there they 
might kill him.  A neighbour had a cow stolen, but the thieves had to leave it 
behind in the end because they could not move it.  It was lucky the owner did 
not hear what was going on, because if he had he might have tackled them 
and been killed. 
Robberies are associated with the period after the coffee harvest, which is the only 
time of the year when villagers have significant amounts of cash.  During a men’s 
discussion group participants described how robbers break into houses at night and 
target the man of the house for a beating because he is the one who knows where the 
money is hidden.  I have already presented the story of Ernest M. and the bean thief.  
I also heard several accounts of break-ins, arson and beatings, sometimes motivated 
by long-standing grudges.  For instance Emmanuel W. described how his wife was 
almost strangled one night by a naked, mud-smeared man who rose up from the 
undergrowth as she was crossing the Singye on her way back from a local shop.  He 
interpreted it as a form of attack on himself and connected it to the shooting of the 
LC1 Secretary a few years before, a crime that apparently had never been resolved.   
It is interesting that Emmanuel saw the murderous attack on his wife as a vicarious 
attack on himself.  This brings me back the topic of violence against women, and 
specifically the question of why it did not come up more often during interviews.  In 
Chapter 7 I mentioned how married women’s attempts to claim their conjugal 
entitlement to food for themselves and their children sometimes leads to domestic 
violence.  I also heard a few accounts of sexual harassment and physical violence 
directed at young unmarried women.  One young woman, Grace B., told me that she 
had been subjected to threats of rape from a married neighbour who had fled to 
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Kenya after she reported it to the police.  The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa in 
general is that violence against women is a pervasive problem, so I assume that these 
stories were the tip of the iceberg.  Understandable reticence, fear of the men 
concerned or an acceptance of violence against women as a fact of life: any or all of 
these may explain why the topic was not brought up in conversations with women.  It 
may be symptomatic of the ‘mutedness’ of women as a social group (Ardener, 1975), 
which I discuss in Chapter 11.   
I now return to crop theft, this time concentrating on villagers’ views of thieves and 
their collective reaction to the spate of crop thefts that was troubling the community 
in 2009.   
8.4  Responses to theft and robbery: From pragmatism to violence  
So far I have analysed crop theft as a threat to the victims’ food security.  But there is 
another human security dimension to this problem, namely the treatment of thieves.  
One day, as I was sitting in a compound conducting an interview, I heard a hue and 
cry just above me on the hillside, followed by confused shouting.  Later, I was told 
that what I had heard was a chicken-thief being chased and beaten.  Historically the 
Gisu, like people in many other parts of Africa, have tended to beat anyone caught 
stealing or suspected to be a thief (La Fontaine, 1959; Heald, 1998).  I heard some 
uncompromising opinions about how to deal with thieves as well as disturbing 
anecdotes of men in neighbouring villages who had been crippled or disfigured by 
the beatings they had received from lynch mobs.  The comment of a bystander when 
I was listening to Ernest’s account of his attack is a case in point: ‘You should kill 
thieves, not just injure them’.  Clearly, then, thieves and robbers take on a high risk 
when operating in Bubufu.   
If a suspected thief is killed his family may respond, thus starting a feud.  For 
instance, according to Martin K. villagers were so wound up about the intruder who 
attacked Ernest M. that another such incident might trigger a feud:   
Martin K: extract from interview notes 
People in the village are saying that the next thief they catch, they will just 
kill.  This worries him because when they kill the thief, his family might 
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come and destroy houses and plantations belonging to people who had 
nothing to do with the killing.  If this happens he is worried that there will be 
no peace in the community. 
The potential for scapegoating is another consideration: in general, it is young men 
who tend to be blamed for thefts (Heald 1998:80).  The next two stories illustrate 
this.  The first concerns Peter M., whom I quoted above regarding the risk of getting 
involved in a quarrel.  The second is about the violent death of Melvin J.   
Peter M: summary from interview transcripts and notes 
When first interviewed in 2009, 19-year-old Peter complained about 
mistreatment from his father, Joseph.  Peter had recently moved into his 
father’s household in the hope that he might do something for him. Joseph 
was one of the better-off men in the village.  He had never married Peter’s 
mother, had several children by various women, and his current wife seemed 
to have a vindictive attitude towards her step-son.  Peter described a recent 
incident:  
Cassava was uprooted in the garden and I was accused.  My father tied me 
with ropes, claiming that I had stolen the cassava.  One of my aunts said she 
saw me take it, but it was thieves who actually stole it and I denied it, and 
they even gave me the Bible to swear on, but they still believe that it was me.  
Whenever something goes missing or some small thing is done wrong they 
always accuse me, although they have never caught me. Maybe their hearts 
don’t like me.   
I come back to Peter M. in Chapter 9. The second, more ambiguous, story concerns 
an incident in late 2009.  A trivial theft was said by some villagers to be the cause of 
manslaughter:  
Summarised from Mr. Balungira’s notes of interviews with Albert M. and 
Stephen K. 
After an evening of drinking, Roger M., the owner of a bar in the village, 
attacked his young cousin Melvin, striking him on the head with a heavy 
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stick.  Melvin walked away from the scene but was found dead near the river 
soon afterwards and Roger fled to Kenya.  While no-one knew for sure what 
underlay the killing, some people said that it was because Roger suspected his 
cousin of stealing two ducks he had recently bought in Mbale.  Other theories 
concerned putative family tensions.  Melvin’s mother was Roger’s father’s 
sister, and the two men had been brought up in the same household: the 
identity of Melvin’s father was unknown.  Other guesses involved sexual 
jealousy, as both men were interested in marrying the widow of one of 
Roger’s brothers who was said that to have preferred Melvin.   
Both Peter and Melvin were in disadvantageous positions with a tenuous claim on 
land or the means of an education.  In Peter’s case, this was because his father had 
never been married to his mother, and in Melvin’s case, it was because the identity of 
his father was not known.  Peter’s case in particular reflects Heald’s finding that 
accusations of theft are often used to justify the rejection of young men’s claim on 
resources (1998:9). 
Heald writes that at the time of her fieldwork in the 1960s the Gisu regarded thieves 
as ‘irredeemable degenerates’ (ibid:132) motivated by ill-will (ibid:6).  Similarly, 
some Bubufu residents branded thieves as feckless, lazy and greedy for cash to spend 
on alcohol.  
Jessica W: extract from interview transcript 
There are people who only think about stealing other people’s things. Like 
this period people don’t have food. You can grow your food expecting to help 
yourself, but they come and steal because they don’t have food themselves. 
Some people don’t have land for farming, but there are others who do have 
gardens, but when they wake up in the morning they don’t plan what to do. 
Elijah R: extract from interview transcript  
These days some people do not want to farm: they like roaming around and 
wait for other people to farm so they can just come and steal.  In the past 
people were few and there was plenty of food, and someone could afford to 
leave his cassava or matoke in the garden for a long time.  Also the sale of 
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food these days has increased crop theft because most of the youths who steal 
the food just sell it...Many youths these days are greedy for money and they 
steal people’s food to sell for beer money. 
These remarks about ‘greedy youths’ are echoed in a study set in a nearby sub-
county where village elders complained about young landless men hanging around 
the village stealing and causing trouble (Jenkins et al, 2010).  However views about 
crop thieves were diverse and often more nuanced than this.  Several people 
attributed crop theft to thieves’ food insecurity and landlessness:  
Noel M: extract from interview notes   
When people are many the land becomes small.  There is not enough land for 
farming so this causes people to steal.  
James L: extract from interview transcript 
In April and May I think that hunger causes it. During these months people 
get worried about their matoke because the thieves steal such a lot.  The 
thieves are from around here, and people know who they are.   
In contrast to the talk of killing thieves quoted above, the actual behaviour of several 
people who succeeded in catching crop thieves was mild.  In 2010, Mr. Balungira 
was told first-hand of three cases where thieves, in two cases close neighbours of the 
theft victims, were taken either to the police station or to the village chairman, who 
imposed cash fines.  In all three cases, though, the theft victims dropped the charges 
as they realised they would never be able to extract a fine from the offenders due to 
their poverty.  This case was typical:  
Milton W: summary from interview notes 
When Milton W. noticed some matoke was missing, he suspected a 
neighbour.  The following day he trailed him to the market, where he thought 
the thief would try to sell it.  When he caught him with the matoke the man 
confessed, but at the police station he persuaded Milton not to press charges 
on the grounds that he had no land to sell and so would not be able to pay the 
fine.   
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The following comment suggests that thieves may take advantage of people’s 
unwillingness to press charges against their neighbours:   
Wilfred T: summary from interview notes 
The reason he decided to rent land in Bududa [a neighbouring district] was 
because when you rent land in a place where you are not known the people in 
that area can fear to steal your crops because they do not know your 
character.  But in your own community someone can easily steal your crops, 
knowing that when you catch them they can plead with you for forgiveness. 
Not everyone shared Wilfred’s view: for instance Ezra K. decided it was safe to farm 
land in another village only after people in the district had come up with an effective 
solution to the crop theft problem, which I describe below.   
8.5 Arrival of the tracker dogs: A collective response to crop theft  
In the first half of 2009 the people of Bubufu seemed powerless to put a stop to crop 
theft, but the situation changed dramatically in December of that year, when the 
villagers banded together to put an end to it.  While their success was astonishing, 
their ingenious solution had ambiguous implications for human security.  Taking 
their cue from other local communities plagued by crop theft, they formed syndicates 
to hire the unofficial services of a police tracker dog.  At first the hire charge was 
120,000 shillings, but owing to high demand the price soon soared to 200,000 
shillings.  Each syndicate member contributed about USh10,000, and if any of them 
had crops stolen the combined sum was used to hire the dog and its police handler.  
The outlay was recouped through fines levied on the thief.  Several alleged thieves 
were apprehended in this way, and the effect was striking. When Mr. Balungira 
visited Bubufu in April 2010 he was told that crop theft had altogether ceased 
because would-be thieves were afraid of being caught.  This comment was typical:  
Paul M: summary from interview notes  
In previous years you never saw a bunch of mature matoke here, but ever 
since they began bringing a police dog, thieves have stopped stealing it.  
These days people leave it to mature, because nobody can steal it. 
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The introduction of dogs was such an effective deterrent that the local price of 
matoke was said to have fallen sharply as there was so much more of it available 
(interview with John K.).  Villagers also talked of an elderly widow in an adjacent  
village who was now able to make a little money selling her elephant grass for cow 
fodder, whereas in the past people had just stolen it.  According to Mr. Balungira, 
James L.’s ‘appeal to the government is to add more such dogs’. 
The sniffer dog groups are an example of Gisu ‘social ingenuity’ (Homer-Dixon, 
1999).  Was their introduction a minor triumph for human security?  Perhaps the best 
answer is ‘yes and no’.  While the protection of vulnerable people from thieves was 
clearly positive, the fines imposed were disproportionately high: for example 
USh500,000 to 800,000 for stealing a bunch of matoke worth a mere USh4,000.  In 
several cases these high fines resulted in the alleged culprits being forced to sell 
productive assets.  A man in his late 20s, Anthony H., had to sell his boda boda 
bicycle to pay a fine after the sniffer dog identified him as the person who had stolen 
his neighbour’s matoke.  The fact that he had a bicycle indicates that he was by no 
means one of the poorest members of the community.  On the other hand, several of 
his brother’s young children were living with him while their father worked in Kenya 
and he also had a young wife and child of his own, so his responsibilities were 
considerable.  Ezra K. told Mr. Balungira that across the area ‘many young men have 
lost their land, cows and other property to pay the fines and others have run away 
from their villages’.  
The implications are disturbing when one reflects on the unreliability and possible 
falsification of scent evidence.  The use of tracker dog evidence alone to convict 
alleged thieves has been challenged in English courts as well as by the English media 
(Marks, 2009).  In the case of R v Pieterson and Holloway in 1995 the Court of 
Appeal established that tracker dog evidence could be accepted in a trial, but only in 
conjunction with evidence testifying to the dog’s skills, training and experience 
(Jerrard, n.d.).  The value of tracker dog ‘evidence’, then, is open to question.  
There is a clear analogy between the way the tracker dogs are being used and 
traditional divination practices.  Porter et al (1991) and Reynolds Whyte (1997) 
describe the role that diviners in rural areas of Kenya and Uganda respectively play in 
‘creating certainty’ for the people who use them (Porter et al, 1991:182).  In Bugisu 
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during the 1960s Heald observed witch-finding rituals being used to re-establish 
order during a period of anarchy and violence (Heald, 1998).  Porter et al (1991:183) 
coin the term ‘facipulation’, which they define as a ‘subtle blend of facilitation and 
manipulation’, to describe diviners’ rituals.  Perhaps tracker dog evidence is similarly 
being ‘facipulated’ today.  The tracker dog groups are also in the tradition of the 
vigilante bands that Heald observed in the 1960s (Heald, 1998).  She attributes the 
rapid rise of these organizations to the Gisu ideal of masculine autonomy and self-
help, the acephalous nature of Gisu society and people’s lack of faith in the 
government’s ability to protect them following the state’s withdrawal from rural areas 
after independence.  As with the tracker dog groups, the vigilantes forced many 
young unmarried men to flee their villages (1998:261). 
In the 1960s many of the vigilante groups became involved in protection rackets, and 
something similar has happened with the tracker dog groups.  Soon after their 
introduction moneylenders started offering to pay the joining fee for poorer villagers 
(joint interview with Ezra K. and Chapman W.).  The condition was that in the event 
of their crops being stolen, they would hand over the case to the money-lender, in 
exchange for a small sum of money to cover their loss.  In effect, this extended the 
groups’ protection to villagers previously too poor to join.  It also created an 
incentive for false claims of theft.  On being alerted to a case the money-lenders 
colluded with the police to track down the thief, splitting the fine between them.  
This connivance with the police distinguishes the tracker dog groups from the 1960s 
vigilante groups and contemporary community policing initiatives in Kenya (Heald, 
2007), as in the latter cases communities took justice into their own hands in order to 
bypass ineffective and corrupt police services.   
8.6 Summary 
Theft, robbery and assault are enactments of the dynamic interconnections between 
community relations, food insecurity and poverty.  They are part of a process 
whereby insecurity is redirected from one individual or group to another.  The theft 
of other people’s food crops can be a way of coping with short periods of poverty 
(Fafchamps and Minten, 2006), and crop theft is common in other Gisu communities 
too (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002:20; Ashley 
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and Nanyeenya, 2005; Bird and Shinyekwa, 2005:104).  As researchers working in 
the region noted: ‘One of the most glaring problems that seem to be coming from 
food insecurity is the other forms of insecurity that are also created’ (Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2002:20).  Thus crop theft is a 
maladaptive response to food insecurity in Bugisu.  
Worries about theft are also often mentioned in studies of rural communities in other 
parts of Africa (Quinn et al, 2003; Tschakert, 2007).  The risk of crime deters people 
from investment and enterprise (Fafchamps, 2003), yet despite its significance for 
poor farmers, rural crime is generally under-researched in developing countries 
(Fafchamps and Moser, 2003:626).  Based on the discussion in Chapter 6 and this 
chapter, a pattern is starting to emerge, namely that some of the major drivers of 
individual and household human security in Bubufu receive little attention in 
academic and development policy discourse.  I speculate on the possible reasons for 
this in Chapter 11.  At this stage, my point is that crop theft creates fundamental 
intracommunity tensions.   
The sniffer dog groups represent a step change in villagers’ responses to crop theft, 
partly driven by certain individuals’ desire to make money from the problem.  From 
one point of view they are a positive innovation as well as an impressive 
demonstration of Bubufu villagers’ collective ability to adapt to whatever threatens 
them.  Insofar as they are a continuation of earlier forms of community policing 
(Heald, 1998), the groups articulate a distinctively Gisu idiom of response, 
illustrating how local cultural norms and values shape such adaptations (Ensor and 
Berger, 2009a).  However, I have argued that the combination of swingeing fines and 
the misalliance of money lenders with corrupt police officers may in itself constitute 
a threat to young landless men, some of whom may be unfairly victimised.  In this 
way crop theft and the literal hounding of young men can be seen as part of a cycle 
of generic, culturally-inflected maladaptation to deteriorating conditions.
13
  In the 
light of climate change, this has important implications.  
                                                 
13
 The punishments given to crop thieves in Bubufu are lenient, however, compared to the fatal 
beatings of thieves documented in some other parts of East Africa (e.g. Fleisher, 2000).   
 
  
176 
In the next chapter I analyse a nexus of issues which, like the topics of this chapter, 
find young men at the centre of intra-community conflicts: marriage, brideprice 
demands and defilement charges. 
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Chapter 9: Three cows, two goats, a cock and three ropes: 
Brideprice and intergenerational struggles between men  
 
9.1 Introduction  
Up to now I have mainly discussed the risks, shocks and stresses that affect the 
majority of the population in Bubufu.  This chapter is different.  The nine young 
unmarried men who were interviewed individually did share other people’s concerns 
about healthcare charges, destructive rainfall and landslides, food insecurity and 
poverty: however, rather than prioritising any of these issues they prioritised the 
obstacles they faced in reaching the ‘achievement goals’ (Sen, 1993) that their 
gender and life stage define for them, namely finding the wherewithal to marry and 
set up their own household.  A closely-related issue about which they also 
complained was the imposition of so-called defilement charges.  On the other side of 
the coin, several older men talked about the difficulties they faced in claiming their 
brideprice entitlements, or their efforts to pursue defilement charges.   
The stories featured here are from individual men with complex social identities: 
their accounts are structurally situated and influenced for better or worse by their 
personal relationships, for instance with their wives and fathers.  They afford 
particularistic insights into struggles over masculine entitlements and are part of a 
historical and wider geographic trend. I analyse them in terms of human security and 
try to draw out their implications for climate adaptive capacity.  As in previous 
chapters, the insights of La Fontaine (1959) and Heald (1998) are invaluable, but I 
draw attention to the masculine bias of their studies.  Before proceeding any further I 
need to explain two key terms: brideprice and defilement. 
In line with my aim to approach issues through the subjectivities of the people 
involved, I use the term ‘brideprice’ because this is the Ugandan English translation 
of the Lugisu word inghwe. However, I accept Dalton’s argument (1966) that the 
term ‘bridewealth’ may be more accurate, because it incorporates recognition that 
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marriage payments are not commercial transactions and have noneconomic aspects.  
Uganda’s Penal Code Act defines defilement as a sexual act with a person less than 
18 years old. It is distinct from rape, in that rape is defined as a non consensual or 
coercive sexual act, whereas defilement is not (Amnesty International, 2010). This is 
an important point: there is no evidence that any of the girls concerned in the 
defilement cases that I discuss here were unwilling sexual partners. 
In Uganda as a whole only a small percentage of reported defilement cases go to 
court, because parents usually prefer to negotiate a compensation settlement. Out of 
4,192 defilement cases reported to the police in Uganda between January and June 
2009, only 5.89 per cent ended in a conviction (Amnesty International, 2010). In 
Manafwa District, defilement cases are often linked with the drinking and dancing 
that accompanies the biennial male circumcision ceremony (Manafwa District 
Community Based Services Department and District Planning Unit, 2007).   
In section 9.2 I discuss some of the characteristics of Gisu brideprice and marriage, 
attempting in particular to trace how the brideprice institution has changed since the 
start of the 20th century, when it was first documented. Section 9.3 is taken up with 
examples and analysis concerning young men, while 9.4 looks at these issues from 
the points of view of older men.  The article ends with a short conclusion (section 
9.5) contextualising the individual experiences in the wider African picture.  
9.2 Masculinity, marriage and brideprice in rural Bugisu 
For young Gisu men, as for young men in many other parts of Africa, getting married 
is the vital step that takes them into social adulthood. The paradox is that in order to 
achieve masculine autonomy they need their wives’ labour power and childbearing 
potential (La Fontaine, 1959; Heald, 1998).  Fathers are expected to divide their land 
among their sons during their own lifetime, as a result of which they have very little 
land left for themselves in their old age (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development, 2002:12). The distribution of land used to be closely associated with 
male circumcision, the distinctively Gisu initiation into masculine adulthood. 
Nowadays, however, the associations among circumcision, land allocation and social 
adulthood are not clear cut. The reasons include the rise in landlessness, the growth 
of education as an alternative livelihood strategy to farming and the understandable 
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tendency, given the widespread poverty and food insecurity, for some older men to 
hang on to their land as long as possible.  If a married man dies, it is the custom for 
one of his brothers to take charge of the dead man’s land until the sons are old 
enough to inherit it.  As Heald (1998) stresses, this land inheritance system creates 
tensions between proximate generations of men in the same household and has the 
effect of creating impoverished men at two stages in the life cycle: youth and old 
age.  
The ethnographic accounts of brideprice as an institution in Bugisu cover the period 
from just after the turn of the 20th century to the 1970s. This series of snapshots 
helps to trace how the institution has changed over that time and puts what is 
happening today into historical perspective. Gisu marriage was essentially a contract 
between the bride’s father and the husband (La Fontaine, 1962:93). According to 
Purvis (1909), a young man wishing to take a wife would first make a ‘down 
payment’ of cattle to her father and then pay the rest in instalments linked to the birth 
of children. If a young woman became pregnant before she married, both she and the 
young man responsible were severely beaten by her father and others acting on his 
behalf. The father would also demand a payment of cattle, which Purvis describes as 
compensation for the reduction in the woman’s ‘marketable value’. Any woman who 
married before her father had received the bride price could expect his curse 
(1909:291). Purvis stresses the economic component of brideprice, but it was also an 
expression of what La Fontaine describes as the obligation of a young man to his 
wife’s father and other male kin for having given him, in a wife, the means to 
establish his own household (1962:99).   
By the 1950s, few families could afford to keep up the tradition of formal marriages 
with gifts, feasting and a preliminary brideprice payment and it was already confined 
to the wealthy elite (La Fontaine, 1962). A young man whose father was poor and 
who had no older sisters whose own marriage would bring brideprice into the 
household, was at a disadvantage. Both La Fontaine (1962) and Heald (1998) 
comment that the majority of couples made do with ‘elopement’: the couple simply 
went off together and set up a joint household, sometimes without informing the 
wife’s father. He would then pursue the new husband for brideprice, which would 
usually be paid in instalments over several years. To some extent this liability on the 
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part of the new husband was offset by his expectations of land from his own father. 
According to Heald (1998:95), one of the incentives for eloping was that marriage 
strengthened a man’s moral claim to part of his father’s land.   
Today it is generally accepted in the area that the correct brideprice is three cows, 
two goats, one cock and three ropes. As well as the brideprice itself, substantial cash 
payments are also expected by the bride’s mother and aunts. The continued existence 
of brideprice as a social institution in today’s context of environmental and economic 
pressures could be seen as an example of what Knighton (2007:466) describes as 
‘communal will’ and agency in the face of adversity. But this glosses over the 
contested character of brideprice. Fewer than half of the 162 households surveyed at 
the start of my study owned a cow. This is not unusual in the area: in the 2001 survey 
researchers found that 63 per cent of households in three nearby villages owned no 
cattle at all (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003). The implication is that the ‘official’ 
brideprice level may be more of a cultural ideal or a starting point for negotiations 
than a realistic expectation.  
Women’s perspectives on brideprice are marginalised in the Gisu ethnographic 
literature.  Even today  there is little research on young women’s perceptions and 
experiences of brideprice, although recent studies both in Manafwa District 
(Wakhongo, 2008) and in other parts of Uganda (Kaye et al, 2005:301) associate 
brideprice with girls’ early marriage. Researchers in some parts of the country also 
link brideprice to domestic violence (e.g. Wendo, 2004; Kaye et al, 2005). While I 
have no evidence one way or the other on the issue of domestic violence, some of the 
stories below are at odds with this association of girls’ early marriage with 
brideprice.   
Next, I explore men’s diverse accounts of brideprice and defilement today. I divide 
them into two broad categories: stories told from the viewpoints of young men and 
those close to them and stories from the fathers of young women, who are on the 
other side of the disputes.   
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9.3 Young men’s perspectives  
Reynolds Whyte (2005:168) observes that in every Bunyole community there are 
‘marginal, miserable men without wives who are having trouble making a home’.  
This is a fate that young men are anxious to avoid, but many nowadays have to delay 
marriage due to lack of land and income poverty. 
‘I might die without marrying’: Deferring marriage due to landlessness and 
poverty 
In Bubufu today, as in the past, if a young couple elopes the woman’s father expects 
brideprice compensation. If a young man has sexual relations with an unmarried girl 
without cohabiting with her the woman’s father will try to negotiate a financial 
settlement. There seems to be a blurred line between a father’s customary entitlement 
to brideprice compensation and the legal offence of defilement. Put another way, the 
ability to pursue a defilement charge under the Penal Code Act bolsters a father’s 
ability to extract a fine. If an informal agreement on a cash settlement cannot be 
reached the father may involve the police.  
In effect, the pursuit of defilement charges creates a ‘Catch 22’ situation for young 
men in the community. A married man in Bubufu remarked: ‘There are boys who 
hurry to marry, because when they marry they are looked at as men, because they are 
now independent.’ Yet far from hurrying, several young bachelors discussed the 
difficulty of accumulating sufficient assets to marry and the defilement charges they 
felt hanging over their heads in the meantime if they had sex with a young woman. 
Many young men face two basic problems in relation to getting married: their lack of 
land and their lack of cash or livestock to pay brideprice, as illustrated in the 
examples below:   
Paul M: summary from interview transcript 
Paul M. was 28 when he was first interviewed in March 2009, but rather than 
managing his own household and farm he was still landless and living in his 
maternal uncle’s compound while the uncle was working in Kenya. The 
compound was situated between two small land slippages and was vulnerable 
to another.  Although he had no-one in particular in mind, Paul said that his 
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biggest anxiety was about getting married: ‘If I don’t have enough money I 
might die without marrying’.   
His father had died when he was a child and the land had passed into the care 
of the dead father’s brother until Paul was old enough to inherit it. According 
to Paul, his uncle sold the land and used the proceeds to finance his move to 
Kenya, but Paul hoped to resolve the ownership of the land when he returned. 
He said he planned to get a wife and build a house elsewhere in the next 
month or two, but he worried about not being able to pay the ‘fine’ if he set 
up house with a young woman. A year later he was still single and living in 
the same landslide-threatened compound, which he said was due to his lack 
of income.     
My next example concerns a husband of several years evading and deferring 
brideprice compensation: 
Wilfred T: summary from interview transcript  
Wilfred T. had set up home with a woman despite his lack of land, managing 
to evade brideprice demands. Several years on and now with two children, he 
had decided to regularise his marriage. As is the custom, Wilfred had written 
to his wife’s parents to introduce himself formally to them as the man living 
with their daughter and had enclosed 100,000 Ugandan shillings. He had 
eloped with his wife Rose while she was still at school, and her father had had 
him arrested. In court Rose supported her husband: she lied by denying that 
she had been attending school when she married him. Wilfred said he had 
persuaded her to perjure herself this way by explaining that, if fined, he 
would have to sell the plot where their house stood and they would have 
nowhere to live. Because of her statement he was allowed to defer brideprice 
payment. He had recently started buying old pots and pans, going from door 
to door, and selling them to scrap metal dealers in town.  The business was 
quite profitable, so he had decided that now was a good time to start settling 
his debt to Rose’s father. 
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I want to make three points about this story. First, Wilfred was paying his own 
brideprice rather than having recourse to his father. This is significant: Anderson 
(2007:171) argues that while brideprice payments in most African societies used to 
be transfers between lineages they are now transfers between generations, due to a 
general trend towards young men paying brideprice themselves. Secondly, Wilfred 
highlights the impact of brideprice on a young wife’s material wellbeing, especially 
if her husband is poor. Third, the matter of whether or not Rose was attending school 
when she took up with Wilfred was seen as a key point in the case which I pick up 
again later. 
I now turn to the contrasting stories of two young men, Harold B. and Peter M. Their 
fathers were two of the wealthiest men in the village, each having several acres of 
land, diverse sources of income and large houses built of permanent, rather than 
traditional, materials. But although they were similar in some respects there was a 
crucial difference in the young men’s positions. Harold was the son of his father’s 
current wife, while Peter was the product of a fleeting and casual union between his 
mother and Joseph. This fundamental inequality resulted in very different marriage 
experiences:   
Harold B:  summary from interview transcript  
Harold B. had no land of his own, but was still farming a one-acre plot 
belonging to his father.  He had a small shop in the local trading centre, and 
his father had bought him stock to start a secondhand clothes business in the 
market. A year before, Harold had taken a second wife, an unusual step for 
such a young man. He had enraged his first wife by taking a cow to pay the 
first instalment of brideprice to the new wife’s father. He said he was not sure 
why his father had not yet given him his land inheritance, given his status as a 
married man with children, but thought his father was waiting to see if he 
would settle down with his second wife, whereupon he would formally hand 
over the land. Harold seems to have overreached himself in taking a second 
wife because his status as a polygamous husband was very short-lived. His 
first wife left their two children with his father and stepmother and went to 
Mbale, the region’s capital, to work in a hotel. When he pursued her there, his 
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second wife smashed or burned most of the goods in their marital home and 
returned to her natal village. 
Again, Harold used his own resources rather than his father’s to pay brideprice, in 
this case despite his father’s relative wealth. On the other hand, although Harold’s 
venture into polygyny caused him trouble he could never have contemplated it 
without his father’s support for his business. What he said about his father’s tardiness 
in allocating him land also shows that land inheritance on marriage is contingent 
rather than automatic.   
I introduced Peter M. in Chapter 8: he was the victim of what he said were false 
accusations by his step-mother and another female relative about stealing cassava.  In 
this extract I continue the story:  
Peter M: summary from interview transcript  
Peter M. was in a desperate situation.  The accusation of stealing was just one 
incident in a catalogue of disputes and beatings from his father, Joseph.  
Eventually his father’s brothers intervened and advised him to take a wife.  
They thought that might put pressure on Joseph to help him.  This did in fact 
happen: as well as paying brideprice, Joseph gave Peter a plot of land and 
even donated some sheets of corrugated iron so that he could build a house 
for himself and his young wife.  But even after the marriage his father 
sometimes hit him, while his stepmother continually harassed his wife.  One 
day she accused Peter’s wife of not kneeling to greet her and in the ensuing 
row Joseph removed several of the corrugated iron sheets he had given for the 
roof, making the house uninhabitable. Peter returned to his mother’s village 
and his wife to hers.  
As an outsider to the village with weak claims on his father’s wealth and a hostile 
stepmother, Peter was always going to be vulnerable to accusations of crop theft. But 
his marriage, far from being his salvation, was a means of humiliating him further 
and so became a travesty of the ideal of masculine independence.  
These four stories show a diversity of marriage and brideprice experiences among 
young men of similar age living in the same small community, shaped partly by 
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differing structural positions and kin relationships. Paul’s vulnerability stemmed 
from the early death of his father and his paternal uncle betraying his traditional 
obligations. While Wilfred seemed to have achieved considerable independence and 
was paying his own brideprice, Harold still relied on his father. Peter was cruelly 
disadvantaged by the lack of close relations between his father and mother, which 
among other things exposed him to his stepmother’s animosity. But if getting 
married is a minefield, so is not getting married: below, I look at experiences of 
accusations of defilement. 
 ‘I might meet someone’s daughter then I get a problem’: Defilement charges 
Now I look at four accounts of defilement charges from the perspectives of young 
unmarried men, a mother and a wife. One of the stories introduces the element of 
extortion, a common feature of such cases in the village.   
Conrad B: summary from interview transcript 
Although younger than either Paul M. or Wilfred T., Conrad B. was in a 
much stronger economic position than either. He was already a successful 
entrepreneur making his money from trading cassava, plantains, coffee and 
anything else people offered to him that he could sell on at a profit. He had 
bought two acres of land and some livestock with his business profits, which 
had made him wealthier than many older men in the village. He also rented 
another piece of land. Yet even he claimed that he could not marry because 
he lacked money. Asked about the risks he faced in daily life he talked about 
possible defilement charges: ‘I might meet someone’s daughter then I get a 
problem. You can befriend her and you get her pregnant, then you are 
arrested’. When interviewed again in 2010 Conrad was still unmarried, which 
he said was because he still did not have enough money. Although he did not 
mention it himself, a neighbour said he had made a young woman pregnant in 
2009, sometime after our first conversation with him. The girl’s father had 
started a defilement charge against him, but he had bribed the police officers 
who came to arrest him and they had allowed him to escape. He went to 
Kenya, only returning after his parents had settled the matter for him.  
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Conrad repeatedly used the phrase ‘someone’s daughter’, corroborating a point made 
by La Fontaine that in this context defilement is regarded as an infringement of a 
father’s brideprice entitlement rather than of that of the young woman herself 
(1959:35).  
In the next case a young man (Martin D.) seems to have been entrapped in an attempt 
to extort money from his parents: 
Dorcas K. and Martin D: summary from interview transcripts and notes 
When Dorcas K. heard that her son had become involved with the 
stepdaughter of a sorcerer she and her husband were angry: ‘It upset his 
father, who said he would never pay his school fees again, because we knew 
the parents of the girl would fine us and we could not pay. When we asked 
Martin he denied having an affair with her: he said it was blackmail. It was a 
calamity, because it was around that time he failed to pass his Grade 6 at 
primary school for the third time, despite me struggling to buy all his school 
necessities.’    
When the girl disappeared from the village her stepfather claimed that Martin 
had eloped with her and started threatening the family. Later Dorcas found 
out what had really happened. The young woman’s mother and teacher had 
connived to send her to join her biological father in Kenya because her 
stepfather had been sexually harassing her.  Afterwards Dorcas and her 
husband persuaded Martin to ‘accept Jesus as his personal saviour’ and he 
buckled down to his schoolwork.  
Martin himself claimed that, because of this experience, he had abjured 
sexual relationships. After his circumcision, friends had tried to persuade him 
to get a girlfriend, but he had told them that he would do it ‘when the right 
time came’. He hoped to get a girlfriend after he had finished his studies and 
obtained a job, because then he would be able to cater to her needs.  
Otherwise he might be tempted to steal in order to provide for her and that 
might anger his parents.  
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Martin’s comment about providing for his girlfriend’s material needs suggests that 
sexual relations outside as well as within marriage require a certain amount of cash 
on men’s part.  In another part of rural Uganda, Westaway (2008:47) found that 
some young women exploit young men’s sexual interest in them to extract money 
and presents, a practice known as ‘de-toothing’.  Again, this indicates that young 
men are to some extent vulnerable to being exploited in their sexual relations. 
If young unmarried men are vulnerable to defilement charges, married men are by no 
means immune either.  The following story illustrates how cases can quickly escalate 
into violence once the police are involved:  
Rachel P: summary from interview transcript  
Interviewed in 2009, Rachel P. said that her biggest worry concerned a 
defilement charge against her husband, Sam K.. One night in 2008 police had 
arrived to arrest Sam for the alleged defilement of an 18-year-old girl who 
was pregnant. On opening the door and seeing the four armed men outside, he 
had run off into the darkness. The police had shot at him but missed. 
According to Rachel, the man who was really responsible had escaped to 
Kampala: ‘The girl saw that life was difficult and her brothers were being 
very harsh to her. There was no one to take care of her, so she said that it was 
my husband who had impregnated her’. A year later she still found the 
incident disquieting and said that she was worried that the police might return 
to arrest Sam or to confiscate their cow as a fine.   
In addition to the stories above I heard of several other cases where young men 
accused of defilement had been arrested or had fled across the border to Kenya to 
avoid the police.  
People also talked of ‘entrapment’ cases in which unscrupulous individuals had tried 
to blackmail the parents of young men. In order to understand the next example the 
reader needs to know that it is the custom among the Gisu for adolescent boys to live 
in separate huts on the edge of their father’s compound. This is what Ernest M. said 
had happened to his son Isaac:   
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Ernest M: summary from interview transcript  
One night a ‘friend’ of Isaac’s brought a young woman to his hut on the 
pretext that she had run away from her parents and needed somewhere to 
sleep. After leaving them together he soon returned with police officers who 
arrested him for defilement. On finding out the next day that Isaac was being 
held at the police station, Ernest negotiated with the woman’s parents. ‘I 
managed to remove him. They wanted 700,000 shillings from me. The officer 
in charge pleaded with them to be fair to me and not turn this situation into 
business, because this same girl had earlier on caused someone else’s arrest in 
a similar case. They calmed down and we agreed on 500,000 shillings.’  
The connections between defilement charges, extortion, landlessness and poverty are 
manifold.  For instance, some older men have to sell land to pay brideprice on behalf 
of their sons, compounding their generational vulnerability (Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development, 2002:24), and a District Community 
Development Officer attributed the large number of landless young men in the area 
to their fathers having sold land to pay defilement fines for them, which is an ironic 
twist of causality.  Other people, including a parish chairman, talked of poverty-
stricken families using their daughters to trap young men into paying defilement 
fines, while a local official described how schoolgirls are sometimes led into 
transactional sex when men offer to buy them food, after which their parents pursue 
defilement charges.  
From Ernest’s negotiation of a defilement fine for his son’s transgression I now turn 
to the older male actors who are involved on the other side of brideprice and 
defilement disputes.   
9.4 ‘Reporting’ to the father: Older men claiming their entitlements 
While brideprice is imbued with cultural meaning, here I focus on the economic 
benefits for the recipients. Many elderly men in Bubufu experience a specifically 
Gisu gendered vulnerability after they have distributed land to their sons. I go into 
some detail about the situation of two older men to highlight the role that brideprice 
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might have played in their material wellbeing. Fred J. had brought a case for 
brideprice compensation in the local court:  
Fred J: summary from interview transcript  
Fred had less than an acre of land, having divided most of it among his seven 
sons. In 2006 he decided to take the husband of one of his daughters to court 
for failure to pay brideprice: the couple had been married for a long time and 
had three children. He had reminded his son-in-law several times, but despite 
his promises he had never paid him anything.  When Fred took him to court, 
the court ruled that he should receive three cows, three goats and a cock, but 
so far the son in law had only paid one cow. Fred sold it and used some of the 
money to pay a granddaughter’s school fees.   
This story illustrates the disjuncture between entitlements and responsibilities that 
may affect older men in Bubufu: although Fred had given most of his land to his sons 
he still had responsibilities regarding his grandchildren. It is also clear that even after 
a court ruling his chances of getting the whole of the compensation he had been 
awarded were slim.   
Gregory N. appeared to be waiting patiently for his daughter and her husband to 
establish themselves in jobs before pressing his brideprice demands:   
Gregory N: summary from interview transcript 
In his early 70s, Gregory N. was much older than Fred, but even at that 
advanced age he still had 7 dependants living with him although he had 
distributed about half of his land to his sons: ‘Eating has become difficult 
because the price of maize flour, sugar, salt, paraffin and soap has gone up 
and I am not managing’. He had not received bridewealth for a daughter who 
had married two years earlier and given birth to a child, but he intended to 
call her husband to discuss it: ‘I am giving him time to see what he will do. 
Both my daughter and son-in-law are teachers. He has finished his studies 
and now I am waiting for my daughter to finish hers, after which I will go and 
demand brideprice.’   
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Gregory’s account illustrates how the brideprice custom is being modified in keeping 
with the spread of higher education, reflecting the modern reality that the best 
livelihood course both for young people and their parents is to try to gain 
qualifications and find paid work outside the area. Neither Fred nor Gregory had 
unmarried sons. If they had, they might also have talked about the need to obtain 
brideprice so that they could use the cattle to enable a son to marry in turn.   
What of the fathers who pursue defilement charges in respect of their daughters?  
Rose N., the young wife who eloped and lied about it in court, told the following 
story, purportedly about her sister:  
Rose N: extract from interview transcript 
If you have a daughter who is at school and you have paid all the school fees 
and you hear that she is pregnant, you can feel very bad. You wonder why 
your child decided to become pregnant after you spent a lot of money on her, 
thinking that she would complete her studies. It has happened in my family. 
My father had just taken back to school one of my sisters who had given 
birth, but she immediately got pregnant again. Our father was bitter and cried 
to the teachers to pay back some of the fees he had paid for her. 
This story conforms closely to Rose’s own elopement, so it may be that she was 
really talking about herself rather than her sister.  She tells it from the father’s point 
of view: a father’s anger at having ‘wasted’ his investment in a daughter’s education 
is at the core of the anecdote.  A remark made during a women’s group discussion 
suggests that the custom of defilement fines is one of the factors that facilitates 
parents sending their daughters to secondary school in the first place:   
Unknown speaker: extract from group discussion transcript  
Our parents used to say that it was useless for a girl child to go to school 
because any time she could abandon school and get married. However in 
these times if the parents see that they are intelligent and willing to study – 
and also defilement fines can be imposed – they give all their children the 
chance to study. 
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For parents, the possibility of levying a fine for defilement seems to serve as 
insurance against two types of loss: first, ‘lost’ expenditure on school fees and 
second, the loss of ‘assistance’ that might have been obtained from an educated and 
employed daughter.
14
 
In Uganda generally, young women and men resist the brideprice custom by eloping 
(Kaye et al, 2005:301). In Bubufu it is also a way for young women to defy their 
parents’ wish that they should finish their education.  
Soon after he negotiated the payoff to the people who entrapped his son Ernest M. 
found himself on the other side of a similar dispute when his 17-year-old daughter 
Erica eloped. She was supposed to be at boarding school in another part of the 
region, and on hearing that she had left and was living with a young man in a trading 
centre a few miles away Ernest threatened to have the man arrested and fined. The 
couple fled to Kampala before anything could be done. Ernest seems to have half 
expected this, because in an interview several months before Erica eloped he had had 
this to say about the wilfulness of daughters:  
Ernest M: summary from interview transcript 
You might think that she is at school, but someone tells you she is hanging 
around the trading centre. When she comes home she pretends she has just 
come from school. When she does this twice you can tell that she will not 
finish her studies. If you let her carry on like that she’ll come home pregnant 
one day.   
When asked whether or not parents ever pressured their daughters to leave school 
and marry, the reaction of the village chairman was typical: ‘It is the girls themselves 
who refuse to study and decide to elope with men’.  Purvis remarks of the Gisu: 
‘every man, woman and child claims to be independent’ (1909:336); these stories 
and comments show young women exercising determined agency in defiance of their 
parents.  
                                                 
14
 Mr. Balungira suggested that for some parents the possibility of claiming defilement fines is the 
chief motivation for sending their daughters to school.  Although this is plausible, I have no evidence 
from Bubufu to support the idea. 
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9.5 Summary 
Environmental and social processes, including weather shocks and stresses, interact 
with local gender norms to create masculine vulnerability in Bubufu.  In Chapter 5 I 
discussed the masculine vulnerability that is a short-term outcome of disasters such 
as landslides, but there is a long-term trend under way too.  Men’s traditional 
entitlement to land is both figuratively and literally vanishing due to population 
growth, environmental degradation and the impacts of intense rainfall, notably 
landslides and erosion.  Few alternative livelihood options are available to provide a 
material basis for marriage.  In this harsh scenario young men struggle to acquire 
sufficient assets to marry and set up a household, simultaneously dodging defilement 
fines.   
Further along the Gisu man’s life course, older men still try to insist on their 
traditional entitlement to brideprice, despite or because of today’s punishing 
environmental and economic conditions.  This helps to sustain brideprice as a social 
and cultural institution, although from a rational outsider’s point of view it is no 
longer in keeping with its material context and could be regarded as dysfunctional.   
Contemporary studies of brideprice suggest that similar struggles are going on in 
other locations. For instance, the payment of brideprice is declining in neighbouring 
Bunyole too, although ‘expectations and demands for it remain’ (Reynolds Whyte, 
2005:155).  Masquelier goes so far as to argue that because of brideprice, generation 
rather than class is now regarded as the salient axis of differentiation in Africa 
(2005:73).  In Chapters 6 to 8 I highlighted how the abuse of privileged structural 
positions can interfere with other people’s ability to survive and thrive in a context of 
adverse change.  I see brideprice demands and defilement charges as 
intergenerational struggles between men that form part of this general pattern.  
With regard to the custom of defilement charges, I have kept faith with my 
epistemological reliance on subjectivities by concentrating on young men’s views.  
Indeed, I have had little choice in the matter due to the difficulties that dogged my 
attempts to talk to young women.  Stepping back from young men’s specific 
interests, though, defilement charges take on a different significance.  Parents in the 
village now see putting their daughters through secondary school as a livelihood 
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strategy for the future.  In this light, defilement settlements may be understood as a 
mechanism for protecting critical adaptive strategies. 
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Chapter 10: The duality of social relations 
 
10.1 Introduction  
In Chapters 4 to 9 I investigated risks, shocks and stresses, led by villagers’ 
subjective priorities.  This chapter is somewhat different, as it speaks directly to my 
research interest in the role of micro-level social relations in adaptive capacity.  Like 
previous chapters, it is mainly based on data from interviews and group discussions, 
and I also draw on studies in the literature in my interpretation of the data. 
Heald begins her well-known account of life in a Gisu community in the mid 1960s 
with a moving description of human insecurity (1998:1):  
Every morning exposed the sadnesses and troubles of the night, bringing 
fresh news of illness, assault, threat, theft and murder. 
Previous chapters indicate that Bubufu is also a community troubled by tension, 
conflict and crime.  In Chapter 7 I analysed conjugal struggles over household 
provisioning.  In Chapter 8, I looked at crop theft as both a cause and a symptom of 
household-level food insecurity, and argued that sniffer dog groups may be a 
maladaptation to insecurity.  In Chapter 9 I investigated brideprice disputes and 
defilement charges in which the conflicting interests of different generations of men 
are pitted against one another.  The stories I presented were selected from a much 
wider pool of available examples.  In short, Bubufu is a community under strain.  
Judging by Heald’s comment above this situation may have prevailed for decades.  
So far, so bad.  But of course, all this evidence regarding the ‘dark side’ of micro-
level social relations came to the fore as a result of asking people about perceived 
threats: inevitably tensions and conflicts were highlighted rather than goodwill and 
harmony.  But as well as pointing to contestation and conflict I have provided 
examples of social bonds and networks providing valuable support.  For instance, my 
evidence shows that kin do provide some support for landslide-affected families 
  
196 
despite the prevalence of poverty (Chapter 5), and that some husbands take their 
household provisioning responsibilities seriously (Chapter 7).  In this chapter I start 
out with the notion that social relations in the village are potentially ambiguous in 
relation to adaptive capacity in that they have the potential to both facilitate and 
constrain poor people’s individual agency (Cleaver, 2005).  I interrogate my 
evidence, seeking a clearer and more specific idea of how they influence adaptation 
choices and outcomes.   
The chapter is divided into four parts.  In section 10.2 I focus on social bonds and 
networks.  In section 10.3, I consider conjugal struggles over wives’ livelihood 
activities.  In section 10.4 I discuss the power of envy and mistrust.  That is followed 
by an account of villagers’ attempts to make self-help groups work for them in 
section 10.5, and in section 10.6 I round off the chapter by drawing out some 
implications for climate adaptive capacity.   
10.2 ‘These graves were my bank’: Informal risk-sharing networks  
Nerissa A. was a widow in her mid-60s.  She lived alone apart from three 
grandchildren.  Her husband and two sons had died, one of her sons having been 
murdered by a co-worker in Kampala who was reportedly jealous of the position of 
trust he had enjoyed with his employer, the manager of a security firm.  When asked 
if she had anyone she could call on for financial assistance if she needed it, she 
pointed to three cement-sealed graves in front of her house, saying: ‘These graves 
were my bank’.  That phrase sums up both the reliance of many villagers in their kin 
and the precarious nature of such a support system.   
The vast majority of villagers asked about possible sources of assistance in an 
emergency were able to give the names of kin, and sometimes of friends and 
neighbours, who had helped them out in the past or on whom they could call for help 
in a crisis.  I begin with relations between parents and children, as the household is 
often identified as the primary risk-sharing social unit (e.g. Fafchamps, 2003).  Many 
older parents said that they relied on their educated grown-up daughters and sons for 
help with school fees, investments such as in livestock, and during crises.  Such help 
was usually given in the form of gifts and financial transfers rather than loans, and 
could make a big difference to villagers’ quality of life in their later years.  For 
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instance, Gregory N., who was looking after several grandchildren since one of his 
sons had died, compared his own situation unfavourably with that of Mr. S., the 
lineage elder whose house is shown in Chapter 2: ‘If for example you look at [Mr 
S.], he is older than me, but he is well off because the children have built him a house 
and they give him help’.  However during the same interview he said that his grown-
up daughter, a teacher, had promised to help him to stock a small shop that he 
wanted to start up as an income-generation activity.   
Anticipation of such support in later life motivates villagers’ struggles to pay their 
children’s secondary school fees.  Investing in children’s education is a sound 
forward-looking strategy for household security, and in Chapter 9 I argued that 
defilement charges are a way for parents to protect this investment in their daughters.  
During the interviews most people were explicit about their expectations of 
intergenerational reciprocity:  
Gordon N: summary from interview notes 
Between 1992 and 2008 Gordon N. worked in Kenya, doing farm labour.  He 
eventually returned to the village because, as he explained, ‘what I earned I 
used to educate two of my sons, and now they are grown up and working.  So 
I won’t go back [to Kenya], because now the older ones who are already 
working are helping me to educate the younger ones’.  One of his older sons 
was working in security and the other was a local teacher who had helped him 
to get the job of watchman at the new secondary school.   
Gordon described his work in Kenya in positive terms.  The only problem he 
had encountered had been when he was imprisoned for seven days in 1998 
after a young man, also a Gisu, whom he had recommended for a job 
subsequently stole from his employer.  Despite this experience Gordon by no 
means regretted his time in Kenya: ‘I was able to educate my children, buy 
the land I occupy and pay the balance of the bridewealth.’  He said that he 
would not go back though: ‘My aim for going was the betterment of my 
children.  And now they just have to buy me a cow for rearing, and I will sit 
at home.’   
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It is not just fathers who go to such trouble to get their children through secondary 
school: 
Bridget M: summary from interview transcript and notes 
Bridget, a widow in her 40s, left her two teenage children with her elderly 
mother, also a widow, and went alone to Kenya to find work.  She had asked 
her husband’s brother to pay her children’s school fees, but he had been 
unable to help as he had twelve children of his own and some of them were 
planning to go to university, so would need financial support.  She worked as 
a house girl in Kenya for several months before being caught up in the ethnic 
violence that following the disputed elections of 2008.  She was lucky to 
escape being killed and returned home having been paid only half of the 
wages owing to her:  
‘I decided to look for money so that my child could go on to Senior Four.  
As a woman you have to struggle so that you educate your children. For 
example, you can sell a goat and you might educate your child up to 
Senior Three with that, but then you find there are no other sources of 
support.  That is when you decide: ‘Let me get someone to take me to 
Kenya so that my child does not just sit at home, because it could be bad 
luck and she might have a baby, even though I’ve spent money on her.  
It’s better to educate her to a higher level, so that tomorrow she can be 
able to help me, because I’m a widow.’ 
What Bridget said about her motivation for the trip to Kenya reveals her 
determination to get at least one of her children through secondary school as a 
livelihood strategy for her own future.  Her story also illustrates Dolan’s (2004:654) 
point that Ugandan women often seek employment as a response to distress 
conditions; in Bridget’s case widowhood and lack of support from affines.  In 
general I found evidence of a strong norm of mutual support between parents and 
their children which is critical to parents’ livelihood strategies.   
I have also already touched on the close ties that married women retain with their 
kin, and I return to this subject now.  In Chapter 7 I quoted Sandra N. complaining 
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about her absent husband’s failure to provide for the household.  She contrasted this 
with the help she got from her parents:   
Sandra N: summary from interview transcript 
When I realise there is too much poverty – ‘What will the children eat? Can I 
go and steal something?’ – What I do is to carry the children to my mother.  
She shares whatever food she has with her grandchildren; how could she 
chase them away?  If I did not go there how would I have survived?  I go 
there a lot.  When I see the children just sitting here hungry, I take them to 
my mother in-law; she might wonder where I am going.  I then run home and 
tell my mother that the children are hungry.  My mother then calls my father 
and explains to him that my children are hungry and then he gives me money 
and food.   
In some cases women in rural Africa cultivate kin relationships as a calculated 
response to economic recession and land pressure (Moore and Vaughan, 1994), but 
the ethnographic evidence (e.g. Heald 1998) suggests that Gisu women have always 
maintained strong relations with their kin.  It is not clear, then, to what extent the 
assistance that Bubufu women get from their parents reflects a current crisis or 
historical continuity.  Sandra claimed that she received no food or any other kind of 
help from her husband’s parents, although they lived only a few yards away, and 
when I asked her if she could take the children to her husband in Kampala when 
times were hard in the village, she replied:  
Sandra N: summary from interview transcript 
Unless he calls me, I can’t go to him. I don’t know how he lives, eats and 
sleeps. I can’t go where I’m not invited. But as for going home, it is just a 
matter of packing my things, carrying my children and we go, without any 
questions asked.  
The contrast between Sandra’s expectation of an unconditional welcome at her 
parents’ house contrasts sharply with the emotional distance in her relationship with 
her husband.  
  
200 
The examples I have given so far are of generally supportive kin relations, and I 
could quote many other examples of parents, children and siblings helping one 
another, especially where a grown-up child or a sibling has managed to establish 
him- or herself outside the village.  In other cases though, kin relations are permeated 
with hostility and resentment (Chapter 9). Even in the absence of outright 
contestation, assistance from kin cannot always be relied on. Sometimes villagers 
ascribed refusals of help to mutual poverty, sometimes to meanness, and others 
talked of a general breakdown in patterns of reciprocity: 
Mary M: extract from interview transcript 
It is just a few people who have kin who can help them.  For the majority, 
their relatives are not capable of helping them.  Someone may go to a relative 
to ask for help but when he reaches them he finds the relative with empty 
hands.   
Anthony M: extract from interview transcript  
I have well-off relatives, and I have asked them to lend me some money but 
they have not helped me. They are mean with their money and they think I 
will use it carelessly or refuse to pay back. 
Older villagers’ sense of a decline in reciprocity was articulated by Dorcas K., 
among others: 
Dorcas K: summary of interview notes 
Dorcas said that there was a lack of trust in the village so it was best to be 
independent and not rely on other people for assistance.  In the past there was 
intergenerational reciprocity.  If you helped someone you could expect their 
children to help you as adults.  Now that has gone.  If people give you a loan, 
they want it recorded in writing. 
Following on from Dorcas’ last point, a few other villagers also complained that 
assistance that used to come in the form of gifts now came, if at all, in the form of 
loans.  Gregory N. said that lenders now expected you to have some form of 
collateral, and that was one reason why it was a good idea to have a cow: ‘If you do 
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not have a cow, no-one will lend you money because they know you have nothing to 
sell in order to pay it back’. 
Other studies have also highlighted the unreliability of social bonds and networks for 
poor people in rural East Africa.  Goulden (2006:241) found that better-off and 
middle-income villagers were able to borrow from others rather than the poor.  In 
Tanzania, Cleaver (2005:899) found that assistance given to the very poor tended to 
be ‘limited and stop-gap’.  While both Gregory N. and Anthony M. complained of 
being refused ‘assistance’, perhaps this needs to be considered from the point of view 
of lenders as well as would-be borrowers.  Gregory’s lineage uncle justified his 
refusal of a loan by pointing to the high proportion of village shops that fail due to 
bad credit.  As I illustrate below, this is a frequent cause of small business collapse in 
Bubufu, so in this case the refusal to lend seems to have been based on hard-headed 
reality.  Richard M., a shopkeeper in the village, complained of lending money that 
had not been repaid, saying that it had put pressure on his business.  John K., one of a 
handful of villagers who received a salary (as a part-time teacher), was the subject of 
many requests for assistance.  However, he said that he also had to look after his own 
children, those of his brothers ‘who were not doing well’ and his parents.  As a result 
he had stopped running a shop from his house due to lack of capital to buy goods.  I 
have already quoted his father Gordon’s expectation that John and his brother would 
buy a cow for him in return for the sacrifices Gordon had made to fund their 
education.  Kinship can be a drain on the resources of salaried individuals like John 
(Ellis and Ade Freeman, 2005:4).  Platteau (2009:681) cites studies from various 
parts of Africa showing economically successful individuals moving to towns and 
deliberately weakening their links with their home villages in order to evade 
expectations of support.  
Given the unreliability of assistance and tension among kin, do affines represent an 
alternative source of support for a beleaguered villager? This is a significant 
question: Heald argues that for men, affinal relationships are more relaxed than kin 
relationships: whereas  among men the latter are inherently competitive over land, in 
the case of affines there are no assets at stake (Heald, 1998:149).  La Fontaine (1962) 
also stresses the importance of affinal relations to Gisu men.  It may be that inability 
to pay timely and sufficient brideprice (Chapter 9) has poisoned what were 
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historically benign relations among male affines, because hardly any men named 
affines as a source of assistance.  I have very little information on married women’s 
relations with their affines, although Sandra claimed that she got no assistance from 
them even when their grandchildren were going hungry.   
While kinship and lineage are often bases for informal risk-sharing networks among 
the poor in developing countries, friendship can also be important in this regard 
(Fafchamps,  2003:103).  At this point I look beyond kinship to networks based on 
friendship and working together, often outside the village.  Several men who had 
worked or studied outside the village mentioned receiving help at times of need from 
friends, fellow-students and workmates.  Milton W., for instance, who often worked 
on building projects elsewhere, talked of his workmates having a whip-round to help 
pay a child’s medical costs.  Another villager, Jason K., was taken in for over a year 
by a friend in Mbale after being injured in a boda boda accident.  According to his 
wife Agatha, Jason had struck up a friendship with the man after hiding him from the 
relatives of someone he had killed in a traffic accident.  When Jackson himself was 
injured later this friend helped him in return.  Such urban friendships and networks 
might have advantages over kin-based networks, first because they are not vitiated by 
the endemic poverty of the village and second because their members are not 
exposed to covariate risk such as the natural hazards that affect Bubufu.   
On the other hand, urban and rural risk-sharing networks alike are exposed to the 
same high risk levels that characterise sub-Saharan Africa generally, as illustrated by 
the following story about Abner J., who in his desperate attempts to make a living 
received help from both kin and non-kin. His mother, Gloria C., gave the following 
account to Mr. Balungira when he visited Bubufu in 2010: 
Abner J.’s story: based on notes from interview with his mother, Gloria C. 
Abner ran a small ‘hotel’ but the business collapsed.  He used to get wheat, 
cooking oil, sugar and other goods on credit from local shopkeepers, but as he 
did not pay them they stopped supplying him and he was unable to continue 
running the hotel.  He had no land of his own but just shared a small plot with 
his mother.  Life became hard for him, and in December 2009 he decided to 
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go to Mbale to look for work as a boda boda rider.  His wife and their two 
children moved in with her mother.   
In Mbale he met a man from [a trading centre near Bubufu] who gave him a 
bicycle on credit so that he could get started.  They agreed that Abner would 
pay for it in daily instalments; after three months the bicycle would be his to 
keep.  He brought the bicycle to Bubufu and put it overnight in someone’s 
house.  That night thieves broke into the house and stole it; they took nothing 
else.  Abner agreed with the bicycle’s owner that he would buy another one.  
He decided to visit his sister, who worked in Kenya as housemaid for an 
Indian family, so that he could find work and earn money to buy the second 
bicycle. He got to his sister’s place, but a few days later her house caught fire 
and all her property was lost.  
By May 2010, Abner wanted to come back from Kenya but had no money for 
transport.  The man who had given him the bicycle had committed suicide a 
few weeks before after the sister with whom he was living in Mbale threw 
him out.  So when he comes back from Kenya, he does not know whether this 
man’s family will still sell him the bicycle or not.   
Several points come across very strongly here: Abner’s indefatigable efforts; the 
diversity of the social bonds upon which he was able to draw for help; the extreme 
precariousness of those sources; and the way his efforts were both aided and 
obstructed by micro-level social relations acting directly and indirectly on his own 
interests.  Although Abner seems to have been unlucky in the number of calamities 
that intervened between him and earning a livelihood, stories of individual tenacity in 
the face of livelihood calamities are by no means unusual in Bubufu.  His story 
illustrates Cleaver’s remark (2005:895) that ‘the chronically poor are severely 
frustrated in their capacity to exercise agency’.  Some of the incidents that befell him 
show how fragile goodwill and assistance can be in a context of covariate poverty 
and high risk.  Then there is the matter of the stolen bicycle: the fact that nothing else 
was taken indicates that the bicycle was the target, which in turn implicates someone 
that Abner knew, perhaps a neighbour or an acquaintance.  I discussed the effects of 
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crime in Chapter 8.  The theft of the bicycle is another example of how so-called 
‘petty crime’ can seriously harm a poor person’s human security.   
Social bonds and networks cannot always be relied on at times of need.  Moreover, 
they may represent a drain on resources rather than a means of support.  Support 
from kin, friends and workmates can be eroded by endemic poverty, the desire of 
more successful individuals to distance themselves from poor relatives and the high-
risk environment that the Ugandan poor inhabit.  Moreover, Gisu kinship ties have an 
inbuilt potential for conflict.  I did not find evidence of the strong mutual support 
among affines that Heald (1998) noticed.   
Next, I consider how conjugal relations affect married women’s livelihood activities.   
10.3 ‘Men stop homes from developing’: Conjugal contestations over 
women’s livelihood activities 
In Chapter 7 I discussed how husbands’ sale of food crops may threaten the food 
security of other household members.  In this section I argue that prevailing gender 
norms constrain women’s efforts to accumulate livestock and engage in non-farm 
livelihood activities. ‘It is men who stop homes from developing’, Teresa J. said 
during a women’s group discussion. 
During one of the women’s group discussions I asked the participants which of them 
personally owned livestock.  Several said that they did, reflecting the fact that wealth 
ranks 1 and 2 were disproportionately represented in the group’s composition.  
However, my query triggered several stories like this one: 
Sophia B: extract from group discussion transcript 
My father gave me land, which land I later sold and bought a cow in the hope 
that it would help us solve our problems in the home. One day my husband 
said: ‘If you do not let me sell that cow then take it away and leave my house. 
When I sought my friends’ advice they said: ‘Let him sell the cow if he 
wants. Do not let the cow make you abandon your children’. 
It was clear that husbands’ appropriation of their wives’ cows was a source of 
considerable resentment and unhappiness among married women.  On the other hand 
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I should point out that there are households in the village where the husband is quite 
happy for his wife to rear livestock, for instance in Chapter 7 I quoted Joan B., whose 
husband helps to collect fodder for her cow.   
I now turn to women’s economic activities, which in this context often means the 
petty trading of fruit and vegetables.  Although I have hardly any information on 
when women in the area began to pursue off-farm livelihood activities, this comment 
suggests that it may be a novel phenomenon in Bubufu:  
Ernest M: extract from interview transcript  
A while ago I was sitting here with a friend and some women passed with 
cassava they were selling. I said to my friend: ‘Do you see how the world has 
changed? These days women are doing business too.’  And you may find that 
as this woman was selling cassava, the man was just sitting around at home. 
Not all husbands are supportive.  Some object to their wives engaging in economic 
activity at all, while in other cases contestation arises over who controls the woman’s 
income and the uses to which it is put. I illustrate these different points of 
disagreement with extracts from interviews with two particular women.  The first is 
Sandra N., a young married woman who I have quoted elsewhere in this and other 
chapters.  The second is a middle-aged married woman, Esther N., who has also 
featured before.  This is Sandra N. explaining to me in 2009 why she did not 
undertake any off-farm livelihood activities:  
Sandra N: extract from interview transcript 
I used to deal in coffee and even beans ... if you have got a friend who is 
selling them you buy them and sell later at a profit.  But now I cannot buy a 
hen and sell it later, nor the eggs. [My husband] would ask me ‘Where are the 
eggs? What did you use the money for? So now you have the authority to sell 
things in this house?  From today onwards it is you who will be buying things 
in the home!’  When your husband decides that you will be the one to provide 
for the family, where are you going to get the money?  It is for this reason 
that, even when you have eggs, you do not sell them.  
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Sandra refers to the notion that everything in the house belongs to the male 
household head even if the wife has acquired it, an idea that appeared in Chapter 7.  
She also explains her reluctance to engage in economic activity by the fact that her 
husband would use it as an excuse to transfer purchasing responsibilities to her, 
something other wives also complained about.  It seems that wives’ earning cash, 
however tiny the amount, may be viewed as a transgression of male authority and an 
abnegation of the women’s own  responsibilities as wives, thus justifying shifting the 
responsibility for provisioning from husband to wife.   
In 2010, Mr. Balungira visited Sandra again.  Her husband, who had been working 
elsewhere as a teaching assistant, had returned to the village and was now working in 
a primary school.  
Sandra N: extract from interview notes 
[Her husband’s] teaching job has not contributed a lot to the welfare of the 
family as he is not on the payroll and only gets small allowances.  Last 
September, he gave her USh10,000 to support the family.  She used it to buy 
greens for USh3,000 and tomatoes for USh6,000.  She began selling them at 
the trading centre as a way of getting some money to buy food rather than 
looking to her husband for support all the time.  However, she was 
discouraged because one day she came from the market with food, and as she 
was in the kitchen cooking her husband stole her money from her bag. When 
she asked him why, he claimed he would pay it back, but he never did.  The 
husband continued with this habit of taking her money until all her capital 
was exhausted.  When she asked for it back, he told her ‘If you want to sell 
tomatoes, go and sell them at your parent’s home’. So she decided to stop this 
business in March [2010].  While she regrets it, she would rather sit at home 
than work just so her husband can take her money.  
After the earlier visit the point of contestation between Sandra and her husband had 
shifted.  Now, rather than opposing Sandra’s livelihood activities or punishing her 
for them, her husband was appropriating her income, which she regarded as stealing.  
In the dispute that followed he drew on the notions that wives are living in ‘their 
husbands’ homes’ and that their independent petty trading transgresses their 
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husbands’ entitlements (‘go and sell them at your parents’ home’).  In principle 
wives accept men’s power to veto their economic activities on the grounds that the 
household belongs to them (Chapter 7).  ‘If [your husband] permits you, then you 
start the business, but you cannot start on your own because you are in his home’, as 
Zoe S. explained during a group discussion.   
I now turn to Esther N.’s story.  Her husband, Ezra K., was in some ways an 
altruistic household head, and I quoted her in Chapter 7 (‘I am like a child to him’).  
In a subsequent interview conducted by Mr. Balungira, however, it turned out that 
she had never forgotten how Ezra had cheated her almost 30 years earlier:   
Esther N: summary of interview notes 
Esther’s father gave her some money from the brideprice her husband Ezra 
had paid for her, and she bought a pig with it.  After a while, Ezra persuaded 
her to sell the pig and buy a bag of coffee beans instead, telling her it would 
be more profitable.  He offered to sell the coffee for her through the Coffee 
Growers’ Cooperative Society.  However she never saw the money, because 
he claimed first that there was a delay in payment, and then that there had 
been an error and that trying to claim the money from the Society would be 
more trouble than it was worth.  On realising she had been cheated Esther 
resolved never to invest in livestock for the household again.  She had stuck 
to that until 2010, when she received a cash gift from the parents of the young 
man who married her oldest daughter.  She used some of it to buy a pig for 
her son: ‘The husband can’t sell it, because my son would oppose him’.   
While both Sandra’s husband and Ezra used covert means to obtain money from their 
wives, other husbands were quite blatant about it: 
Sophia B: extract from group discussion transcript 
There are two types of husband.  One type comes in a humble way and says: 
‘I saw you coming back from the market. Have you got USh500 so I can go 
out [and drink]?'  Then there is the kind who comes to you in a tough way and 
says: ‘I want money’.  When you give him USh1,000 he tells you: ‘I’m going 
out, but make sure you buy food for the kids.’ If you come home with, say, 
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USh2,000, give him USh1,000 and buy posho with the other 1,000, you’re 
left with nothing. 
The phrase ‘in a tough way’ suggests physical threats or actual violence.  During this 
discussion I asked participants how men spent the money they got through selling 
household assets or appropriating their wives’ earnings.  The answer came back in a 
chorus of voices: ‘Drinking, drinking!’  I did not ask men directly about drinking in 
the village, so I only have the women’s point of view to convey.  
The next story is from Teresa J., who also featured in Chapter 7: she is the young 
married woman whose husband gave their cow to his second wife.  What she said 
about trying to start a business provides several valuable insights into intrahousehold 
dynamics, so I quote her at length: 
Teresa J: extracts from group discussion transcript 
You might have some money, so you think of starting a business so you can 
buy salt for the house, and if your husband has not been able to buy soap that 
day, you can also buy soap. Your husband will give you permission to start 
up the business, but as time goes on someone tells him: ‘Have you let your 
wife go to the market? You have left her for other men, she is just roaming 
around and she has left the children hungry at home. Can’t you do the 
business yourself?  Stop her, make her stay at home and cook for the children.  
If your wife gets money she will start to despise you’.  Therefore even if your 
husband gives you permission at the start, he will later tell you to stop the 
business because his friends have told him that when a woman gets money 
she will despise him.  
Later, when your husband comes back home drunk he tells you: ‘Tomorrow I 
don’t want to find you in the market or at the roadside selling tomatoes.  
What about those men you are befriending? You just roam around in the 
market. What kind of business are you doing? I do not even see how you have 
helped in this home’.  Later, when you tell him ‘I thought we had been 
helping each other in this house because when you do not have money I have 
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been buying the soap’ he replies: ‘They told me you have finished all the men 
in the market. I have stopped you’. 
The other thing is that you can get some money and decide to buy a hen, a pig 
or a cow to keep in the home so that it can be of use to the family. Then a 
friend will tell your husband: ‘Why do you allow a woman to rear animals in 
your home as if she is the man? All that livestock is yours. Do not allow her 
to own that livestock’. 
Teresa’s story illustrates several of the barriers that married women face in their 
efforts to earn a little cash.  The first is their domestic responsibilities: ‘He will tell 
you ‘I brought you here to look after my children, not to do business”’, another 
married woman, Ellen P., said that husbands’ determination to maintain tight control 
of household resources and their fear of losing status also come across clearly.  
Teresa was the only woman to talk about gossip and suspicion of adultery as an 
obstacle to women’s micro-enterprise. There are three possibilities: perhaps she 
actually was meeting new sexual partners during her trips to market; perhaps there 
was just gossip to that effect; or perhaps her husband fabricated the gossip story to 
justify forbidding her business activities.  Lastly, Teresa depicts married men 
policing each others’ wives, egging each other on to keep them in check.  They seem 
to fear that if one wife is allowed to step out of line others will try to follow her 
example.  
While many married women do casual farm labour for other people, I never heard of 
a husband objecting to that.  As I explained in Chapter 7, married women are paid for 
this kind of work with food.  In this way farming for other people becomes a direct 
substitute for women’s own subsistence farming in keeping with the traditional 
gender status quo.  Women earning cash, on the other hand, is seen as transgressing 
this arrangement.  This is one possible explanation for why husbands oppose their 
wives’ petty trading but not their farm labouring.  Worries about their wives coming 
into contact with men in distant public places such as the big markets, as in Teresa’s 
account, may be another.   
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These findings are broadly consistent with other studies in the Mount Elgon area, 
although there are some differences.  For instance, Dolan (2004:647) found that the 
stigmatisation of women’s mobility outside the home made it hard for them to 
undertake non-farm livelihood activities, corroborating Teresa’ story.  Male 
household heads in nearby Bududa District tend to appropriate all the cash earned 
from household land, which deters women from engaging in off-farm income 
generation (Kagoda, 2008:368).  Wakhongo (2008) on the other hand, claims that 
women in her study area in Manafwa District do control the small amounts they earn 
from petty trading.  Husbands tend to tighten control of household cash during 
periods of poverty and relax it when things are not so hard (Verschoor, 2008).  While 
I was not in a position to chart changes in a single household over time, I did notice 
that wives of men classed in wealth ranks 1 and 2 (e.g. Julia N. and Mary M.) 
seemed to have more autonomy in the matter of non-farm economic activities than 
poorer women.  In keeping with Verschoor’s interpretation, this might be due to their 
husbands’ relatively secure economic position compared to men in the lowest wealth 
rank: however, this was not something I had the opportunity to explore.   
Like the married women in Eriksen et al’s (2005) study locations, wives in Bubufu 
strive for some degree of economic independence in a context of environmental 
change.  In Bubufu, women’s economic activities may be a social innovation (‘Do 
you see how the world has changed?’) in response to land scarcity and declining 
agricultural productivity.  Husbands’ opposition and their appropriation of women’s 
income obstruct their wives’ adaptive strategies, reflecting Thornton et al’s 
observation that gender relations may constrain the flexibility required for successful 
adaptation (2007:462).  Nielsen and Reenberg (2010) also found that men are 
reluctant to allow their wives to earn income, which the authors characterise as a 
brake on adaptation to environmental and climatic change.  Although she eschews a 
climate change narrative, Bryceson (2002) argues that intrahousehold relations are 
being transformed all over rural Africa, linked to declines in income from male-
dominated cash crops and the increasing economic activity of wives and children.  
Intrahousehold relations, like other types of social relations, may be ‘fragile, 
contested and constraining’ (Cleaver, 2005: 898), and the stories here are snapshots 
of what may be a wide-ranging, long-term process. From disputes within households 
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I now move on to consider the potent force of envy and mistrust in the wider 
community.  
10.4 ‘They find a way to harm you’: Envy and mistrust 
There is a spectrum of antagonistic social relations in the village, comprising gossip, 
suspicion, fears of witchcraft practices and accusations of witchcraft, theft and 
robbery, false accusations of theft and defilement, extortion and crimes of physical 
violence.  I have already discussed some of these problems as threats to human 
security in Chapters 8 and 9.  In this section, I specifically consider how they affect 
people’s ability to cope with and adapt to environmental and economic change.  
In interviews and discussions a picture was painted of a community pervaded by 
envy, ill-will and mistrust, as in this example: 
Gregory N: extract from interview transcript  
Here, people are dishonest and they like gossiping. If you talk with someone 
just as we are talking, he will go and tell someone else and again he comes 
back to you to tell you what the other person said. This is what is disturbing 
the people in this area. 
Such an atmosphere has particular implications for enterprise.  The Gisu see 
themselves as entrepreneurial people, (Jenkins et al, 2010) and many interviewees 
spoke of their desire to set up some kind of microbusiness.  However, several 
villagers also identified envy as a deterrent, as in this rather startling statement from 
Edith K., a middle-aged widow:  
Edith K: summary from interview notes  
If she had any cash, she’d start buying and selling maize and tomatoes, or 
open a little shop.  But in this village, women don’t like each other and they 
would attack her in her house because of envy.  They would kill her, steal her 
property.  A man in [a neighbouring village] had his shop attacked, was 
robbed and injured.  People are worried that if you do well you might become 
richer than them.  For instance, if someone has cows, a neighbour might see 
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him or her selling the milk and think to himself: ‘How come they have cows 
and I don’t?’ 
Rose N. attributed the robbery and stabbing of a woman friend in March 2009 to 
‘envy’:  
Rose N: extract from interview transcript 
She was coming back from shopping.  It was because they saw her with the 
things and wanted to take them.  And because of that they hated her… if they 
know that you are better off than them, it becomes a cause of hatred.  It is 
from that point that somebody starts not greeting you, as if they have heard 
something bad about you.  They find a way to harm you.  
Other villagers said that the fear of theft and robbery deterred them from investing in 
livestock or accumulating household assets, although they did not link property 
crimes to envy:  
Milton W: extract from interview transcript 
They had two pigs, but they were stolen last November.  These days before 
someone thinks of buying a cow or pig he worries a lot because he could be 
throwing his money away, because thieves can easily steal this cow and pig.  
Edwin W: extract from interview notes 
With thieves, you can’t do anything developmental because you are worried 
that they will come and steal things. 
Stories of witchcraft were much rarer than stories of theft, which I attribute to 
villagers’ self-presentation as ‘modern’ people (Goffmann, 1969) or to fear of 
antagonising the ‘witch’.  However, in the next two extracts Jessica W. (the woman 
whose outhouses were burned down) and Dorcas K. both talk about envy as the 
motivation for witchcraft:  
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Jessica W: extract from interview transcript 
Sometimes our neighbours are bad: they never want to see you prosper. You 
might have bought a cow or a hen and when this hen moves around they kill 
it.  They know how to do it. You just see it changing... I had five hens and 
one day only three came back.  I found the other two dead among my sweet 
potato plants.  
Dorcas K: summary from interview notes 
Dorcas said that there was a lack of trust in the village, and now it is best to 
be independent and not rely on anyone else for assistance.  Envy and fear of 
witchcraft are rife.  She has been lucky, because none of her children have 
died.  Yet this very fact might expose her to jealousy.   
The risk of being accused of witchcraft was also mentioned occasionally, for instance 
by Elijah N., an elderly man living alone, and in passing during a women’s group 
discussion when a speaker mentioned such accusations as a reason for having to 
move to another area.  A few miles down the road towards Bubulo, I also had the 
disturbing experience of seeing a ‘witch’ being escorted to the police station while a 
crowd of young people danced and cheered around her.   
But while theft, witchcraft and envy were all mentioned as disincentives to economic 
activity, as far as businesses were concerned the risks of losing money through bad 
debt or cheating were higher. Earlier I quoted Gregory N., whose lineage uncle 
refused to lend him money to start a shop on the grounds that high levels of customer 
debt were bound to destroy the enterprise.  Wilfred T. described how unpaid debts 
can lead to conflict as well as financial loss:  
Wilfred T: extract from interview transcript 
If you give credit, it is a problem for they may end up not paying you back, 
and later your business will fail, as you will be just giving out money...And 
when you ask them for the money they owe, they may start a quarrel.  Also if 
people ask you for things on credit then take two months to pay, that will 
affect you, hence quarrels. 
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People who ran cafés also often encountered problems with customer credit, as Mr. 
Balungira explained: 
The risk with opening a hotel is that you might think that you are going to 
make money, but you can end up losing.  There are many people who tell you 
to give them food on credit and promise to pay tomorrow, but in most cases 
they do not pay, so you lack the money to buy food for the hotel the next day. 
This happened to the Bubufu man who ran the cafe in the parish trading centre where 
I and my research team sometimes ate lunch. In his case, he was cheated by the 
contractors widening the feeder road. 
To sum up this section, my evidence suggests that fear of envy, theft and bad debt 
discourages economic activity, asset accumulation, innovation and entrepreneurship 
in the village.  This is in line with findings by Dercon (2008), Fafchamps and Minten 
(2009), and Kebede and Zizzo (2011).  Dercon (2008) puts so-called ‘institutional 
issues’ like these at the very heart of his analysis of economic risk in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Envy is a powerful and widespread phenomenon.  Scott remarks in passing 
on ‘the abrasive force of gossip and envy’ in a typical village (1976:5), Platteau 
writes of ‘the incriminatory and jealousy-ridden atmosphere that pervades many 
African villages’ (2009:681) and Heald uses similarly strong language to describe 
envy in her study location (1998).  Homer-Dixon (1999:117) argues that levels of 
trust and reciprocity are crucial determinants of a society’s ‘ingenuity’ in dealing 
with threats, so the significance of envy in African rural lives carries important 
implications for the epistemic climate adaptation community, including the 
proponents of community-based adaptation (e.g. Ensor and Berger, 2009b).  
Despite envy’s potential to turn a villager’s best endeavours sour, some are trying to 
alleviate their poverty by working together.  In the next section I look at the 
phenomenon of self-help groups.   
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10.5 ‘You look for people who are trustworthy’: Associating for self-help  
According to the Community Development Officer for the sub-county, there were 55 
voluntary associations of one kind or another in the parish.  The oldest and best-
established is the Sikhana burial group, which helped to distribute relief items during 
the 1997 landslide crisis (Chapter 5).  Some of the other groups seemed to be quite 
new: for instance I heard of one which had been founded only a few months before I 
arrived to start my fieldwork, two of whose twelve members had already dropped 
out.  I now discuss some of the difficulties villagers faced in making such groups 
work for them, starting with an account of the Foundation for Credit and Community 
Assistance (FOCCAS), a non-governmental micro-credit organization that had a 
presence in the village for several years.   
FOCCAS 
FOCCAS ran several savings and credit groups in Bubufu between 1997 and 2004.  
It was based in Mbale, and although it was set up and run at first by US-based NGOs, 
it operated under entirely local management after 2002.  Based on several interviews, 
I pieced together the following story: 
Cuthbert J., Ernest M. and Mary M: summary from interview notes and 
transcripts  
Thirty people joined the FOCCAS group, but the field officer obtained loans 
for thirty-six people by adding six ‘ghost members’ to the list.  The villagers’ 
accounts of how this was done differed.  One woman, Mary M., said that the 
field officer had persuaded the villagers to connive with her in exchange for a 
share of the fake loans.  Other people maintained she had not told them about 
the fictitious members.  Whatever the truth on that point, everyone concurred 
that she stole the members’ savings.   
When the loans to the ghost members were not repaid, group members had 
their assets such as cows and even the tin sheets from their roofs confiscated.  
They lost their savings too, because FOCCAS rules stipulated that the whole 
group was liable for individual loan defaults.  The field officer was eventually 
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arrested in Mbale, but people in Bubufu later heard that she was not tried, 
which they assumed was because she had bribed the police officers.   
A participatory review of FOCCAS’s operations carried out in around 2003 indicates 
that the problems of officials manipulating records, being ‘slow to bank money’, 
recording ghost borrowers and embezzling group funds were by no means exclusive 
to Bubufu (Imp-Act, 2004).  In addition, LADDER researchers found that some 
FOCCAS members ran into difficulty because of the high interest rate (given as 12-
15% per annum) and a repayment period which, at 16 weeks, was much too short.  
As a result some borrowers were forced to sell land and livestock to repay their loan 
(Economic Policy Research Centre 2001a).  According to Dolan (2004:658), 
FOCCAS was more useful to better-off women than to the poorest. These same 
problems came up in Bubufu.  For instance, Albert N. argued that one reason that 
borrowers had not been able to repay their loans on time was because FOCCAS’ 
short repayment period did not allow for the fact that they had to extend credit to 
their customers, which the customers then took a long time to repay.   
After the embezzlement case, FOCCAS offered to help the villagers to start afresh 
with a new group.  Some people agreed, but only on condition that the group was 
managed by someone in their own community rather than an outsider.  What 
happened next was a second betrayal:   
Cuthbert J., Ernest M. and Mary M: summary from interview notes and 
transcripts  
One of the sub-county councillors, Mrs. G., was appointed treasurer of a 
ROSCA, only to claim some time later that the group funds had been stolen 
from her in an Mbale taxi park as she was taking them to the bank.  Members 
were suspicious, and when they heard that she had bought land and a cow in 
her natal village they were convinced that she had stolen the money herself.  
In Mary M.’s words, ‘those who were strong’ confronted her to demand their 
money back.  While these people did get their money reimbursed, members 
who did not dare to challenge her lost all their money.   
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Perhaps the passage of time had softened the pain of that double blow, or perhaps 
only the people whose own fingers had been burnt took the earlier lessons to heart.  
Either way, I was surprised to hear some villagers express enthusiasm about the idea 
of micro-credit schemes returning to the village.  For instance, three of the four 
groups who took part in PRA exercises identified micro-credit schemes as a way of 
helping them to overcome their poverty.  In an individual interview Heather N., who 
was too young to have been involved in the FOCCAS incident herself, claimed that it 
was the involvement of outsiders, and subsequently the poor choice of a leader from 
the village, that had caused the problems with FOCCAS:  
Heather N: extract from interview transcript 
When you are forming a group, you look for people who are 
trustworthy...When you set up a new group you do not invite the same people 
who ate the money the first  time, because they want you to contribute the 
money so that they can benefit. When you form another group you should be 
able to trust one another.  
Only Irene K., wife of the sub-county Vice Chairman, was pessimistic about the idea 
of a new micro-credit scheme. She argued that few borrowers would be able to repay 
their loans because of the difficulty of running profitable local businesses in a 
community already saturated with shops and bars.  
Whereas opinions about the usefulness of micro-credit schemes were mixed, several 
other types of voluntary association with the catch-all title of ‘friendship groups’ 
were already operating.  It was difficult to be sure how many such groups existed as 
some villagers did not know the name of the group they belonged to, but I counted 
seven or eight. Table 10.1 provides an overview of these voluntary associations and 
their main functions, based on evidence from the household survey. 
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Table 10.1: Voluntary associations operating in Bubufu  
 
Some of the self-help groups, notably the burial society, provided insurance directly 
to their members, while others did so indirectly by facilitating the development of 
social networks (Goldstein, 2005).  While such groups are generally ineffective at 
providing informal insurance against covariate shocks, they may offer ways of 
dealing with idiosyncratic shocks such as a death in the family (Dercon, 2005:5).  
Cuthbert J., an office-holder in two groups, and sub-county Vice Chairman Dennis 
W. were both clear that as collective responses to poverty and human insecurity, 
women’s friendship groups were a positive development in Bubufu:  
Cuthbert J: extract from interview transcript 
There have been a number of new groups and they have helped people to 
come together and cooperate when they have a problem. People in these 
groups advise each other on developmental issues, and when one of them gets 
Type of 
group  
Purpose  Functions and activities 
Burial 
groups 
 
To help members to give relatives a 
‘decent’ burial   
Members make regular contributions.  
When the relative of a member dies, 
members provide the shroud and food 
and water for the burial ceremony. 
Gift circles 
 
Enables members to save up for basic 
household goods and, in some cases, 
invest, for example in livestock.  Some 
groups link people from different 
villages. 
Members contribute between 
USh10,000 and 15,000 depending on 
the group.  Each member receives gifts 
in rotation, often household items such 
as cups and plates.  Members are 
mostly women.   
ROSCAs Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations enable members to make 
regular savings of small amounts and 
take out small loans  
Each member makes a monthly 
payment of say USh10,000 and 
receives a lump sum when their turn 
comes. 
Farmers’ 
groups 
Improving farming and income-
generation 
Members learn new farming 
techniques, try new crop varieties and 
learn new off-farm skills for income 
generation, e.g. making charcoal.  
Collective ownership of livestock. 
Youth 
groups 
 
Supporting income generation among 
younger male villagers 
‘Youth’ is deemed to include men of up 
to 30 and sometimes beyond.  
Emphasis on acquiring income-
generating skills e.g. block-laying and 
generating income through, for 
instance, collective ownership of 
livestock.  Members help each other 
with farming. 
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a problem they visit him and counsel him, and this has created unity among 
the people here. 
Dennis W: summary of interview transcript 
In the past there was nothing like women’s groups, but these days women 
have come together and are helping each other to support their families. This 
change has come about because these days many homes are poor and the only 
way they can improve their lives is by supporting each other. 
Both Cuthbert’s and Gregory’s comments present a scenario of villagers trying, 
perhaps slowly and painfully, to develop alternatives to individual responses to 
human insecurity.  While both emphasised the community cohesion that such groups 
could foster, Gregory N. took a narrowly instrumental point of view, concentrating 
on ROSCAs’ role of providing start-up capital for small businesses.  Although he 
spoke of ROSCAs in rather disparaging terms and compared them unfavourably with 
groups in other areas, even he could see that their popularity signalled villagers’ 
increasing willingness to overcome mutual distrust and cooperate with one another:   
Gregory N: extract from interview transcript  
The thing is that the people in these groups do not give each other much 
money, for instance USh500,000.  At most they give you USh150,000 to buy 
a calf, whereas you need about USh500,000 to ...to start a shop.  My wife 
used to be in one of those groups and all she ever got was USh50,000 to buy 
soap and a few things.  I have heard that in [nearby sub-counties] people in 
such groups give each other a good amount of money, unlike the groups in 
this area...They trust each other, whereas in our area people never wish 
anything good for other people, and they think if they give you a lot of money 
you will prosper.  They are not united, but they are gradually learning and 
they might change this attitude in future because they have begun copying 
what other people are doing. 
Not everyone in the village had the chance to join a Gift Circle or ROSCA.  One had 
to be invited, and villagers had learned from earlier failures of micro-credit 
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associations that members had to be selected carefully (interview with Ernest M.).  
The exclusion of poorer people, in particular poor women, has been highlighted as 
one of the weaknesses of micro-credit as a strategy for alleviating rural poverty (e.g. 
Cleaver, 2005).  Cleaver (2005) notes that, in her study area in Tanzania, it was 
common for the poorest villagers to scrape together contributions for a few months 
initially before dropping out, and I found examples of this in Bubufu too, such as 
Elizabeth N., a de facto female household head with an unsupportive husband.  
Another example was Ernest M: a combination of healthcare expenses and paying 
off his son’s defilement case meant he was struggling to pay his contributions to his 
ROSCA, and so would not be able to take out a loan.   
Some women also talked of being forbidden by husbands to participate in ROSCAs 
on the grounds that it impinged on the husband’s position as household head:   
Teresa J: extract from group discussion 
As women we are requesting government to give us some seeds or cows so 
that we can rear them and share the calves and develop.  But…government 
may give us these things as a group and when there comes a time for a 
meeting and you attend, your husband will ask you ‘You attended as who? 
Are you the only member?  Never attend again’. The man will therefore stop 
you, yet you never know, some of your friends in the group could have given 
you money to start up a business.  
Dorcas K. gave several reasons for not joining a self-help group including inability to 
pay the contributions, time poverty and gossip: 
 Dorcas K: extract from interview transcript 
She does not belong to any group because they request membership and 
registration fees which she cannot afford, and she would rather use the money 
to buy exercise books for her children. Also the members in this group are a 
mixture of ‘Born Agains’ and others, hence there is a lot of gossip and this 
has discouraged her. The other thing is that she is a busy person and fears that 
if she joins these groups and is appointed to the executive council it would 
increase the number of commitments she has. 
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Wakhongo (2008) also found that some husbands forbade their wives to get involved 
in community activities such as ROSCAs and that many other women could not get 
involved due to ‘multiple gender roles that consume most of their time’ (118).   
The reason most commonly put forward for leaving a group, or for not joining one in 
the first place, was the perceived corruption of leaders.  This problem came up 
several times during the initial household survey.  Besides the FOCCAS groups at 
least one other group had disbanded due to the disappearance of funds.  For instance 
the treasurer of one of the ROSCAs had died and the money the group had amassed 
was never seen again.  In a separate case, several people had been duped into paying 
fees to outsiders claiming to represent NGOs.  The sub-county Community 
Development Officer confirmed that professional confidence tricksters had operated 
in the area in the past, passing themselves off as NGO officials.  The fact that a few 
children in the village did receive limited and sporadic assistance from Compassion 
International, a Christian faith-based charity that works through child sponsorship, 
made it easier for them to fool people in this way.   
In the Ugandan region of Teso, Jones (2009) found that any ‘development’ in his 
study village tended to happen without government involvement.  Bubufu’s self-help 
groups are a good illustration of a community’s own efforts to ameliorate poverty, 
and an anecdote from Albert N. highlights the importance of autonomy.  The groups 
are encouraged to register with the sub-county administration so that officials can 
channel support through them during crises such as that in early 2010, but Albert N. 
recounted how registration had stultified a youth group he used to belong to:   
Albert N: extract from interview transcript 
The group was doing well, until we registered with the government.  They 
promised us assistance, so the members stopped doing the different activities 
and waited for government help, which never arrived.  
It is important to balance examples of failures and dishonesty by stressing that some 
self-help groups in the village appeared to function well.  Nevertheless, given the 
problems that have occurred it seems surprising that so many people in Bubufu were 
eager to join voluntary associations, especially as financial contributions are 
involved.  Things seem to have changed since the late 1990s, when residents of 
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Mbale District (which at that time included Manafwa District) scored dismally low 
on voluntarism and working together to solve community problems (Widner and 
Mundt, 1998).  If there indeed has been a change in attitude towards voluntary 
associations, one of the other findings of Widner and Mundt’s (ibid) survey may 
provide a clue as to why. Of the eight Ugandan districts surveyed, Mbale District 
also had the lowest proportion of respondents expressing high levels of optimism 
about their future well-being.  In other words, the willingness of Bubufu villagers to 
put time and money into a gift circle or a ROSCA despite the risks and difficulties, 
may well be a product of their dire poverty, lack of support from government 
agencies and their recognition of the inadequacy of individual solutions.  As Dennis 
W. said of women’s self-help groups, ‘the only way they can improve their lives is 
by supporting each other.’ 
10.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have considered different aspects of micro-level social relations and 
what they might mean for climate adaptive capacity.  The dark side of social 
relations has been prominent, but I have no wish to understate their positive aspects.  
Like Heald (1998), I found examples of good will and mutual assistance among kin, 
affines and neighbours.  Heald uses the term ‘pervasive dialectic’ (1998:7) to 
describe the duality she observed between trust and good will and their opposites, 
mistrust, envy and malice.  This is still a good way to describe social relations in 
Bubufu today; they are a matter of both light and shade; they may provide security 
and they may also threaten.  Social bonds and networks, while often providing 
support, cannot always be relied on at times of need and may become a source of 
trouble.  As for conjugal relations, while in some households spouses work together 
in others husbands see their wives’ livelihood activities as a challenge to their own 
authority.  Here, I see the dominant gender ideology as ‘sticky’ and dysfunctional, 
lagging behind economic and environmental changes because some of the power-
holders concerned see social change as inimical to their own structural positions.  
Moving outside the household, the envy, mistrust and the social friction they 
engender are pervasive and destructive features of rural life in sub-Saharan Africa.  It 
behoves climate change researchers, especially those interested in communal 
adaptation solutions, to pay more attention to these problems.  As environmental 
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scarcity often generates social friction (Homer-Dixon, 1999) they are by no means 
marginal issues.   
In Chapters 4 to 10 I have taken my cue from villagers’ subjective accounts of the 
risks, stresses and problems that affect them and how they deal with these.  My 
interest has been in the nature of human insecurity in the community and what it 
means for climate adaptive capacity.  The thesis’ table of contents may at first sight 
suggest that the chapters cover disparate issues that do not belong to the climate 
change discourse.  On the contrary, they are closely and dynamically interlinked and 
are critical to analyses of climate adaptivity.  In the next and final chapter I 
synthesise my overall argument, comment briefly on human security as an 
investigative framework for my study and discuss some of the methodological 
problems I faced. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusion 
 
11.1 Introduction 
In this thesis I have addressed the following research question: How important are 
climate threats (and by analogy, climate change) to human security in a rural African 
context of multiple risks, shocks and stresses, and what do the sociocultural aspects 
of current threats and responses imply for climate adaptive capacity?  I have done 
this through the study of a community affected by land scarcity and environmental 
degradation which is thus very exposed and sensitive to the impacts of destructive 
rainfall.  My research methods were based on interviews, group discussions and 
observation, and I have drawn on the literature, including ethnography, as a 
secondary source to help me to interpret the resulting data.  My analysis is structured 
around the concepts of human security and climate adaptive capacity.  I 
operationalised the concept of human security as the threats – to individuals 
themselves, their families and their community – of which study participants are 
aware.  I investigated their responses to these threats for the insights they provided 
into their generic adaptive capacity, with adaptation to future climate change in 
mind.  In this final chapter I review what has been achieved, drawing together the 
threads of my argument to define my distinctive contribution to scholarship on 
climate adaptation in development contexts.  I also comment on some of the 
strengths and weaknesses of my methodology.  
In section 11.2 I start to answer both the first and second parts of my main question 
by drawing out the implications of my findings regarding destructive rainfall and 
landslides, and how people try to cope with and adapt to these.  In Section 11.3 I pay 
particular attention to agency and the role of local government. Section 11.4 is 
oriented towards the first part of the question; I argue that micro-level, day-to-day 
social conflicts are important drivers of human insecurity and comment on why this 
tends to be overlooked in development and climate change academic discourses.  In 
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section 11.5 I conceptualise human insecurity as a cycle incorporating culturally-
inflected maladaptive responses, and restate the causalities and interconnections that 
I have discussed in previous chapters; this section addresses the second part of my 
question.  In section 11.6 I comment on my framing and methodology.  Finally, I 
encapsulate my contribution to scholarship on climate change in development 
contexts (section 11.7). 
11.2 Coping with and adapting to destructive rainfall: sociocultural 
dimensions  
It is clear from Chapters 4 and 5 that the impacts of destructive rainfall, among 
which I include landslides, are regarded as very serious threats by the majority of 
people in my case study village.  Broadly speaking, my findings are in line with 
those of Thomas et al (2007:318), who conclude from their study that concerns about 
the effects of climate change on rural African communities are ‘justified’.  The 
effects of destructive rainfall on food security in Bugisu have already been noted 
(Economic Policy Research Centre, 2001a-c), so my findings in this regard are not 
original.  On the other hand, I have come across no East African climate change 
studies that focus on destructive rainfall in highland regions as I have done here; it is 
more common to document the problem of drought.  Disaggregating the impacts of 
destructive rainfall on hillside communities (Chapter 4) helps to build understanding 
of the possible context-specific consequences of climate change, which are especially 
significant in the light of meteorological projections for East Africa (see 
Introduction).   
I have drawn attention to the ineffectiveness of efforts to control run-off and crop 
loss, and to how access to coping and adaptation measures is patterned by conjugal 
power relations as well as wealth status.  My evidence also indicates that de facto 
female household heads in particular are isolated from agricultural extension 
activities and social learning that might support agricultural adaptation.  Given 
women’s responsibility for producing food in SSA, these gender issues have long 
been identified as problems for farming efficiency as well as gender equity.  With a 
climate change perspective they take on additional significance because they show 
how effective agricultural adaptation can only occur if women farmers are fully 
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involved.  Traditional conjugal norms tend to work against wives’ off-farm and non-
farm adaptations, too, not least because some male household heads see them as 
threatening their own position.  Some aspects of Gisu gender ideology, such as the 
notion that the man owns the household and everything in it, can be characterised as 
counter-adaptive in relation to climate change.   
Local non-farm livelihood activities such as keeping shop and petty trading are 
generic adaptations to changing environmental, climatic and economic conditions.  
However they are inaccessible to the poorest members of the community, and the 
same gender barriers that apply to agricultural and off-farm adaptation also apply to 
these non-farm livelihood activities.  In addition they are individualistic and 
competitive, with a tendency to ‘beggar thy neighbour’ when too many people take 
them up.  Would-be micro-entrepreneurs also have to contend with envy and 
mistrust, which both inhibit and undermine local non-farm adaptation (Chapter 10).  
In short, these forms of adaptation suffer from some of the negative outcomes of 
Gisu individualism.  However, I have also drawn attention to how the norm of self-
reliance associated with Gisu individualism, especially for men, may impel and 
support coping and adaptation.   
Turning to the landslides that destructive rainfall can trigger, their effects on physical 
and food security are well documented in the disaster literature.  My analysis 
contributes insights into the way cultural norms shape gendered vulnerability, for 
instance through pressures on male household heads and the Gisu pattern of wives 
maintaining links with their natal villages.  Traditional beliefs about ancestral graves 
may or may not be significant in coping and adaptation in relation to climate-related 
disasters such as landslides: this is an area that cries out for further research building 
on recent work that looks at attachment to place as an influence on adaptation (e.g. 
Adger et al, 2011).    
Adaptation has to be culturally imaginable as well as practicable.  Weighing up the 
evidence in Chapters 4 and 5, adaptation may represent as much of a cultural 
challenge for the Gisu of Mount Elgon as for the Fulbe in Nielsen and Reenberg’s 
Burkina Faso study (2010) which I cited in Chapter 1.  While certain features of Gisu 
culture may be unique, in other ways – for instance in the matter of conjugal norms – 
it resembles many other traditional cultures in East Africa.  My insights into the 
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complex and ambiguous influences of Gisu culture on climate adaptation are useful 
both because they draw attention to this underemphasised aspect of adaptation and 
because they may be applicable to other traditional societies in the region that are 
similarly exposed to climate threats and environmental degradation.  In this way my 
analysis engages with cutting-edge debates on this topic (e.g. Cannon, 2008; Heyd 
and Brooks, 2009).  
11.3 Agency and governance 
My evidence has shown over and over again that many people are competent and 
tenacious in their efforts to adapt to deteriorating environmental conditions and more 
particularly, destructive rainfall and landslides.  Yet the El Niño event in 1997/1998 
has left a legacy of enduring human insecurity with affected villagers ill-equipped to 
deal with the El Niño event of 2009/2010, so what is happening illustrates Homer-
Dixon’s argument that the ability to cope with and adapt to environmental change is 
damaged by the very crises for which it is required (1999:26).  Thomas and Twyman 
(2005:116) criticise accounts of climate change that portray poor people as passive 
victims rather than active protagonists in their own stories, and my evidence also 
challenges such stereotypes by showing that extreme vulnerability can go hand in 
hand with vigorous agency.  It supports researchers who argue that much of the 
technical climate adaptation literature is complacent and unrealistic, obscuring 
extremely harsh realities (Orlove, 2009; Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010; Pelling, 
2011).  For instance, many people in Bubufu lack even the most basic resources, 
such as farm implements or seeds. 
Governance is a critical factor in individual adaptive capacity in my study area.  In 
its broadest sense, governance concerns the entirety of political and economic 
institutions, rules and relationships in a society (Leftwich, 1993).  However I want to 
focus here on local government and how Ugandan national government policies and 
orientations play out at the local level.  Jones (2009) makes a strong argument that 
the Ugandan state has in effect withdrawn from many rural areas, due to the national 
government’s reliance on donor funding and the consequent tendency for local 
government personnel to identify themselves with the regional capitals, where they 
have indirect access to such funding.  The sub-county chief in my study area was 
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often absent (Chapter 2), an observation which tends to support Jones’ 
characterisation of the Ugandan state as ‘withdrawn’ (2009:63).  On the other hand, 
the road-widening project, NARO’s activities and, above all, the new secondary 
school suggest that the state was more engaged in Bubufu than in the community 
analysed by Jones.  In particular, as an important official space for special events and 
celebrations, the new school represented stronger links to government institutions 
and actors (Chapter 2).   
It cannot be said, then, that the state was absent from Bubufu.  Rather, the point I 
want to make is that there was a tendency for government interventions to 
systematically bypass or even victimise poor people in the community.  The NAADS 
programme’s intentional targetting of better-off farmers, which reflected national 
development policy, is an example of deliberately marginalising poor people 
(Chapter 4).  The encroachment of the newly-widened road on farms and 
compounds, without any compensation, is an example of an authoritarianism that 
makes victims of poor people (Chapter 4).  I would also cite President Museveni’s 
scolding about ‘harassing nature’, delivered to the bereaved community after the 
Bududa landslide, as a vivid illustration of how Ugandan national government at the 
highest levels is antipathetic to poor people (Chapter 5).  With an adaptive capacity 
perspective, such hostility on the part of governance actors is likely to be very 
damaging.  
Having discussed some aspects of adaptive capacity in relation to destructive rainfall, 
I move on now to look at to other proximate sources of human insecurity.  
11.4 The fear of others: social conflicts as elements of human insecurity  
Apart from the impacts of destructive rainfall and landslides, many of the other 
threats that emerged as villagers’ priorities arise from conflicts of interest among 
differently-placed social actors and the ensuing tensions, contestations and conflicts.  
Heald (1998:132) writes of ‘the insecurity that comes from the fear of others’, and 
this type of insecurity appears frequently in my evidence.  Under this heading I 
include coercive unofficial healthcare charges (Chapter 6); male household heads’ 
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appropriation of household resources for personal use (Chapter 7);
15
 crime (Chapter 
8), and struggles around brideprice and defilement charges (Chapter 9).  These are 
not large-scale violent conflicts but everyday tensions and contestations, although 
they do sometimes erupt into violence.  They are concomitants of scarcity, and in 
some cases they are also manifestations of unequal power relations.  
Given that my study location is an extreme case of a community exposed to climatic 
and environmental change, the salience of socially-constructed threats like these is a 
striking and significant finding.  It throws doubt on the adequacy of strictly technical 
climate adaptation discourses, a point I pursue in section 11.4.  I have already 
remarked on the relative neglect of some of these issues in studies of rural 
development and climate change adaptation alike.  In the context of development 
economics, Platteau and Abraham identify ‘a widespread tendency to downplay the 
community imperfections that plague many rural societies’ (2002:104), which they 
link to the promotion of participatory approaches to development (Platteau and 
Abraham, 2002).  Cleaver (2005), on the other hand, links the understatement to the 
‘social capital’ discourse.  Participatory approaches to development, as well as the 
idea of social capital, incorporate community cohesion as a normative goal, so the 
divisive forces of envy and mistrust do not sit well in these narratives.  I also 
speculate that social tensions and the abuse of power at the micro-level may have 
low profiles in development scholarship because of a sense that such problems are 
not amenable to external interventions.   
11.5 Human insecurity as a maladaptive cycle  
My analysis depicts human insecurity as a vicious cycle of deteriorating conditions 
and maladaptive responses, many of which are mutually reinforcing.  While not the 
most important factor in the cycle, destructive rainfall feeds into it, helping to create 
food insecurity and poverty.  Other researchers use terms like ‘messy’ (Boko et al, 
2007:440) and ‘entangled crises’ (Casale et al, 2010:166) to capture the complexity 
and irreducibility of these interactions.  
                                                 
15
 I have acknowledged the co-constructive element of Chapter 7; it was my decision to privilege the 
gender dynamics of household food insecurity and poverty in that chapter.   
 
  
231 
The effects of destructive rainfall are dangerous partly because they are compounded 
by environmental degradation.  The proximate effects are; damaging run-off, soil 
erosion and landslides.  Environmental degradation is linked to land scarcity and 
rapid population growth; Uganda has one of the highest population growth rates in 
the world (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, 2011a).  This needs to be framed as a governance issue, because Uganda’s 
population increase is due in part to decisions made at the highest level of 
government.  For instance, Wakabi (2006) attributes it to deliberate policy on the part 
of President Museveni, based on his belief that a larger national population would 
expand markets and stimulate economic growth.  On another level, it is a gender 
equity issue, because Uganda has one of the highest rates of unmet family planning 
need in the world at 40.6 per cent (United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Population Division, 2011b).   
As I have argued in 11.3, the people of Bubufu also have to contend with a hostile 
institutional environment.  This means the community does not enjoy the governance 
conditions that might enable it to escape from its vicious cycle of human insecurity.  
In this it can be contrasted with Machakos in Kenya (Tiffen et al, 1994).  Rather than 
inevitably leading to environmental degradation and food insecurity, the evidence 
from this region indicates that rapid population growth can in fact promote 
sustainable environmental management and lead to higher per capita incomes.  
However the authors repeatedly point out that the Machakos success story depended 
on government policies and actions that supported agricultural intensification and put 
in place institutional and infrastructural frameworks that enabled farmers to access 
markets and sources of knowledge; it is a very different story from Bubufu’s. 
Acute land scarcity means that married women cannot produce enough subsistence 
food.  I have drawn on Sen’s cooperative conflict model of the household to argue 
that this diminishes their perceived contribution to the household (Chapter 6).  I have 
also made the case that land scarcity has weakened women’s breakdown position in 
marriage by making it harder for them to leave their husbands and make a living 
back in their natal villages.  Traditional gender norms that prevent married women 
from bolstering their bargaining position by earning money outside the home are yet 
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another factor in the decline of women’s intrahousehold status, according to my 
analysis.  I see this decline as central to the human insecurity cycle.   
Crime, false accusations, envy and mistrust can be seen as maladaptive responses to 
insecurity, in the sense that rather than alleviate the problems outlined above they 
exacerbate them for some, shifting insecurity around from one individual or 
household to another.  Distress sales of land to pay unofficial healthcare charges 
show how the abuse of power relations, in this case inside a governance institution, 
can increase poor people’s vulnerability to climate shocks and stresses.  In some 
cases even collective culturally-inflected strategies designed to protect human 
security are transformed into human security threats in themselves.  I have argued 
that this happened when money-lenders and corrupt policemen started to exploit the 
sniffer dog groups for personal gain (Chapter 8); the deliberate entrapment of young 
men with defilement charges is another case in point (Chapter 9).  
I commented above on the lack of attention to these problems in development 
discourses.  From a climate change perspective the downplaying of social 
antagonism and micro-level power relations is especially unhelpful, as social friction 
often accompanies environmental crises (Homer-Dixon, 1999).  Far from being 
trivial or marginal issues, I see micro-level social tensions and struggles as critical to 
adaptive capacity and my analysis challenges the tendency of some environmental 
and climate change researchers to relegate cultural and social issues to ‘context’ (e.g. 
O’Brien et al, 2009:24).   
One of the advantages of viewing human insecurity as an integrated whole, rather 
than as a conglomeration of separate issues, is that it facilitates the identification of 
indirect strategies for reducing climate vulnerability.  For example, my evidence 
indicates that addressing the problem of health sector corruption would be very 
effective for reducing climate vulnerability in many poor rural communities in 
Africa.  Indirect strategies such as this can be thought of as policy ‘pivot points’ 
(Southern Africa Vulnerability Initiative, 2004).  Such a policy would also qualify as 
a ‘no-regrets’ response to climate change: in other words it would deliver a synergy 
between development objectives and climate adaptation (Schipper and Pelling, 2006: 
Heltberg et al, 2009).  More fundamentally, given that rapid population growth is a 
major driver of human insecurity in the area, improving access to family planning 
  
233 
services is a development imperative that would also help to reduce climate 
vulnerability.  Again, this would count as a ‘no regrets’ strategy.    
11.6 Reflections on framework and methodology 
Did my use of human security as an investigative framework facilitate any 
theoretical insights?  Its holism enabled me to consider diverse and superficially 
unrelated issues together and brought their interconnections into clear view.  It also 
allowed me to take into account social dynamics and change related to material 
threats such as disasters and food insecurity.  The emphases on social identity 
(Truong et al, 2006) and social relations (Truong et al, 2006; Tadjbakhsh and 
Chenoy, 2007:109; Gasper, 2010) has facilitated a gender-sensitive analysis of 
discourses as well as of the structural positions of spouses, helping me to investigate 
gender issues such as pressures on masculinity on the one hand and the decline in 
women’s household bargaining power in the other.  Treating social relations as a 
referent of human security also brought the maladaptive behaviour of certain social 
actors to centre stage rather than excluding these dynamics from my analysis.  I do 
not claim, however, that only a human security framework can embrace any of these 
aspects of change.  In general I see the holism of the concept, rather than any of its 
specific constituents, as its main strength; it is more than the sum of its parts.   
Individual subjectivities, or in Gasper’s words, people’s ‘felt insecurities’ (2010:17), 
are a necessary starting point for an enquiry into human security, but they are an 
insufficient epistemic basis for such an enquiry by themselves.  In order to explain 
what I mean by this, I introduce the metaphor of journeys through threat landscapes. 
Journeys through threat landscapes: A metaphor  
Perhaps because of the way threat inheres in Bubufu’s topography, I find that the 
image of individuals moving through their own ‘threat landscapes’ is a useful way to 
think about difference and change in human security.  A landscape is a stretch of 
terrain seen from a single point of view, a construct rather than a realistic depiction, 
so it is subjective (Hirsch, 1995:2). Suppose each feature in a landscape represents a 
specific threat.  In a small community such as my study location, many villagers’ 
landscapes would be similar in the general lie of the land but there would be some 
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differences in both their physical features and the prominence of those features 
relative to one another.  Landscapes would also be peopled with human figures, some 
of them forbidding.  For one individual the threat from destructive rainfall might 
loom very large, whereas for another that same threat might be absent or dwarfed by 
something or someone else.  Physical landscapes are subject to change, and threat 
landscapes also change as individuals travel through them in time, sometimes 
colliding with other figures intent on their own journeys.   
This metaphor might strike some people as fanciful, but it has helped me to think 
through two problems that arise from a reliance on subjectivities as the sources of 
evidence.  The first problem is that, by definition, threat landscapes have limited 
horizons.  Macro- and even meso-level causal factors, as well as historical events and 
trends, tend to be hidden beyond horizons because most individuals perceive only 
proximate, contemporaneous and micro-level outcomes (Wisner et al, 2004:7).  This 
may have been why the historical trend of rapid population growth was so 
underrepresented in discussions and interviews, for instance. Climate change is an 
example of a global trend with geographically remote origins that lie beyond the ken 
of my study participants; no-one had heard of anthropogenic climate change or that 
increased rainfall was projected for the region.  Horizons, then, represent the 
cognitive limitations of individual threat landscapes.   
Moreover, some very serious dangers may not figure in threat landscapes even 
though they are indeed proximate, contemporaneous, and have clear micro-level 
outcomes.  This type of invisible threat may lie hidden underground because it is 
associated with doxa (Bourdieu, 1977).  In my study location one such apparently 
buried threat is maternal mortality and morbidity, which did not appear in women 
villagers’ priorities although objectively these risks are very high in Uganda.  I 
explain this omission with reference to Ardener’s theory of ‘muted groups’ (1975) 
which I have touched on in previous chapters.  According to this theory women may 
find it impossible to even formulate, let alone articulate, their gender-specific 
interests if the dominant masculine discourse does not accommodate them.  In my 
study location, HIV/AIDS seems to be another ‘buried threat’; I briefly speculated on 
the reasons for this in Chapter Six. 
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Despite the limitations of threat landscapes there is no doubt in my mind that 
individual subjectivities have to be the basis of enquiries into human security.  
However the usefulness of subjective accounts lies in providing an initial ‘sketch 
map’ of the main threats affecting a population and how these are socially 
differentiated.  Ideally this evidence can then be built on through more systematic 
study using in-depth qualitative research and complementary methods such as 
quantitative surveys.   
11.7 Final remarks  
What have I achieved?  My findings on climate impacts, coping and adaptation are 
applicable to many other locations in the East African highlands.  I have made a case 
that micro-level sociocultural dynamics are critical to climate adaptation in 
traditional African societies and I have drawn attention to how these dynamics may 
produce climate maladaptation, helping to move on a debate that is as yet 
underdeveloped.  The concept of climate maladaptation is relatively new, and as far 
as I am aware this is the first time it has been applied to micro-level social relations.  
I have also explicitly linked this kind of climate maladaptation to power relations, an 
appreciation of which is often missing in the climate change literature.  These 
insights could be used as starting points for research in other traditional African 
communities, and as sub-Saharan Africa is likely to be disproportionately affected by 
the impact of climate change (Boko et al, 2007) there is a clear need for such 
research.  Lastly, I have operationalised the idea of human security in micro-level 
field research concerning climate change, which is innovative, and offered some 
reflections on this experience. I hope this will pave the way for other researchers to 
conduct micro-level climate change adaptation research using a human security 
framework. 
My primary message is that climate adaptation scholarship would benefit from 
treating sociocultural dynamics as an integral part of the climate change problem 
rather than as an aspect of its context.  While acknowledging the limitations of my 
study, I put these ideas forward as original contributions to research on climate 
change adaptation in development contexts.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Article on climate change from Uganda’s Daily Monitor, 
Wednesday March 18
th
 2009 
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Appendix 2: Research questions about the study context 
 
Questions What information do I 
need? 
How can I obtain the information? 
Sampling frame and 
households:  What is the 
physical extent of the 
sampling frame?  How are 
households generally 
defined?  How many 
households are there in the 
study location?  What 
variations in household type 
are to be found in the study 
area?  What are the main 
ways in which households in 
the location differ from one 
another (apart from by 
wealth)? 
Boundaries of the two 
LC1s 
Do local people define 
households as co-
residential or extended 
units? 
Number of households 
Types of household (e.g. 
male-headed, female-
headed, adults living 
alone) 
Transect walk with key informants e.g. 
LC1 chairmen  
Household survey  
Ethnographic literature 
 
 
What are the characteristics 
of local gender relations?   
Sociocultural norms 
regarding:  intra-household 
decision-making;  control 
of income streams within 
households;    
the gendered division of 
labour;   access to 
resources and physical 
mobility   
Ethnographic literature 
Recent studies\survey 
Interviews with key informants, e.g. 
Community Development Officer  
Observation 
Semi-structured interviews  
Focus group discussions 
How do women and men in 
this locality make and 
safeguard their livings?   
What is the range of 
livelihood activities 
available to men and to 
women?   
Which types of work can 
men and women do and 
not do? 
Semi-structured interviews  
Focus group discussions 
Secondary literature 
Key informant interviews with village 
chairmen and local government officials   
Transect walks and observation 
What is the farm production 
system?   
 
Crops grown, and by 
whom 
Livestock  
Balance between 
subsistence and 
crops/vegetables grown for 
sale 
Seasonal crop choices 
Transect walks and observation 
Secondary data  
Key informant interviews with District and 
Sub-county Natural Resources Officers and 
Community Development Officers  
Semi-structured interviews  
What type of weather shocks 
and stresses have affected the 
study location in recent 
years, and what have their 
impacts been?   
 
Instances of drought, 
destructive rainfall, or 
other weather shocks and 
stresses, and their impacts 
Key informant interview with District 
Natural Resources Officers  
Semi-structured interviews  
Secondary data:  Meteorological studies;  
National Adaptation Programmes of 
Action;  NGO reports 
What climatic trends do 
meteorologists predict for 
this area?    
Recent climate scenarios 
for East Africa 
Meteorological literature 
Appendix Table A2: Research questions about the study context
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Appendix 3: Details of fieldwork methods 
1. Personnel and training 
Mr Balungira conducted semi-structured interviews with men while I interviewed 
women, working with a female assistant who translated from English into Lugisu and 
back.  I employed several other assistants: two people to translate and transcribe 
interviews; several villagers who acted as ‘fixers’, for instance arranging interviews 
for us; and a local woman who helped us to conduct the household enumeration 
survey.  I soon realised that the local assistants attracted resentment and malicious 
gossip from some of the other villagers because of the payments I gave them.  This 
was an early lesson in the corrosive power of envy in the community (Chapter 8).  
After two half-days spent training the assistants in a classroom situation I conducted 
several pilot semi-structured interviews in Bubufu with the assistants observing and 
translating.  My assistants then conducted some interviews themselves with me 
observing, and then I gave them feedback.  We then carried out ten pilot interviews 
together before starting the main phase of individual interviews. 
2. Observation 
Observation was a valuable technique during all phases of the fieldwork.  For 
instance, it enabled me to see for myself the effects of heavy rain and some of the 
coping measures that people were using. 
3. Key informant interviews 
Two district and two sub-county officials and the two village chairmen were 
interviewed at the start of the main fieldwork phase to collect general information 
about trends, issues and events affecting the community.  These interviews oriented 
me to local government discourses.  In addition, a total of 29 villagers – 9 women 
and 11 men – were interviewed with the same aim.  These were mainly older men 
and women, but I included some younger people as key informants in order to make 
sure that their viewpoint was represented.  These interviews also served to introduce 
myself and my research to the community, although I was careful not to reveal my 
particular interest in weather shocks and stresses.   
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4. Household enumeration survey 
The household enumeration survey took three weeks; training was provided to the 
team beforehand.  The aim was to establish a sampling frame.  Each separate 
household was counted and information on household members, the marital status of 
the household head, size of land-holdings, livestock ownership and livelihood 
activities was also collected.   
5. Participatory rural analysis techniques 
I used participatory rural analysis (PRA) techniques at two stages.  First, a 
participatory wealth-ranking exercise was conducted.  Separate groups of three men 
and four women ranked all the households in the village into wealth categories 
according to their own criteria.  Both groups did this very quickly and confidently, 
the women dividing households into five categories and the men four.  Because of 
the small numbers in the ‘better-off’ categories I then asked both groups to collapse 
these five categories into three, which they again accomplished very quickly, 
combining the top two and then combining the bottom two together.  
While there was a high degree of consensus between the men and women’s wealth 
rankings, I found on comparing them that 22 households had been assigned to 
different ranks.  These disagreements were resolved at a third short meeting with one 
woman and one man who had both participated in the first stage.  It turned out that 
most of the discrepancies were due to the women not knowing as much as the men 
about male household heads’ assets, although in three cases the disparities were due 
to mistaking the household in question for another one.  The end result was a 
composite of the men’s and women’s wealth ranking in three categories.  The 
following table shows the criteria used in the ranking exercise and the numbers of 
households falling into each category; traces of the original five categories can still 
be seen in the definitions.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
240 
Wealth 
category 
Definition Number of 
households  
1 Salaried government workers (all teachers).   
Men who own ‘a lot’ of land and cows and have their adult children working 
for them.   
Businessmen and farmers who sell a lot of food crops, and perhaps also buy and 
sell coffee. 
13 
2 Farmers who often sell produce at the market and so have some cash, but who 
have less land than farmers in wealth rank 1. 
38 
3 Farmers who mostly have to rent land and/or do casual farm labour for other 
people.  May have a small plot on which their house is built.  They have a few 
coffee stems, some plantain trees and cassava, but all on a small scale.   
People who lost their land to landslides in 1997, including the young unmarried 
men in these landless households.   
Elderly people, including widows and widowers, whose sons may have gone to 
Kenya to work and do not send remittances.  Despite their age, some do 
seasonal casual farm labour for other people.  
111 
TOTAL  162 
Appendix Table A3: Table of wealth ranks 
 
As well as using PRA for the wealth ranking, towards the end of the fieldwork I held 
four group discussions where I used two basic PRA techniques, brainstorming and 
ranking to investigate perceived threats.  The four groups were organised as follows: 
women from wealth ranks 1 and 2; women from wealth rank 3; men from wealth 
ranks 1 and 2; men from wealth rank 3. Each group contained 10-12 individuals.  I 
also asked participants of these groups to identify and prioritise the type of 
government interventions that would help them to deal with these threats, although I 
stressed that I had no influence over the government in the matter.  In general PRA is 
useful for obtaining consensual views on a topic, and these methods complemented 
the semi-structured interviews and the focus group discussions.  None of the people 
taking part in these exercises were interviewed individually, and one of my 
objectives was to increase the number of villagers who took part in the study.  The 
participants were all married adults.  
6. Semi-structured interviews  
Individual interviews were essential, given that I wanted to explore social variation.  
They also allowed participants to discuss sensitive issues that they might have been 
reluctant to air in a group situation, and it meant that the views of shyer, less 
dominant personalities were not drowned out.  
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Using a semi-structured format had two important advantages over a questionnaire.  
As well as focusing on specific topics, interviewers could allow new issues to 
emerge; it also facilitated exploration and probing.  It was more appropriate to my 
research aims than a completely unstructured interview format because the checklist 
of topics enabled some comparability among interviewees (Bryman 2008:462). 
After a few minutes of introduction and after providing basic information about 
themselves the interviewees were asked to give their views on ‘the bad things that 
could happen to you as a person, to people of your home or in this area’.  
Questioning was open-ended in order not to bias interviewees towards talking about 
weather shocks and stresses;  my assistant and I did not mention weather shocks and 
stresses unless the interviewee did so first.  Interviewees were then asked about how 
they might protect themselves from the threats they had identified.  See Appendix 4 
for the semi-structured interview guidelines. 
7. Group discussions  
Group discussions are useful for eliciting normative discourse and can be viewed as 
group ‘performances’ (Alasuutari et al, 2008).  I used them to explore, among other 
things, local discourses on gender relations, in particular around threats that had 
already emerged as priorities in the semi-structured interviews.  Two discussions 
were held with a group of nine women and one was held with a group of seven men.  
Except for one young woman, none of them had taken part in the semi-structured 
interviews, although some had been interviewed as key informants.  The participants 
were selected because they had been cooperative, confident and articulate in previous 
encounters.  These group discussions turned out to be one of my best sources of data, 
in my view because of these qualities on the part of the participants.   
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Appendix 4:  Guide for semi-structured interviews  
1. Introduction 
Introduce the interview topics and ask if interviewee has any questions or concerns.  
General discussion, e.g. of livelihoods within the household, number and ages of 
children etc. 
 2. Threat perceptions 
Introduce topic of risk.  Ask interviewee to talk about what risks they confront in 
their own lives, and risks that they perceive as threatening other household members.  
Use this Lugisu translation: 
‘Bibindu bibi binyala bya byakhukwaho iwe ngo umundu, oba khubandu be mungo 
mwowo oba mu shitsinsa shi?’ [What bad things that could happen to you as a 
person, to people of your home or in this area?] 
Accept current stresses or other problems.  Try to identify the priority risks for this 
person, and the reasons behind their priorities. 
Which of the threats mentioned worries the interviewee most?  Why?   
3. Responses 
What action can the interviewee take against the various threats s/he mentioned?  
Discuss responses mentioned.  If any obvious responses are not mentioned, probe 
why not.  Encourage interviewees to talk about the reasons for their answers.  
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Appendix 5: Sample segments and numbers of people in each  
Sampling categories Number of people  
in category 
De jure female household heads  4 
De facto female household heads  6 
Wife with husband in wealth rank 1 3 
Wife with husband in wealth rank 2 4 
Wife with husband in wealth rank 3 6 
Young unmarried women in wealth rank 1 3 
Young unmarried women in wealth rank 2 0 
Young unmarried women in wealth rank 3 3 
Sub-total females  29 
MALES 
Previously-married men living alone  4 
Married man in wealth rank 1  3 
Married man in wealth rank 2 5 
Married man in wealth rank 3 8 
Young unmarried men (fathers in wealth rank 1) 1 
Young unmarried men (fathers in wealth rank 2) 4 
Young unmarried men (fathers in wealth rank 3) 4 
Sub-total males 29 
Total  58 
Appendix Table A5: Sample segments and numbers of people in each 
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Appendix 6: Initial semi-structured interview sample showing household 
relationships linking interviewees 
Pseudonym Spouse 
Son or male 
kin aged 18+  
Daughter or female kin 
aged 18+ 
Wealth Rank 1 Households 
Gertrude N     
James L. Lorna K.   Esther B. 
 
Clara N. Peter M. Harriet W. 
 Samson N    
 Maggie B.   Elspeth B. 
Noel M. Jessica W.    
Wealth Rank 2 Households 
Richard M  Jennifer N   
Emmanuel W.  Abner W.   
Milton W. Julia N.   
Benjamin F.  Josephine K.   
 
Dorcas K. Martin K.  
Catherine N. (de facto FHH)    
Sandra N. (de  facto FHH)    
 
 Ben M.  
 
 Richard W.  
 
 Steven W.   
Wealth Rank 3 Households 
Harold B.    
Sam K. Rachel N.   
Ezra K. Esther N.  Heather N. (Ezra K.’s niece) 
Anthony M. Lydia M.   
Gregory N.    
Patrick M. Ida N.   
Agnes M.  Jason K   
Cuthbert W.   Nyree M   
Anthony M. Lydia M.   
Elizabeth N. (de facto FHH)    
 
 Conrad B.  
 
 Samwiri W.   
 
 Joshua W.  
Wilfred T. Rose N.    
Men living alone 
John M    
Elijah N.    
Fred W.     
 Paul M.    
Widows 
Alice B.    Grace N. (Granddaughter) 
Belinda M    
Florence K.    
Penelope K. 
Bridget M. (Daughter of 
Penelope K. and mother of 
Gerald K.) 
Gerald K. Caroline K.  
Appendix Table A6: Initial semi-structured interview sample showing household 
relationships linking interviewees 
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Appendix 7: Drawing of a typical Gisu household by a Mbale sign-maker 
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Appendix 8: Comments on data in Table 4.2 (Chapter 4) 
For the sake of consistency, harvest information is restricted to beans and maize, as 
not all farmers gave information for other crops such as matoke, horticultural 
produce or coffee.  However, I have included information in the table on weather-
related damage to other crops, as this information was available from all the farmers 
interviewed.  Where harvest estimates of other crops were given they tended to be 
small: groundnut and coffee bean harvests were usually estimated in terms of the 
number of basins they filled rather than in 100-kilogram bags, for instance.   
The reported estimates of both acreage and harvests need to be read critically, due 
both to their vagueness in some cases and to the fact that some or all of them may be 
deliberate underestimates.  Writing of her fieldwork experience during the 1960s, La 
Fontaine generalises that the Gisu did not allow either their landholdings or their 
harvests to be measured (1962:97).  With regard to Table 4.2 I find it hard to believe 
that Samson N., (Number 22) with his 8 acres, harvested only 100 kilograms of 
beans, the same amount as Catherine N. (Number 23) with her 1-acre plot.  Samson 
had one of the largest landholdings in Bubufu, but I was told by participants in the 
wealth-ranking exercise that he was a ‘miser’ (the English word was used) who kept 
himself to himself and disguised the extent of his wealth, for instance by habitually 
dressing in tattered clothes.  I have kept him in the table because his comments on 
crop loss from rain and the measures he took to control it have the ring of truth, and 
he would have nothing to gain by distorting that information.  Samson aside, other 
people may have underreported landholdings and harvests from a wish to represent 
themselves as deserving recipients of assistance.  For instance, when I talked to 
Sandra N. (no. 15 in the table) in 2009 I noticed a tendency to exaggerate the 
difficulty of her circumstances, so when she told Joshua the following year that she 
had only harvested 12 kilograms of beans the first season she may have deliberately 
understated the amount.  Nevertheless, even after allowances are made for 
underestimation, some of the harvests seem very low indeed, for instance a meagre 
16 kilograms for John M. (no. 7).   
On the other hand, the estimates of acreage given in 2010 are generally higher than 
those given during the initial household survey.  That may be because Mr. Balungira 
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enquired about rented and borrowed land as well as land owned.  It might also 
indicate increased trust following our presence in the village for several months in 
2009.  Another way of cross-checking is to compare what wives and husbands said 
when interviewed separately, and in all cases shown in the table the estimates of 
garden size given by husbands and wives concur.  Also they broadly reflect the 
severe land shortage that characterises the area (Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003), which I 
highlighted as an ongoing stressor in Chapter 3.   
The table shows some widely differing harvests, even where the exposure of the land 
to weather shocks and stresses might be expected to be similar.  For instance, Patrick 
N. said he usually got a better bean harvest in the second season because his gardens 
were on steep slopes and ‘the sun had warmed the soil’.  What Gregory N. said was 
completely at odds with this; he said he could not grow beans on his upper slope 
garden at all because of too much sunlight.  In this case the difference may be due to 
micro-climatic factors arising from orientation, or it might reflect different attitudes 
to risk on the part of these two farmers.  Such inconsistencies might also arise from 
non-weather-related constraints to productivity.  
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Appendix 9: Perceived advantages and disadvantages of eucalyptus cultivation  
Advantages  
Resilient in run-off and floods 
Fast-growing: can be sold within six years 
Ready local market for timber, for use as firewood and as building material; useful cash-crop   
Provides firewood for own use   
The trees soak up excess water on flooded land 
The trees act as wind-breaks, protecting property and crops 
The trees are harder to steal than food crops (see Chapter 8)   
Disadvantages  
Cannot be grown next to food crops as they soak up water in the soil 
Cost of seedlings prohibitive for some farmers 
Impractical on small landholdings because they take up space needed for food crops 
Can cause storm-damage to buildings if planted too close  
Appendix Table A9: Perceived advantages and disadvantages of eucalyptus cultivation  
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Appendix 10: Copy of letter from parish chief to sub-county chief on landslide 
risk (copied by Mr. Balungira) 
 
Office of the parish chief, [name removed} 
28/2/2010. 
 
 The Sub county chief, [name removed] Sub County. 
 
Dear Sir, 
REF: Report about the expected landslide in the parishes of [names removed] 
 
This is to furnish the above report to your office concerning the expected above 
catastrophe. The situation might become disastrous on the lives and properties of the 
residents in case the soils were washed down and the villages to be affected would be 
[names removed]. The purpose of this report therefore is to draw your urgent action 
as there is already evidence on the ground to mention; cracks and 3 and ½ metres of 
soil have been pushed downhill(submerged). 
Prepared by: 
 
[name removed], Parish chief. 
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